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In this Article, Professor Lee argues that the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought by foreign states against States alleging violations of treaties of the United States.
The basisfor nonimmunity is a peacekeeping theory of ratification consent:
Just as, by ratifyingthe Constitution, the States agreed to suits by other States
and the national sovereign to ensure domestic peace, they agreed to suits by
foreign states in the supreme national tribunalfor the sake of international
peace. The Founders of the new Republic viewed state breach of the 1783
Treaty of Peace as the leadingpotential cause for a shooting or trade war.
The Article's thesis is supported by the text of Article III as amended by
the Eleventh Amendment and by evidence of original intent, including the
inauguralimplementation of the OriginalJurisdiction Clause by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nor is it inconsistent with the principle of sovereign dignity
for the semisovereign States to be sued by fully sovereign foreign states in the
Supreme Court. Justices of the Court throughout the nineteenth and the first
quarter of the twentieth centuries acknowledged this aspect of the Court's
originaljurisdiction,but awareness was lost by the time of the 1934 decision
in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi when the Republic had become a
world power. Reclaiming the Court's lost jurisdiction today requires a narrowing of that decision, but makes sense given the resurgence of American
federalism and the pace of globalization.
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A foreign citizen or subject cannot sue a State, but a foreign
sovereign, as, for instance, the Queen of England, may bring a
suit against the State of Massachusetts, or any other State in the
Union, in the Supreme Court of the United States.... I once
advised [in 1860] a representative of the Queen (the Governor
General of Canada) that such a suit might be brought to ascertain the liability of the State of New York to certain tribes of
Indians settled in Canada. There were obvious reasons why the
Queen, at that time, should not become a suitor in our Supreme
Court. But the time may come when such a suit may be
brought.
-Former

Associate Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, 18801
INTRODUCTION

For all that has been said and written about the institution of the
Supreme Court of the United States, its original jurisdiction remains
something of a mystery. The Original Jurisdiction Clause of the Constitution states: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. '2 The modem Court's original docket is
comprised almost entirely of controversies between States, 3 which are the
only category of the Court's original jurisdiction that Congress has de1. Benjamin Robbins Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar Jurisprudence of the
Courts of the United States 18 & n.3 (George Ticknor Curtis & Benjamin R. Curtis eds.,
1880) [hereinafter Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar Jurisprudence]. Justice
Curtis, appointed to the Supreme Court in 1851 by President Millard Fillmore, resigned
from the Court in 1857 after its decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856), and represented President AndrewJohnson in his impeachment trial. See Richard
Y. Funston, Curtis, Benjamin Robbins, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of
the United States 211, 212 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992). A man of extraordinary
intellect, Curtis was a leading lawyer of his day, and, despite his short tenure as Associate
Justice, the eyecatching rigor, craftsmanship, and decency of his opinions mark him as
among the very best jurists of the nineteenth-century Court. While in private practice, he
was retained as counsel by Great Britain in 1860 in a matter concerning the payment of
annuities by the State of New York to Cayuga Indians residing in Canada. See 1 A Memoir
of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D. 283-84 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879) [hereinafter
Memoir of Benjamin Curtis].
2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
3. See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., DanielJ. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 279-80 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Hart &
Wechsler]. To avoid a source of confusion endemic to writing in this area, and in accord
with current Supreme Court practice, "State" is capitalized when referring to one of the
United States in a nominal form, and the lower case is used in referring to "foreign state"
or the state as a political theoretical concept, for example, "sovereign state," or when the
word is used as an adjective, for example, "state sovereign immunity" or "state court."
Contrary capitalization in original text has not been altered. I prefer this convention to
the otherwise sensible workaround of substitution, e.g., "foreign nation" for "foreign state,"
because it is faithful to usage in Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and international
law, and because it conveys the complicating affinity between the concepts of an American
State and the foreign state as they were understood at the time of the founding.
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clared to be exclusive. 4 It is well settled that a State has no sovereign
immunity in a suit by another State, and so it may be sued in the Court
without its consent. 5 The United States may also sue a State without con8
7
sent,6 although Congress has consigned, and the Court has endorsed,
concurrent jurisdiction over such suits to federal district courts. Even
within the exclusive category of suits between States, the Court has
claimed discretion in choosing the cases it will hear. 9
The thesis of this Article is that the Constitution also vests in the
Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits against States
brought by foreign states alleging violation of ratified treaties of the
United States. The basis for nonimmunity in suits by foreign states is the
same peacekeeping theory of ratification consent that is presumed tojustify suits against States by other States or the United States. 10 Just as the
States, by ratifying the Constitution, agreed to suits in the national court
by other States and the national sovereign to ensure domestic peace, they
agreed to suits by foreign states in the supreme national tribunal-situated as an intermediary between semisovereign States and fully sovereign
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) ("The Supreme Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.").
5. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982) ("Because the State
of Colorado has a substantial interest in the outcome of this suit, New Mexico may not
invoke its Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal actions by citizens of another
State."); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action
between two States only violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually
suing to recover for injuries to specific individuals."); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83
(1907) (The Eleventh Amendment "refers only to suits and actions by individuals, leaving
undisturbed the jurisdiction over suits or actions by one State against another.").
6. See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 271 n.4 (2001); United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) ("[N]othing in ... the Constitution prevents or has
ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States.");
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 701-02 (1950) (denying Louisiana's claim of
sovereign immunity in original action by the United States); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 642 (1892) (holding that the Supreme Court "has original jurisdiction of a suit by
the United States against a State").
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) ("The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of. . . [a]ll controversies between the United States and a State.").
8. See United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 537 (1973) (approving Congress's
provision for concurrent jurisdiction in controversies between the United States and a
State).
9. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990, 990 (1988) (denying Louisiana
leave to file complaint against Mississippi in boundary dispute); California v. West Virginia,
454 U.S. 1027, 1027 (1981) (denying leave to file complaint arising out of an alleged
breach of contract covering athletic contests between two state universities); Arizona v.
New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797-98 (1976) (per curiam) (denying Arizona leave to file an
original action alleging unconstitutionality of a New Mexico energy tax where an action
was pending in state court); cf. Ohio v. Wynadotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 499 (1971)
(denying Ohio leave to file original action in a suit of nonexclusive jurisdiction). But see
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 560-61, 576 (1985)
(criticizing the modern Court's policy of discretionary denial of leave to file in original
actions over which it has exclusive jurisdiction).
10. See infra Part II.C.
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foreign states-for the sake of international peace. Ratification consent
to suit by foreign states was different from consent to suit by other States
because it did not guarantee a State the reciprocal right to sue a foreign
state in the Supreme Court or in the foreign sovereign's courts, but in
this regard it was similar to the States' constitutional bargain vis-:1-vis the
United States, which also did not give the States a reciprocal right to sue
the United States."'
There was, however, an additional feature of nonreciprocity. While a
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States would bind a State or
the United States under the Supremacy Clause,1 2 there was some question whether it would bind the foreign state as a matter of international
law. Certainly, it would be unlikely that a foreign state that had elected to
bring suit in the Court would wage war or break relations over an adverse
decision, but there was no specific rule under late eighteenth-century international law compelling a sovereign to abide by the decision of another sovereign's national tribunal, no matter its international function.
The Court's function was thus one of a "quasi-international" 13 tribunal
not only in the sense that it was a national tribunal performing an international function that involved a subnational, semisovereign American
State on one side, but also in the sense of the national, rather than international, legal effect of its decision. The acute danger to the young, weak
Republic's trade and peace posed by individual state defections from U.S.
11. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) ("It does not follow
that because a State may be sued by the United States without its consent, therefore the
United States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public policy forbids that
conclusion."); cf. Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States,
98 Mich. L. Rev. 92, 111 (1999) (articulating reciprocity rationale for ratification consent
by States to suits by the United States and other States).
12. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.
13. Justice Holmes appears to have been the first to coin this term, but in reference to
the Court's role in resolving disputes between States:
The case is to be considered in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a
quasi-international controversy, remembering that there is no municipal code
governing the matter, and that this court may be called on to adjust differences
that cannot be dealt with by Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either
State alone.
Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125,
146-47 (1902) (Fuller, C.J.) ("Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic
tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand.... ."); Herbert A. Smith, The American Supreme Court as an
International Tribunal, at iii (1920) (using the tide to describe the Court's function in
resolving State-versus-State controversies as a model for truly international tribunals). The
adjective seems equally, if not more, apt to characterize the Court's role as an American
national tribunal in the adjudication of international disputes between a fully sovereign
foreign state and a subnational, semisovereign American State.
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treaties in the late eighteenth century 14 inspired the Framers to vest the
Supreme Court with this original jurisdiction despite the possible lack of
reciprocity. It is no coincidence, then, that the jurisdiction was universally affirmed by distinguished Supreme Courtjustices from the founding
through the first quarter of the twentieth century.15 It was only in 1934,
when the great-power status of the United States in the world balance was
incontestable, that the reasons for the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction over treaty-based suits brought by foreign states against States
were completely forgotten.
Reclaiming the Court's lost jurisdiction today would require only
one departure from existing statutes and precedents. Although there is
presently no statute conferring original jurisdiction on the Court for suits
by foreign states, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction has long been
presumed to be self-executing. 16 And although the Court has indicated
that other aspects of its original jurisdiction are not exclusive as a constitutional matter, 17 it has never said that any original jurisdiction it might
have over suits against States by foreign states is not exclusive,
Moreover, because Congress has not enacted any statute specifically assigning
original jurisdiction to federal district courts in suits by foreign states
against States, no revision of the judicial code would be necessary. 19 Nor
is it the aim of this Article to criticize the Court's precedents affording it
some degree of discretion in deciding whether to hear an original action
committed to its exclusive cognizance. 20 Indeed, discretion in granting
leave to file an original action exercised consistently with Article III standards may prove a useful screen to ensure that foreign states have reason14. See infra note 291 and text accompanying note 292.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 74 (1860) ("The judicial
power, so far as [the Court's original] jurisdiction . . . is concerned, is vested by the
Constitution; it would neither remain dormant, nor would it expire, though the Legislative
power had never passed a law to authorize certain processes to assert such jurisdiction.").
17. See, e.g., Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 465 (1884) ("[T]he original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court was made concurrent with any other court to which jurisdiction might
be given in suits between a State and citizens of other States or aliens."); Brs v. Preston,
111 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1884) ("[T]he original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a
consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive .
").
18. The Court has also never said that its original jurisdiction over suits between States
may be concurrently vested. The issue has never come up because there has always been a
statute providing for exclusive original jurisdiction in the Court over controversies between
two or more States.
19. The diversity statute extends original jurisdiction of civil actions exceeding the
amount in controversy between "a foreign state ... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of
different States" but not the States themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (4) (2000). However, a
suit by a foreign state against a State arising under treaty law, which is the focus of this
Article, would fall within the scope of the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, which would accordingly have to be construed not to apply to those suits in order
to effectuate the exclusivity of the Court's original jurisdiction.
20. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1771

ably exhausted diplomatic and other methods of resolution before invok21
ing the Court's jurisdiction to decide a U.S. treaty dispute with a State.
The only doctrinal obstacle to jurisdiction is the Supreme Court's
decision in Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi, in which the Court denied
Monaco leave to file an original action on the ground of state sovereign
immunity. 22 The Monaco decision, which members of the present Court
have recently questioned, 23 is, in my view, without basis in constitutional
text or original intent. Article III extends federal judicial power to controversies between a State and "foreign States, Citizens or Subjects, '24 but
the Eleventh Amendment forecloses only suits against States "by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." 25 And the historical evidence, as this
Article will demonstrate, confirms that the States gave ratification consent
to suits in the Supreme Court by foreign states on U.S. treaty claims as a
peacekeeping, war-avoidance mechanism. If the Framers intended the
resolution of controversies in which a foreign state alleged that a State
21. See infra text accompanying notes 192-194.
22. 292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 507-512.
24. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
25. Id. amend. XI. The textual and originalist argument against Monaco was
previewed in an earlier article, which argued generally for a literal interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment based on contemporaneous international law principles of
sovereign equality and dignity. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1027, 1088-92
(2002) [hereinafter Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment]. Given the strong
textual argument against its holding, it is surprising that the Monaco decision attracted no
specific, detailed attack-that is, one condemning its unique deviation as opposed to the
general evolution of state sovereign immunity-until 2002. In the last two years, however,
more scholars have noted that Monaco seems a particularly indefensible extension of state
sovereign immunity in terms of text and principle. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, States as
Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1, 36 n.162, 70 n.293 (2003)
(citing Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra, at 1096-97, 1082-92, for
the "argument that Monaco was incorrectly decided"); Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1492, 1575 (2004)
("Under Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, states are immune from suits brought by
foreign nations, notwithstanding the text of the Eleventh Amendment. . . ." (citing Lee,
Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra, at 1046-47, 1089-90)); Note, Too
Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of the Law of
Nations, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2654, 2676 (2003) [hereinafter Note, Too Sovereign] (Monaco's
"holding was not required by the letter of the Eleventh Amendment" and could be
overruled or distinguished to ensure state compliance with U.S. treaty obligations.). The
textual argument against Monaco was most recently echoed and expanded by Professor
John Manning. See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1739 (2004) ("Given this obvious
selectivity, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Amendment reflects a considered
judgment to place suits by foreign states on one side of the line rather than the other.").
Professor Manning's broader thesis is that "when interpreting a precisely worded
constitutional provision like the Eleventh Amendment, the Court must adhere to the
compromise embedded in the text." Id. at 1750. Because he is a textualist in approach
and given his general legislative-process theme, he does not examine in any detail why the
Framers might have sought this particular compromise.
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was breaching a U.S. treaty to be a judicial question for the Court, then
any constitutional separation of powers objection disappears. A prudential objection on separation of powers grounds seems equally off the
mark, insofar as the legal question in such a controversy is the purely
domestic one of whether a State has breached a treaty obligation it is
committed to obey under the Supremacy Clause. This has long been considered a judicial question appropriate for the courts. 26 Moreover, because Monaco was a simple diversity suit, the Court could, as other commentators have pointed out, avoid overruling it by limiting it to its facts
and authorizing suit by foreign states against nonconsenting States only
when claims arising under a treaty are alleged. 27 Such a move to limit
rather than to overrule Monaco is admittedly in tension with the text of
the Original Jurisdiction Clause as amended by the Eleventh Amendment, which does not distinguish between treaty claims and other claims,
but it is consistent with original intent, which was principally concerned
28
with treaty violations by the States.
Developments subsequent to Monaco raise two more potential objections, neither of which is availing. First, the sovereign dignity principle
that the Rehnquist Court has relied upon to craft a robust doctrine of
state sovereign immunity2 9 does not require immunity in a suit brought
by a foreign state. A foreign state, unlike a private person, is more, not
less, vested with sovereignty than an American State. Moreover, when a
sovereign state sues another sovereign state, the decision to sue is subjected to the plaintiff state's political process, necessarily filtering out trivial or purely private claims. As the Court concluded in Alden v. Maine in
reference to suits against States by the sovereign United States, such
"[s]uits . . . require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit
prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delega26. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 326 cmt. b (1987) ("The courts . . . have the final say as to the meaning of an
international agreement insofar as it is law of the United States applicable to cases and
controversies before the courts.").
27. See WilliamJ. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 257, 296 (1998) (noting that
Monaco did not address self-executing treaty obligations); Note, Too Sovereign, supra note
25, at 2676 (Because it involved state law claims, "Monaco could be limited to suits that do
not 'implicate national responsibility.'" (quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, The justiciability of
Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 697, 702 (1998))); cf. David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075, 1293 n.741 (2000) [hereinafter
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation] (noting that question of whether Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies to treaty claims has not yet been answered).
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
("The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that
is consistent with their status as sovereign entities."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749
(1999) ("Private suits against nonconsenting States ... present the indignity of subjecting a
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties
regardless of the forum." (internal citation and quotation omitted)).
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tion to private persons to sue nonconsenting States. '30 This is as true
when the sovereign plaintiff is a foreign state.
Indeed, there is a strong case that the principle of sovereign dignity
compels a conclusion of state nonimmun;ty in a suit by a foreign state.
Suppose, for example, and to put the shoe on the other foot, that the
current President of the United States were to bring suit, pursuant to a
hypothetical Mexican constitutional provision analogous to the Original
Jurisdiction Clause, in the highest Mexican federal court against a Mexican state accused of breaking a treaty by systemic denial of justice to
American creditors.3 1 The President, in the name of the United States,
elects to file suit in the Mexican Supreme Court in lieu of a resort to
military force, economic sanctions, or diplomatic pressure. At the very
least, the suit does not impugn the dignity of the Mexican state. Rather,
the fact that the most powerful foreign state in the world deigned to entrust the dispute to the national court of a far weaker, economically dependent sovereign nation enhances the overall dignity of Mexico by its
statement of implicit trust in the commitment to the rule of law of its
32
highest court.
Another potential objection is doubt about whether original text or
the Framers' intent on the matter should prevail in today's very different
circumstances. 33 Whatever the general merits of this objection, the
Court's function as a quasi-international tribunal of exclusive original jurisdiction over disputes between States and foreign states concerning U.S.
treaty obligations seems particularly timely in an era of resurgent federalism in the domestic sphere and increasing globalization in the international..3 4 Unsurprisingly, the problem of scattered state defections from
30. 527 U.S. at 756.
31. Mexico, like the United States, is a federal republic, and it is composed of thirtyone states. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 43.
32. This hypothetical is an updated version of a point made in 1844 by future Justice
Benjamin Curtis. Justice Curtis reasoned that a net benefit to the sovereign dignity of the
United States would result if powerful foreign states consented to resolve in the Supreme
Court of the United States disputes they might have with States arising from ratified
treaties of the United States. See infra text accompanying note 322.
33. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993)
(advocating translation of old text to new context).
34. The translation argument, in contrast, seems more important with respect to the
Court's original jurisdiction over ambassadorial cases, which has been nonexclusive since
1978. See Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (2000)) (abolishing exclusive original jurisdiction in the
Court for suits against foreign ambassadors and public ministers). There is a plausible
argument based on section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that the Court's original
jurisdiction over suits against ambassadors and public ministers was similarly intended to
be exclusive as a constitutional matter. See infra text accompanying notes 147-158.
Although I argue in this Article that the constitutional text and background history are
better read not to require exclusive jurisdiction in the Court over ambassadorial cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 154-161, there is a strong argument that one should not be
bound to text and founding-era history in that instance regardless of how one interprets
the evidence. In the modern context, given the coverage of diplomatic immunities, such
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treaty obligations of collective benefit to the United States has persisted
to the present day.3 5 Such defections span the political spectrum from
conservative States denying alien criminal suspects access to consul 36 to
progressive States boycotting a foreign nation's goods in possible contravention of bilateral treaties of amity and commerce where they exist. 3 7 At
the same time, any lack of institutional capital that might have constrained the early Supreme Court in the exercise of this sensitive
peacekeeping function has correspondingly diminished given the pre38
sent-day eminence of the Court as an institution.
Reclaiming the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over treaty disputes between foreign states and States would have enormous consequences. For one, although the Court's interpretation of U.S. treaty obligations at igsue would be binding only as a matter of domestic law, it
would surely have persuasive influence over understandings of the treaty
provisions in international law. Indeed, it does not seem unrealistic that
the Court's decisions in such cases would affect other related issues of
international law. The pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the
United States, as the highest tribunal of the most powerful nation in the
world, would thus become a direct force in the shaping and evolution of
international law. In addition, on the domestic front, the jurisdiction
would reintroduce a useful mechanism of the Framers' design to supplement political pressure on state governors and legislators by Congress
and the State Department in the enforcement of treaty discipline against
isolated States that defect from ratified treaties of collective benefit to the
United States. More generally, reclaiming the Court's original and exclujurisdiction is likely to be invoked in civil suits over traffic accidents-a category of
controversies unlikely to cause major rifts in the nation's foreign relations, which was the
underlying justification for this provision of the Original Jurisdiction Clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-164.
35. See infra Part V.C.
36. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999)
(per curiam) (denying Germany leave to file original complaint against Arizona and the
United States alleging that state's failure to advise German citizen charged with a crime of
right of access to consul violated U.S. treaties); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-79
(1998) (per curiam) (order denying certiorari on the same issue between Virginia and a
Paraguayan national).
37. Cf. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000) (holding
state law imposing trade sanctions on Burma preempted by federal statute).
38. The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court noted the problem of enforcing the
Court's decisions in the context of suits against the United States:
[I]n all cases of actions against States or individual citizens, the National Courts
are supported in all their legal and Constitutional proceedings and judgments, by
the arm of the Executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions
against the United States, there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J.). Concerns about
enforcement of an adverse decision against Georgia in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), may also have animated ChiefJustice Marshall's dismissal of the suit
on state sovereign immunity grounds. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study
in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500, 514 (1969).
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sive jurisdiction over treaty-based suits by foreign states against States
should prompt reexamination of the political question doctrine and the
conventional view of the limited scope of the judicial power in matters
39
touching upon foreign affairs.
But perhaps the most important consequence relates to what the exercise of this long lost original jurisdiction will do to the Supreme Court
of the United States as an institution. By deciding controversies of such
an international nature, it is inevitable that the Court will become more
of an internationalist institution, taking its place as primus inter pares
within a growing network of domestic courts, 40 regional courts, and formally international tribunals, which are, in turn, crafting a growing crossreferential body of transnational decisional law. Whether or not one
views this judicial globalization as progress, it is surely inevitable, and it is
equally certain that for the Supreme Court to sit on the sidelines as it
happens is self-defeating. Nor, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, is opting out an option for American constitutionalists who value text and the
Framers' intent.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains how the Original
Jurisdiction Clause is best understood as a peacekeeping measure to entrust to the Supreme Court certain sensitive sovereign controversies including treaty disputes between foreign states and States. An important
component of this task is to show how the Article's thesis is consistent
with the First Congress's implementation of the Clause in section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 178941 and how it might be reconciled with subsequent Supreme Court decisions construing the Original Jurisdiction
Clause. Part II critiques the textual and historical justifications the Court
adopted in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi for extending state sovereign immunity to suits by foreign states. This Part additionally demonstrates how the conclusion of nonimmunity is not only consistent with,
but also compelled by, the Rehnquist Court's reliance on sovereign dignity as the principal justification for state sovereign immunity. Finally, it
rebuts the Monaco dictum interposing a separation of powers objection to
suits against States by foreign states in the Supreme Court. Part III sets
forth the reasons why the Framers thought it necessary to provide for
original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over suits by for39. See infra notes 329-341 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va.J. Int'l L. 1103
(2000). This includes federal district courts, which have made important contributions to
the evolution of the international law of human rights through litigation under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 159 L. Ed. 2d
718, 753 (2004) (upholding power of federal district courts under the ATS to recognize
"private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with
... definite content and acceptance among civilized nations [comparable to] the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted" as part of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of

1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing ATS claim for torture).
41. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 77-78.
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eign states against States for treaty violations given the alternative means
of diplomacy and direct suits by aggrieved foreigners. Part IV discusses
why this quasi-international jurisdiction of the Court was lost over time
and articulates why reclaiming it makes sense today.
I. THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CLAUSE AND SUITS
BETWEEN FOREIGN STATES AND STATES

A. Theories of the OriginalJurisdiction Clause
According to the popular conception, the Supreme Court of the
United States is a domestic legal institution principally concerned with
uniform justice in the vindication of individual rights. 42 On this view, the
Court is the capstone of a national court system dispensing judicial remedies for violations of individual rights by the legislative and executive
branches of the national government, and, especially concerning U.S.
persons after the Civil War, by the States. The doctrine ofjudicial review
announced in Marbury v. Madison was premised on that view and an essential enabler of it.43 The Constitution's authorization of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over federal law decisions of the state courts
and the decisions of any lower federal courts Congress might create 4 4 is
consistent with this conception of its purpose.
The clause of the Constitution delineating the Court's original jurisdiction, however, seems at odds with this prevailing view of the Court's
main institutional purpose. 45 It says: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. '' 46 Cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, and consuls-the representatives of foreign
42. See generallyJohn Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review
(1980) (articulating theory of judicial review of open-ended constitutional provisions to
enable participation of "society's habitual unequals" in representative government, not to

implement values judges perceive to be fundamental).
43. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals . .

").

44. "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.2.
45. Chief Justice John Marshall commented on the apparent difference between the
two constitutional grants of Supreme Court jurisdiction in 1821:
When, then, the constitution declares the jurisdiction, in cases where a State shall
be a party, to be original, and in all cases arising under the constitution or a law,
to be appellate-the conclusion seems irresistible, that its framers designed to
include in the first class those cases in which jurisdiction is given, because a State
is a party; and to include in the second, those in which jurisdiction is given,
because the case arises under the constitution or a law.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393-94 (1821).
46. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl.2. The first version of this provision drafted by the
Constitutional Committee of Detail also provided for original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court "[i]n cases of impeachment." See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 186 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand].
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sovereigns-would appear to have no significant implications for the domestic enforcement of the rights of private persons. And the Court has
construed the latter, State-as-Party half of the Original Jurisdiction Clause
47
to be defined solely by the character of the other litigants to the suit,
specifically without regard to whether a claim to enforce federal law was
at issue. 48 Moreover, the universe of potential litigants, the Court has
concluded, is confined to parties expressly enumerated in Article III, Section 2, Clause l's general grant of federal judicial power over "controversies" to which a State might be party, necessarily cutting out suits by instate citizens alleging violations of their federal rights. 49 This precedent,
50
in conjunction with the evolution of state sovereign immunity doctrine,
limits the Court's present constitutional State-as-Party original jurisdiction to two categories of cases: (1) State versus State and State versus
United States, regardless of which is plaintiff and whether a State, if defendant, has expressly consented; and (2) State versus foreign states, citizens, or subjects, and State versus citizens of other States, but only when
the State is plaintiff, absent state consent or valid congressional abrogation of immunity. Thus, neither a private plaintiff nor a foreign state can
ever invoke the Court's original jurisdiction against a nonconsenting
State, federal question or no.
While it has long been acknowledged that the constitutional grant of
original jurisdiction is self-executing, 5' there has always been an imple47. California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257-58 (1895) ("The original jurisdiction
depends solely on the character of the parties, and is confined to the cases in which are
those enumerated parties and those only."); cf. Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 553, 556 (1870) (The Original Jurisdiction Clause "distributes the jurisdiction
conferred upon the Supreme Court in the previous one into original and appellate
jurisdiction; but does not profess to confer any" additional jurisdiction.).
48. See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 163 (1922) (citing cases
but providing no reasoning in denying original jurisdiction in a suit clearly arising under
federal law to which a State was party).
49. See S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. at 257-58 (denying original jurisdiction because a citizen
of California was joined in the suit); cf. Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. at
163 (indicating joinder of a Texas citizen on Texas's side would destroy the Court's
original jurisdiction). But cf. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983) (allowing
intervention of an Indian tribe in a suit between two States in which the United States had
already intervened).
50. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]ie Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21
(1890), the Court extended state sovereign immunity to suits by in-state citizens arising
under federal law, and in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30
(1934), it extended immunity to suits by foreign states.
51. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888); Kentucky v. Dennsion, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 74 (1860) ("The
judicial power, so far as [the original] jurisdiction of the court is concerned, is vested by
the Constitution; it would neither remain dormant, nor would it expire, though the
Legislative power had never passed a law to authorize certain processes to assert such
jurisdiction."); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492 (1854); Chisholm v. Georgia,
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menting statute. 52 The Court has indicated that Congress lacks the
53
power to diminish or enlarge the twin spans of the constitutional grant,
which the Court has narrowly construed, however, to refer to civil, and
not criminal, cases.5 4 But it is also commonly believed that the Court's
original jurisdiction is not exclusive as a constitutional matter, 55 and the
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 451, 465-66, 467, 479 (1793) (opinions of Blair,J., Wilson,J., Cushing,
J., and Jay, C.J., respectively).
52. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (2000)), was the First Congress's inaugural effort. I discuss below, infra Part I.C,
the possibility that the apparently superfluous enactment of section 13 can be explained as
an attempt by the First Congress to fix the parameters of exclusive jurisdiction.
53. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1979) (finding it "extremely
doubtful" that Congress could divest Supreme Court of original jurisdiction by investing it
exclusively in district court); S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. at 261 ("The jurisdiction is limited and
manifestly intended to be sparingly exercised, and should not be expanded by
construction."); Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. at 300 ("The original jurisdiction of this court is
conferred by the constitution, without limit of the amount in controversy, and congress has
never imposed (if indeed it could impose) any such limit."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803) (Congress may not enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction);
see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 268-70, 272-73 (noting that Supreme Court
precedent suggests Congress may not add or subtract from Court's original jurisdiction);
Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts 809 (6th ed. 2002) (same);
John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the
Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 205, 209 (1997) (same); James E. Pfander,
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum.
L. Rev. 1515, 1549-57 (2001) (stating that Article III is designed to foreclose congressional
expansion of original jurisdiction). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1989)
[hereinafter Amar, Marbury] (arguing that Congress has power "under the 'necessary and
proper' clause, to reduce or even to eliminate the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over lawsuits 'in which a State shall be Party'"); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View
of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 254
n.160 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, A Neo-Federalist View] (arguing that the Constitution
does not require Congress to grant any federal courtjurisdiction over Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 "Controversies" including those in which a State is party, but must provide some
federal jurisdiction over "All Cases" listed in that clause). Legislative nonabridgement
seems a fair inference from the text, for the Original Jurisdiction Clause does not mention
"Exceptions" or "Regulations" as its sister provision for appellate jurisdiction does. See
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. By contrast, some scholars believe Congress may increase the
Court's original jurisdiction by transferal from its constitutional appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to the same provision for "Exceptions" or "Regulations." See, e.g., Edward S.
Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review 5-6 (1914); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v.
Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional
Wisdom, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329, 398-400; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 31-33.
54. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398-99 (1821); Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) at 431-32 (Iredell, J.); cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80 ("[T]he
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature . . ").
55. See Ames v.Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 465 (1884) ("Thus the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court was made concurrent with any other court to which jurisdiction might
be given in suits between a State and citizens of other States or aliens."); B6rs v. Preston,
111 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1884) ("[T]he original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a
consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and ...the subordinate courts
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current statute provides that the Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive
only for State-versus-State cases. 5 6 Nonexclusivity in practice means that
the Court's original jurisdiction is nearly a dead letter, for the Court today infrequently exercises its jurisdiction in the first instance when a
lower federal or state court is available. 5 7 It goes without saying that
under both the Court's interpretation of the Constitution and the Court's
original jurisdiction statute, whether there is a claim of violation of federal law is of no consequence to the Court's original jurisdiction, exclusive or nonexclusive. From these doctrinal parameters of the Court's
original jurisdiction, one can infer little concern with the enforcement of
federal rights by foreign or U.S. private persons.
Accordingly, the Court and commentators havejustified the Original
Jurisdiction Clause using two theories independent of a federal-rights-enforcement theme. First, the Court has speculated that the Clause affords
it original jurisdiction over State-as-party and ambassadorial cases to
"match[ ] the dignity of the parties to the status of the court. '58 Second,
Professor Akhil Amar has suggested that the Clause represented a practical accommodation of geography. 59 He presumes that the Framers
thought the Court would be sited in the national capital, where States
would be represented by their senators and foreign states by their ambassadors or ministers. Neither would have to travel to a distant forum-a
lower federal court that, additionally, might be located within the terri60
tory of a litigant State and thus be more vulnerable to local prejudice.
Consuls who, by definition, were stationed at commercial ports, not
of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such representatives of
foreign governments.").
56. The statute provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)
All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All controversies between the
United States and a State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the
citizens of another State or against aliens.
28 U.S.C. § 1251. The statute does not refer to suits against States by foreign states.
57. See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's
Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 Me. L. Rev. 185, 187-88,
198-201 (1993) (reviewing conditions under which the Court has exercised its original
jurisdiction from 1961 to 1993).
58. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. at 65-66; see also Ames, 111 U.S. at 464 (The
"evident purpose" of the Court's original jurisdiction was to "keep open the highest court
of the nation for the determination, in the first instance, of suits involving a State or a
diplomatic or commercial representative of a foreign government. So much was due to
); cf. United States v.
the rank and dignity of those for whom the provision was made ....
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892) (As to statutory implementation of the Original
Jurisdiction Clause, "it best comported with the dignity of a State, that a case in which it
was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate judicial
tribunal of the nation.").
59. See Amar, Marbury, supra note 53, at 469-78.
60. See id.
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national capitals, 61 though explicitly mentioned in the Original Jurisdiction Clause, 6 2 pose a difficulty for Professor Amar's thesis. 63
In a seminal article, 64 Professor James Pfander proposed a reconciliation of this tension between the federal-rights-enforcing vision of the
Court's institutional purpose and the restrictive doctrinal position on the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. In his account, the common law
immunity of a sovereign from suit in its own courts precluded the enforcement of federal law by individuals in an allegedly transgressing
State's courts. 65 A separate sort of immunity, which he calls "law-of-nations" immunity to mark its origin in contemporaneous international law,
foreclosed suits against sovereigns in the courts of other sovereigns. 66 As
61. "Among the modern institutions for the utility of commerce, one of the most
useful is that of consuls or persons residing in the large trading cities, and especially in
foreign seaports, with a commission empowering them to attend to the rights and
privileges of their nation .... " Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of
the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, Book 2,
§ 34, at 207 (Northampton, Mass., 4th Am. ed. 1820) (1758).
Because of their commercial responsibilities, it was a subject of debate in late
eighteenth-century international law whether consuls were accorded the same rights and
privileges as ambassadors and the various orders of public ministers. See infra note 151.
It is apparent from Article II of the Constitution that the Framers understood and
accepted this conception of consuls. The President is given the power to "appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" subject to the Senate's advice and
consent, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, but "shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers" only, id. art. II, § 3. The President would logically not "receive" consuls since
their duty stations were ports, not the national capital. Moreover, as commercial, not
diplomatic, representatives of a foreign sovereign, consuls would not have presented their
credentials to the President in his capacity as head of state.
62. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls ....
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
63. See DanielJ. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1569, 1604-08 (1990) (criticizing Professor Amar's theory on this and other grounds).
Another problem with the geographical convenience theory is the Clause's failure to
provide original jurisdiction in the Court over "Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party," a large category of suits for which the Court would be a geographically
convenient forum if located in the national capital with the other branches of government.
64. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in StateParty Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555 (1994) [hereinafter Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme
Court's Original Jurisdiction].
65. See id. at 581. In this Article, I refer to the concept Professor Pfander calls
"common law immunity" as "home court immunity."
66. See id. at 582-84. Professor Pfander's law-of-nations immunity differs from this
Article's theory of the Eleventh Amendment as articulating a state sovereign immunity
based on the principle of sovereign dignity under late eighteenth-century international
law. On this theory, a noncitizen could not sue a sovereign state because the state is made
up of numerous citizens, and the noncitizen is one person who is, in turn, a constituent
part of his own state. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25,
at 1032-34; infra Part II.D. Purely on that principle, there is nothing wrong with a fully
sovereign state exercising a valid international law claim against another sovereign state,
whether in a putative tribunal with jurisdiction (which, of course, did not exist at
international law in the eighteenth century) or by waging war. One way to understand this
Article's argument is as demonstrating how the Framers, fearful of war as a means of
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applied in the American context, this rendered the States immune from
suits in the courts of other States and, more importantly, the federal
courts of the national sovereign. Significantly in the latter regard, the
consequence of the so-called Madisonian compromise was that the Con67
stitution did not commit Congress to create lower federal courts at all.
The invocation of these immunities would have entirely disabled the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction: Federal-law-enforcing suits could
not be brought in the courts of the allegedly violating State by virtue of
common law immunity, nor in the courts of other States or putative lower
federal courts (which Congress was not obligated to establish) by virtue of
law-of-nations immunity.
Professor Pfander's thesis is that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was the Framers' solution to this "remedial gap" 6 8 by constitutional abrogation of the States' "law-of-nations" immunity:
The framers appear consciously to have chosen to subject the
states to suit in federal courts, thus vitiating the states' law-ofnations immunity. Yet the framers did not necessarily intend
the grant of jurisdiction to abrogate the states' common law immunity in all disputes to which the original jurisdiction
69
extends.
The necessary consequence of this for the Original Jurisdiction Clause is
that, contrary to precedent, it should extend to State-as-party cases arising
under federal law or any other aspect of Article III's general grant of
judicial power, regardless of the identity of the other parties to the suit.
And presuming nonexclusivity, the same conclusion should apply to any
lower federal court. Professor Pfander suggests that an implication of his
theory, which generally privileges federal right enforcement by private
parties as an institutional purpose of the Court, is that the later enactment of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798 should not be construed to
foreclose federal question or admiralty suits, but only state law suits
brought by aliens or citizens of other States-the diverse parties the
Amendment explicitly mentions. 70 In Professor Pfander's view, which is
shared by a majority of the academy, the Supreme Court's decisions exinternational law claim-vindication, sought by domestic constitutional law-the Original
Jurisdiction Clause-to substitute an alternative remedy to war by creating a permanent,
domestic tribunal that might be attractive to potential foreign sovereign litigants for the
peaceful resolution of international law claims arising from state breaches of U.S. treaty
obligations. In contrast, Professor Pfander's law-of-nations immunity does not turn on
whether the plaintiff is itself a sovereign state. The difference between the two
conceptions is elusive, see e.g., Smith, supra note 25, at 34-36 (presuming that Professor
Pfander and I are talking about the same principle of contemporaneous international
law), but crucial in understanding how sovereign suits against States are different from
private ones.
67. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 8-9; 2 Farrand, supra note 46, at 45-46.
68. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction, supra note 64, at

559-60.
69. Id. at 560.
70. See id. at 651-52.
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tending state sovereign immunity to federal question suits by private par71
ties are mistaken.
The interpretation of the purpose and meaning of the Original Jurisdiction Clause proposed in this Article draws from each of the three preexisting theories. Like Professor Pfander's, my approach emphasizes the
federal-law-enforcing function of the Supreme Court as against the States.
But the Framers had in mind for the Court's original jurisdiction the enforcement of federal law pertaining to certain public sovereign actors or
their agents-namely, treaty law and the law of nations in international
matters and federal common law based on customary international law in
interstate matters72-by
the interested public sovereigns or their
agents-American and foreign states, 73 and foreign ambassadors and
ministers.
71. See id.; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101-02 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The Hans Court erroneously assumed that a State could plead sovereign
immunity against a noncitizen suing under federal question jurisdiction, and for that
reason held that a State must enjoy the same protection in a suit by one of its citizens.");
John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in
American History 134-35 (1987) (arguing that, during the first century of American
history, courts uniformly held that Eleventh Amendment touched only diversity
jurisdiction). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J.
1425 (1987) (countering present Court's theories of federalism by emphasizing the
principle of popular sovereignty under which no government entity should enjoy sovereign
immunity against claimed violation of constitutional right); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition AgainstJurisdiction, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 1033 (1983) (contending that Eleventh Amendment requires only narrow
construction of constitutional language authorizing federal courtjurisdiction, but does not
prohibit federal court interventions); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983) (asserting
that the Eleventh Amendment only applies to cases in which federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is pleaded on the basis of diverse party status); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988)
(contending that state sovereign immunity does not extend to claims arising under federal
law); Carlos Manuel Vzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity? 106 Yale L.J. 1683
(1997) (exploring how the Court has crafted exceptions to state sovereign immunity in
order to escape rule-of-law problems).
72. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 738-41 (discussing the Court's making of
federal common law in disputes among States). Applying the law of one State in a dispute
between States would have been unacceptable to one or the other. Accordingly, the
federal rule of decision in a dispute between States was frequenty borrowed from an
international lawbook's discussion of a rule at the law of nations. For example, in Handly's
Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 379-80 (1820), ChiefJustice Marshall resolved
a border dispute between Indiana and Kentucky concerning land along the Ohio River by
citing a rule from Vattel, supra note 61, Book 1, § 267, at 180-81, and no other American
or English decision or treatise.
73. The United States itself is the conspicuously absent sovereign in the Original
Jurisdiction Clause-an absence that is explained by the provision's concern with the
resolution of sovereign disputes of interstate or international character. The Framers
would not have thought that the national government would have breached a ratified
treaty of the United States, or that the Court, as an organ of the national government,
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Included in the catalogue of such public claims that the Court was
intended to hear were the private international law claims of a foreign
sovereign's citizens or subjects espoused by the sovereign. 74 Under international law, "[o]nce a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the
State is sole claimant. ' 75 Because a private claim is filtered through the
public process of an independently sovereign foreign state, no other sovereign may question its discretion to espouse. 7 6 And because the Framers
intended the Supreme Court's function in controversies between foreign
states and States to mimic that of a putative international tribunal, the
Court, in the exercise of this function, could not question the foreign
state's decision to espouse a claim before the Court, just as the United
States could not question a foreign sovereign's decision to espouse by the
instrument of war. (Of course, it does not follow that a semisovereign
State, which participates in the process of national government and has
surrendered its international sovereign rights to war and to conduct diplomatic relations in acceding to the Union, preserves a similarly robust
and unreviewable right to espouse its citizen's claims against other sovereigns, foreign or domestic. 77) On this view, the overarching purpose of
the Court's exercise of its original jurisdiction, even in an instance of
hearing a foreign state's espoused claim, was not the political aim of securing private liberties or rights in a republic, but, rather, to advance the
national interest in peace and harmony domestically among States and
internationally with foreign states.
The Original Jurisdiction Clause, then, was really about affording an
eminent, credibly neutral tribunal for the resolution of public disputes
implicating the essential national interest in domestic and international
peace. Private claims of international law violation espoused by foreign
states were an important subset of such public disputes, but for their national-peace-related, not personal-right-related, ramifications. While this
theory shares the theme of rights enforcement with Professor Pfander's
theory, my interpretation also resembles, in part, the Court's "dignified
tribunal" theory of the Clause and the part of Professor Amar's geographical theory emphasizing the perceived territorial neutrality of the Court.
The Supreme Court was the ideal forum for sensitive sovereign-to-sovereign disputes both because it was the highest court in the land and because, as a supreme national tribunal composed, in the Framers' design,
could be a credibly neutral arbiter in a dispute involving the United States as party. See
infra text accompanying notes 107-110, 371-375.
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2,
at 12 (Aug. 30).
76. See infra text accompanying note 321.
77. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387,
490-94 (1995) (arguing, based on an exhaustive historical survey, that States should be
limited in asserting the claims of their citizens as against the federal government and other
States); infra Part III.E.
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of esteemed jurists from a cross-section of the States and with noted internationalist sensibilities, 78 there was a good chance both States and foreign states might perceive it as a neutral forum for dispute resolution. My
theory of the Court as quasi-international peacekeeping tribunal differs
from the dignified tribunal and geographical theories of the Original Jurisdiction Clause, however, in its ultimate grounding-not in symbolism
or pragmatic convenience, but in the importance ofjudicial resolution of
certain sovereign-to-sovereign controversies for the sake of international
peace and national harmony.
B. "[T]hose in which a State shall be Party"
Validation of any theory of the Original Jurisdiction Clause necessarily begins with its literal language. A consensus starting point is that the
Clause incorporates by reference some subset of the "Cases" or "Contro79
versies" enumerated in the preceding clause of Article III, Section 2.
Once again, the Original Jurisdiction Clause provides, "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which
a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."80 No one disputes that the "Ambassadors" Subclause incorporates
the identically worded grant of judicial power in the preceding clause:
"The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,

other public Ministers and Consuls."8 '
Disagreement focuses on which "Cases" or "Controversies" in the
general grant are the antecedents referred to by the phrase "those in
which a State shall be Party." One textual clue that has been largely ignored is the use of the word "those," which seems to refer to the word
"Cases" in the preceding "Ambassadors" half of the Clause. Professor
78. See infra text accompanying notes 342-358.
79. See Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553, 556 (1870) ("This
second clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court in the
previous one into original and appellate jurisdiction; but does not profess to confer any.")
There are nine categories of cases and controversies in the general grant:
[(1)] all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;
[(2)] all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;
[(3)] all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
[(4)] Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;

[(5)]
[(6)]
[(7)]
[(8)]

Controversies between two or more States;
between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States;
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of

different States[;] and

[(9)] between
Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III,
80. Id. art. III,
81. Id. art. III,

a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
§ 2, cl. 1.
§ 2, cl. 2.
§ 2, cl. 1.
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Pfander has skillfully advanced this literal theory.8 2 Since the only other
"Cases" referenced in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 are those arising
under federal law and admiralty cases, Professor Pfander concludes that
"those in which a State shall be Party" meant "Cases in Law and Equity,
arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under their Authority;" and "Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . in which a State shall be a
Party."88 If the Framers intended the word "those" in the Original Jurisdiction Clause to refer to the "Controversies" listed in the general grant,
then they could have easily substituted the word "those" with "Controversies" and continued "in which a State shall be Party."
One persuasive objection to Professor Pfander's literal reading is
that it is irreconcilable with the First Congress's implementation of the
Original Jurisdiction Clause by the Judiciary Act of 1789.8 4 The Act "is
widely viewed as an indicator of the original understanding of Article III
and, in particular, of Congress' [s] constitutional obligations concerning
the vesting of federal jurisdiction."8 5 Section 13 of the Act vested the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as follows:
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, [(la)]
except between a state and its citizens; and [(ib)] except also
between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.
[(2a) ] And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or
their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have
or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and [(2b) ] original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers,
or in which a consul, or vice
86
consul, shall be a party.
The Act thus treated the Original Jurisdiction Clause's State-as-Party provision as one defined by the character of the other parties, without regard
to whether a case arose under federal or admiralty law.
Moreover, section 9 of the Act separately provides that federal district courts shall have
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of im82. See Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction, supra note
64, at 600-04.
83. See id. at 600 ("The Court's original jurisdiction thus includes a subset of federal
question and admiralty 'cases'-a subset limited to all such 'cases' in which a state appears
as a party.").
84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Star. 73, 80.
85. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 29. A separate provision in section 13 was
famously declared unconstitutional in Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion for the Court
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803), a holding that some
commentators question. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 53, at 31-33.
86. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81.
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post, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures
are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels
of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as
well as upon the high seas... and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as
aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties8 7and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States.
The painstakingly comprehensive breadth of this "exclusive original"
grant of district court jurisdiction over "all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" (and seizures on "other [inland navigable] waters") leaves no doubt that there is nothing left of admiralty cases for the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Nor is there any indication
that the Framers of the Act intended to distinguish "civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" in which a State might be a party. To be
sure, there is no similar provision for "exclusive original cognizance" in
district courts over federal question suits, but neither is there any indication in the First Judiciary Act of an intent to confer federal jurisdiction
over any civil suit arising under federal law, with one famous exception of
no relevance here.8 8 The Act's implementation of the Original Jurisdiction Clause thus suggests the Clause's use of the word "those" was more
likely loose drafting rather than indicative of an intent to refer to the
"Cases" previously enumerated in Article III's general grant of judicial
power.
In light of the lead taken by the First Judiciary Act, the Court has
held that its "original jurisdiction depends solely on the character of the
parties, and is confined to [parties named in Article III, Section 2, Clause
1 'controversies'] .. .and those only."8 9 The Court has held, without
comment, that this holds true even if a claim arising under federal law is
at issue. 90 Thus, for example, the Court has no constitutional original
jurisdiction over suits by in-state citizens alleging state violations of their
federal rights. This is particularly problematic for the individual federalrights-enforcement model of the Supreme Court.
Certainly, though, the conclusion that in-state citizens cannot sue
States is consistent with the literal terms of the First Judiciary Act. The
Act rules out "exclusive jurisdiction" over suits "between a state and its
87. Id. ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
88. That exception is also found in section 9, the so-called "Alien Tort Statute" (ATS).
It provides that the district courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
The ATS clearly contemplated federal jurisdiction for civil tort suits arising under treaties.
See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute and Its
Implications for Human-Rights Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts Today 22-27 (Sept. 3,
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Lee,
Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute Theory].
89. California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257-58 (1895); see also Minnesota v. N. Sec.
Co., 184 U.S. 199, 245 (1902).
90. See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 163 (1922).
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citizens" without any subsequent provision for nonexclusive original jurisdiction in the Court. 9 1 Thus, there is no Supreme Court original jurisdiction for in-state citizens at all in State-as-party cases under the 1789 Act.
At the same time, the fact that this exception is made explicit in the Act
raises doubt about the Court's starting premise in California v. Southern
Pacific Co.-that the reference points for determining the State-as-party
suits within its original jurisdiction are the four "Controversies" subheadings of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 in which a State might be party:
"[(1)] Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; [(2)]
Controversies between two or more States; [ (3)] between a State and Citizens of another State, . . . and [(4)] between a State, or the Citizens
'9 2
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
To be sure, state citizens are an enumeratcd party in the last, foreignparties subheading ("Citizens thereof"), but in a context precluding the
inference that they were intended to be parties adverse to their State. In
light of this, why did the First Congress bother to rule out State-versusstate-citizen suits in section 13 of the Judiciary Act? That is, it would have
been superfluous to say "except between a state and its citizens" if the
only possible litigants in State-as-party cases were those named as adverse
parties to States in the list of "Controversies," since there is no mention of
"Controversies" between a State and its citizens.
There are two potential explanations for the Act's puzzling exception of suits between "a state and its citizens," both of which contradict
the Court's four-controversies theory of acceptable litigants in State-asparty original suits. First, Congress might have been thinking of all potential litigants against States in the Article III general grant of federal
jurisdiction, not just those mentioned in the "Controversies" subheadings. If so, since section 13 began with an open-ended inclusion of all
such potential suitors, "[t] hat the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party," it
was necessary to qualify "except between a state and its citizens" regardless of the fact that state citizens are not a State-adverse party in any enumerated "Controversies."9 3 It was unnecessary, however, to mention
"Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" because they were
dealt with directly in other provisions of section 13, supplying an independent basis for the Court's original jurisdiction in suits in which such
foreign envoys might find themselves in litigation with a State.9 4 Citizens
of other States and foreign citizens or subjects were likewise explicitly addressed in other provisions of section 13 affording original but not exclu9 5
sive jurisdiction.
91. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
92. U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl.1.
93. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
94. See supra text accompanying note 86 (provisions (2a) and (2b)).
95. See supra text accompanying note 86 (provision (ib)).
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On this theory, any conceivable litigants who are not addressed in
these exceptions or provisions would be entitled to exclusive original jurisdiction in the Court in a suit against a State because of the inclusionary
reach of section 13's opening provision, i.e., "[lt]hat the Supreme Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature,
where a state is a party."9 6 This makes sense for other States, the United
States, and foreign states, which are explicitly mentioned in Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1 "Controversies" anyway. But it does not make sense
for other potential litigants mentioned elsewhere in the Constitutionnamely, captive slaves, who were considered neither citizens of States nor
citizens or subjects of foreign states, 97 and Indian tribes, which seem to
have been viewed in 1789 as distinct from States and foreign.states.9 8 Indeed, the Court explicitly held in 1831 that Indian tribes were "domestic
dependent nations" but not "foreign states" or "States of the Union," the
latter two being the only "states" with the presumptive constitutional right
to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. 99 The fatal flaw of the all-litigants theory, then, is its implication of limitlessness for the section's
opening grant providing for the Court's exclusive jurisdiction "of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party," subject to ensuing
statutory qualifications.
The second, more plausible theory is that the drafters of section 13
of the Judiciary Act intended a more precise anchor for the opening provision's seemingly boundless grant. Specifically, they construed the Original Jurisdiction Clause's specification of "those in which a State shall be
Party" as addressing only the three "Controversies" headings in the preceding clause explicitly naming a State as party. These extended federal
judicial power "to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 10 0 On this view,
the drafters of section 13 wanted to make absolutely clear that the words
"Controversies between a State, or the Citizens thereof " 10 ' did not mean
Controversies between a State and citizens thereof. While such a reading
seems mistaken, it was a plausible mistake and one that was famously
96. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80
97. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may
be imposed on such Importation.... ."); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or
Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour.
(modified by the Thirteenth Amendment).
98. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
99. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-16 (1831).
100. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
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made by George Mason at the Virginia ratifying convention. Here is
James Madison's characteristically cool account:
[George Mason]: The last clause is still more improper [than
the one giving federal courts jurisdiction of controversies "between citizens of different States"]. To give them cognizance in
disputes between a State and the citizens thereof, is utterly inconsistent with reason or good policy.
Here Mr. Nicholas arose, and informed Mr. Mason, that his
interpretation of this part was not warranted by the words.
Mr. Mason replied, that if he recollected rightly, the propriety of the power as explained by him, had been contended for;
but that as his memory had never been good, and was now
much impaired10 2from his age, he would not insist on that
interpretation.
Thus, section 13's explicit exception of original jurisdiction over
suits between a State and its citizens may have been drafted as a precautionary measure to ensure that no one would construe the foreign-parties
provision in Article IIl, Section 2, Clause I to mean what Mason had presumed it to say before he was corrected. If this is right, it strongly indicates that section 13 was concerned exclusively and narrowly with parsing
out the exact language of Article III's three "Controversies" subheadings
in which a State is named as a party, and with neither all conceivable
litigants against States nor all litigants against States mentioned in any
"Controversies" subheading. If this, in turn, is correct, then it suggests
the State-as-Party provision of the Original Jurisdiction Clause was itself
limited to the three sets of "Controversies" in which a State is specifically
named as a potential party.
This constitutional implication introduces a single point of divergence from the Court's current doctrine on the issue. In United States v.
Texas, the Court held that its original jurisdiction extended to controversies between a State and the United States.10 3 But as ChiefJustice Fuller,
joined by Justice Lamar, cryptically pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
the United States is not named in any of the three State-as-Party "Controversies" subheadings.1 0 4 Rather, the relevant grant merely says "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party" 10 5 without mentioning
102. George Mason, Remarks at Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 1387, 1403 (John P. Kaminski
& GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter Documentary History of Ratification].
103. 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
104. See id. at 648-49 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); cf. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 598 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the dissent in United States v.
Texas that "the merely literal language of the Constitution precluded" original jurisdiction
over a suit by the United States against a State). Indeed,Justice Benjamin Curtis, who was
not a States' rights champion by any means, believed the States enjoyed sovereign
immunity in suits brought by the United States: "The State of Georgia has consented to be
sued by one or more States, or by foreign states, and by no other person or body politic."
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 507 (1854) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
105. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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a State as party. 10 6 Certainly, a United States-versus-State suit is theoretically within the pale of this particular grant, but that would be of no consequence if the State-as-Party part of the Original Jurisdiction Clause referred solely to the three "Controversies" of the general grant in which a
State is explicitly mentioned as a potential party.
As a historical matter, it seems plausible that the Framers of the Constitution in 1787 did not intend the Original Jurisdiction Clause to extend to a suit between the United States, necessarily represented by the
executive branch, and a State. The crucial aspect of neutrality, which
could be reasonably presumed in a controversy between States or between a State and a foreign state (or affecting foreign ambassadors),
would be more suspect from the State's perspective if the Supreme Court
were to serve as tribunal in a dispute between it and a coordinate branch
of the national government. Nor would it have been clear at the time of
the founding how the Court could have enforced a decision adverse to
the United States in a civil suit. 10 7 As the alternative of a state court forum would be equally unattractive from the United States's perspective, it
is possible that the Framers did not consider United States-versus-State
controversies amenable to federal or state judicial solution. 10 8 The
106. Professor Pfander argues that the Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 basis for United
States v. Texas was its provision for "all Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." See
Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction, supra note 64, at 574-76.
Justice Harlan's opinion is admittedly hard to decipher on this score, for he mentions both
the federal question and the "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party"
subheadings of Article III's general grant as potential bases for the Court's original
jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 644-45. In my view, the
best way to characterize the holding is that the Court has original jurisdiction over a case in
which a State is party, the United States is the other party, and the suit arises under federal
law. Thus, United States v. Texas decided neither the question of whether the Court might
have original jurisdiction in a State-as-party case arising under federal law, nor the question
of whether it might have original jurisdiction in a State-as-party suit where the United
States was the other party, but the suit did not arise under federal law. But it is hard to
imagine that there would be any case between a State and the United States that would not
arise under federal law. Contrary to Professor Pfander's view, the Court seems justified,
then, in proceeding in subsequent cases on the assumption that United States v. Texas stands
for the proposition that the Court may exercise its original jurisdiction in "Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party" and any other party is a State, rather than the
proposition that the Court may exercise original jurisdiction over a State-as-party case
arising under federal law.
107. Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) ("[I]n all
cases of actions against States or individual citizens, the National Courts are supported...
by the arm of the Executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions against the
United States, there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid.").
108. Following the same train of thought, the Court in United States v. Texas reached
the opposite conclusion-that the Framers could not possibly have intended such
controversies to be resolved in any way other than adjudication by the Supreme Court:
[I]f neither party will surrender its claim of authority and jurisdiction over the
disputed territory, the result, according to the defendant's theory of the
Constitution, must be that the United States, in order to effect a settlement of this

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1791

United States never even attempted such a suit until three decades after
the Civil War. The closest instance until that time was Floridav. Georgia in
1854, when the United States sought to intervene on behalf of Florida in
a boundary dispute over territory acquired by the United States in a treaty
with Spain.10 9 These concerns about neutrality and enforcement explain
why the Original Jurisdiction Clause does not provide for jurisdiction in
the Court over "Controversies to which the United States is a Party" at
1 10
all.
But this divergence between the position in United States v. Texasthat the Court's original jurisdiction extends to suits by the United States
"in which a State shall be Party"-and an interpretation of the Original
Jurisdiction Clause that restricts the Court's original jurisdiction to the
three named controversies in which a State is a party (as against States,
citizens of other States, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects) is largely
irrelevant for the purposes of this Article. Either theory would place foreign state-versus-State disputes within the Court's original jurisdiction.
Moreover, there is great affinity between the justifications for state liability in original actions by the United States advanced in United States v.
Texas and justifications for state liability in suits by foreign states. In contrast to self-interested private suits, both sorts of sovereign suits presume
filtration of claims through the suing sovereign's political process, and
both would involve the resolution of controversies implicating the important national interest in peace.'
Nor is it my intent, in light of this affinity, to assert that the holding in United States v. Texas on this point should
be revisited.
To reiterate, section 13 unambiguously mandates original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over cases "where a State is party"
and the other party is another State or a foreign state. Section 13 states
"[t]hat the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is party." Neither a State nor a
foreign state is an enumerated party exception, although they are expressly named in Article III's general grant of federal judicial power over
vexed question of boundary, must bring its suit in one of the courts of Texas...
or that, in the end, there must be a trial of physical strength between the
government of the Union and Texas. The first alternative is unwarranted both by
the letter and spirit of the Constitution .... The second alternative . . . has no
place in our constitutional system, and cannot be contemplated by any patriot
except with feelings of deep concern.
143 U.S. at 641. Such an impasse would most definitely have been a constitutional crisis,
but it does not seem so clear to me that the Framers would have thought the Supreme
Court, as an organ of the national government, an appropriate vehicle for its resolution.
Of course, by 1892, circumstances had changed so dramatically since 1788 that it was
possible, indeed natural, to contemplate such a mission for the Court.
109. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 491 (1854).
110. The Court has indicated that the United States is not a "State" for purposes of
the State-as-Party half of the Original Jurisdiction Clause. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 583 n.3 (1943).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 485-487.
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controversies in which a State might be party. Therefore, the Supreme
Court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature" involving a State and other States or foreign states. (The theory of
United States v. Texas, if a valid interpretation of the 1789 Act, would extend this to the United States.) Since the statute cannot exceed its constitutional authorization, the only conclusion one can draw is that the Original Jurisdiction Clause affords original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
over suits between foreign states and States.
The original Senate bill version of section 13 of the First Judiciary
Act makes this conclusion explicit from another direction by directly
naming foreign states as among those within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. It provides that
the supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where any of the United States or a foreign state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and
except also between a state and citizens of other states or foreigners, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclu1 2
sive jurisdiction.'
The enacted version deviates slightly but importantly from the Senate bill: "where a state is a party" rather than "where any of the United
States or a foreign state is party." The Act in general was little modified
from the Senate version. There is no evidence as to why the language of
the Senate bill was not adopted in this instance. It is thus impossible to
tell whether the enacted phrase "where a state is a party" retained the
Senate bill's explicit dual meaning or whether the modification signaled
an intent to refer only to States (which, of course, would still have provided the Court exclusive jurisdiction of suits between States and foreign
states). The two statutory exceptions to State-as-Party jurisdiction suggest
that "state" means State (which is the operating presumption in this Article), but the problem with this inference is that the enacted exceptions
are identical to the Senate bill's original exceptions, except for the wholly
unrelated substitution of "aliens" (a synonym of negative connotation)
for "foreigners."' 1 3 Any clue from the phrasing of the exceptions is
therefore a red herring.
An intriguing interpretive implication of the Senate bill is that where
the Original Jurisdiction Clause says suits "in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction," the Framers of the
Constitution intended "State" to mean "American or foreign" state. The
effect of this would be minimal, however, because it would only add "controversies between [state] citizens ... and foreign States" to the Court's
112. Judiciary Act of 1789, S.1, 1st Cong., at 6 (Thomas Greenleaf printed version)
(emphasis added) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). See generally Wilfred J. Ritz,
Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990)
(provriding background on context and drafting history of the Act).
113. See Lee, Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute Theory, supra note 88
(manuscript at 16-18).
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constitutional original jurisdiction.' 1 4 Moreover, given the rules of foreign sovereign immunity at international law at the time, such jurisdiction would have operated principally in suits by foreign states against
1 15
state citizens, as foreign states could not be sued without their consent.
Of course, by adopting the language that was ultimately enacted, the First
Congress did not explicitly provide for the statutory implementation of
this original jurisdiction, which would have been self-executing in any
6
event. 11
Apparently, no one has considered or investigated the possibility that
"State" in the Original Jurisdiction Clause means foreign or American
State.' 17 The Supreme Court has concluded that "State" does not mean
Indian tribes (to the extent they were neither foreign states nor States of
the Union)"18 or the United States,I 19 and this is consistent with the Senate bill. Nor is it feasible that "State" has this dual meaning anywhere else
114. Foreign state-versus-State suits would fall within the Original Jurisdiction Clause
on the conventional, American state reading of the State-as-Party Subclause.
115. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 145-46 (1812) (holding
that in the absence of consent, a foreign sovereign "cannot be considered as having
imparted to the ordinary tribunals [of another sovereign] a jurisdiction"); Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451 (1793) (Blair, J.) ("[T]he instances may rarely occur,
when a State may have an opportunity of suing in the American Courts a foreign State
. . . .1').

116. See cases cited supra note 51.
117. In a 1952 article, WienczyslawJ. Wagner raised but did not answer the question
in apparent reference to the statute implementing Article III, Section 2, Clause l's
extension of federal judicial power to "Controversies between two or more States." He
asked: "The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
between two or more states; but how is the word state to be understood? Does it cover
foreign states, or does it relate only to the states of the union?" Wienczyslaw J. Wagner,
The Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 2 St. Louis U.
L.J. 111, 152 (1952). The somewhat confusing ensuing discussion of state sovereign
immunity in suits brought by foreign states before and after Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), indicates that he believed the answer to be negative,
inasmuch as he appears to take no issue with Monaco's holding that a foreign state could
not, like an American State, sue a State in the Supreme Court without its specific consent
to suit. See id. at 152-55. In any event, Wagner did not consider the questions in the
context of interpretation of the State-as-Party provision of the Original Jurisdiction Clause,
specifically as it implements Article III, Section 2, Clause l's provision for "Controversies
... between a State... and foreign States." In addition, Wagner's reference to the Court's
"Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction" in the title of his article, which ably provides a
descriptive survey of the evolution of doctrine on the subject up to 1952, does not refer to
an argument of constitutional exclusivity of the sort made in this Article supra Part I.C.
Professor Michael Rappaport, without focusing specifically on the words "State shall
be Party" in the Original Jurisdiction Clause, has argued that the use of the word "State" in
1789 had the "primary meaning" of "independent nation or country." See Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the
Supreme Court vs. Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 819, 832
(1999). Presumably, he would concur in my view that "State" in the Original Jurisdiction
Clause might be a reference to both American and foreign states.
118. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-20 (1831).
119. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 n.3 (1943).
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in Article III or in the Constitution as a whole. If the Senate bill correctly
construed the Original Jurisdiction Clause, the only plausible reason for
writing "in which a State shall be party" instead of elucidating its dual
meaning seems to be economy of phrasing notwithstanding the sacrifice
in clarity.
There does not appear to be any evidence in the historical records
on this precise interpretive question, but there are two good reasons for
believing the Senate bill was accurate in its interpretation of "State" in the
Original Jurisdiction Clause as a foreign or American state. First, the Senate bill was largely Oliver Ellsworth's handiwork. 120 Ellsworth, then a U.S.
Senator from Connecticut and a future Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, was an extraordinarily capable technical lawyer and a member of
the Constitutional Committee of Detail that drafted Article 111.121 He
would certainly have had insight into what the Framers of the Clause had
intended, for he was one of them.
Second, it is commonly accepted that the Original Jurisdiction
Clause was drafted with an eye to affording domestic and foreign sovereign litigants or their agents a credibly neutral, dignified hearing in the
highest court of the nation. 22 If suits involving American States and foreign ambassadors, public ministers, or consuls warranted the Court's
original cognizance, why not the foreign sovereign state itself, of which
an ambassador is merely an agent? Under contemporaneous international law, an ambassador or public minister was entitled to the dignity of
his sovereign "master," but he himself was not the sovereign, but rather
the master's agent. 123 That the Framers were aware that a "foreign state"
and its "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" were separate
entities is confirmed by the separate provision for each in Article III's
general grant of federal judicial power. In light of this, and given the
Original Jurisdiction Clause's provision for American States and foreign
envoys, it is reasonable to interpret the Clause's specification of "State
120. See William Maclay, Diary Entry of 29 June 1789, in 9 Documentary History of
the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 91, 91 (Kenneth R. Bowling &
Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) ("[T]his Vile Bill is a child of [Ellsworth's], and he defends it
with the Care of a parent."); see also William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early
Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 27 (1995).
121. See Casto, supra note 120, at 14, 31-32.
122. See supra Part I.A. No theory of the Original Jurisdiction Clause doubts that this
motive had something to do with its origin; opinions vary on principal cause. Such a
privilege would be unnecessary for the United States in its own courts.
123. See, e.g., Vattel, supra note 61, Book 4, § 70, at 520-21; id. Book 4, § 80, at
525-26; cf. Ex Parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925) (noting that the right to invoke the
Court's original jurisdiction under the "Ambassadors" provision "is a privilege, not of the
official, but of the sovereign or government which he represents"); Davis v. Packard, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 276, 284 (1833) ("If the privilege or exemption was merely personal ....
it
would [not] have been thought a matter sufficiently important to require a special
provision in the constitution and laws of the United States."). Gruber also held that the
"Ambassadors" provisions in Article III's general grant and necessarily the Original
Jurisdiction Clause applied only to foreign ambassadors. See 269 U.S. at 303.
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shall be Party" to include foreign states. 12 4 This necessarily reinforces the
argument that the Framers of the Constitution intended controversies between States and foreign states to fall within the Court's original
jurisdiction.
C. Does the OriginalJurisdiction Clause Require Any Exclusive
Supreme Court Jurisdiction?
Whether one believes that the State-as-Party half of the Original Jurisdiction Clause envisioned litigants in four "Controversies" or just those
three "Controversies" naming a State as party, one thing is clear from
section 13: Civil controversies between States and between States and foreign states were committed to the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. 125 As previously noted, section 13 opened by providing "[t]hat the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a
civil nature, where a state is a party," 126 subject to ensuing exceptions that
mention neither controversies between States nor controversies between
a State and a foreign state. 127 Under the Act, the Court's jurisdiction is
similarly exclusive only for "suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or
other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court
of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations."' 28 All
other categories of the Court's original jurisdiction, including suits between States and citizens of other States, foreign citizens, or foreign subjects, suits by ambassadors or ministers and associated domestics, and
suits involving consuls or vice consuls, are not exclusive under the First
Judiciary Act. 1 29 Under the modern statute, the Court's original jurisdic13 0
tion is exclusive only for "controversies between two or more States."
Members of the early Court were not so sure that the Constitution
permitted Congress to share the Court's original jurisdiction with lower
courts in this way. With respect to the ambassadors half of the Original
Jurisdiction Clause, the following statement in Federalist No. 81 is a good
starting point:
Public ministers of every class are the immediate representatives
of their sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned
124. Indeed, given doubt whether consuls were entitled to law-of-nations privileges
and protections of the sort enjoyed by ambassadors and public ministers, see infra note
151, their inclusion in the Original Jurisdiction Clause indicates the Framers' preference
for erring on the side of caution where a foreign sovereign's due dignity was concerned. It
is thus especially hard to believe the Framers intended to leave foreign states out of the
Original Jurisdiction Clause.
125. On the four controversies theory of United States v. Texas, the Court's original
jurisdiction under the Act was also exclusive for United States-versus-State controversies.

See 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
126. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
127. See id.

128. Id.
129. See id. ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81.

130. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000).
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are so directly connected with the public peace, that, as well for
the preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties
they represent, it is both expedient and proper that such quesin the first instance to the highest
tions should be submitted
1 31
judicatory of the nation.
In United States v. Ravara,13 2 a 1793 circuit court decision, the two
circuit justices on the three-judge panel disagreed about whether the First
Congress's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to lower federal courts in
cases affecting consuls was constitutional. According to Justice Wilson,
whose opinion prevailed in the case,
[A] lthough the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court an original jurisdiction, in cases like the present [involving a foreign
consul], it does not preclude the Legislature from exercising the
power of vesting a concurrent jurisdiction, in such inferior
Courts, as might by law be established .... 133
Justice Iredell took a different view, one that was consistent with
Hamilton's position quoted above:
I do not concur in this opinion, because it appears to me, that
for obvious reasons of public policy, the Constitution intended
to vest an exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, upon all
questions relating to the Public Agents of Foreign Nations. Besides, the context of the judiciary article of the Constitution
that the word original,
seems fairly to justify the interpretation,
34
means exclusive, jurisdiction.1
Chief Justice Marshall had this to say in Marbury v. Madison, which
supports Justice Iredell's interpretation of the Original Jurisdiction
Clause as disabling congressional discretion to vest the Court's original
jurisdiction concurrently in lower federal courts:
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and
inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have
defined the3 5judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should
be vested.1
Solely on the basis of the Act's foundational bifurcation into exclusive and nonexclusive categories, however, the Court has long presumed
that the Original Jurisdiction Clause contains no constitutional mandate
of original jurisdiction exclusive to the Court. 136 Although the Court has
131. The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
It is unclear whether Hamilton included consuls-the foreign officials at issue in Ravara,
discussed below-in the category of "[p]ublic ministers of every class."
132. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
133. Id. at 298 (Wilson, J.).
134. Id. at 298-99 (Iredell, J.).
135. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
136. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884) ("[W]e are unable to say that it is
not within the power of the Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States
jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution with
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formally affirmed nonexclusive jurisdiction in only two instances that
were nonexclusive under the 1789 Act-suits in which a consul is a
party1 37 and between a State and its citizens1 38-the conventional wisdom
is that Congress may concurrently grant the Court's original jurisdiction
to the lower federal courts as it pleases, without regard for whether such
jurisdiction was nonexclusive under the 1789 Act. 139 With respect to suits
against foreign ambassadors or ministers, the judicial code has provided
for nonexclusive jurisdiction in the Court since 1978,140 thereby reversing
the statutory exclusivity that had pertained since 1789. As to State-asoriginal jurisdiction."); B6rs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 260 (1884) ("[W]e concur.., that as
Congress was not expressly prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting
consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals ... , neither public policy nor convenience would
justify the court in implying such prohibition, and, upon such implication, pronounce the
act of 1789 to be unconstitutional and void."). Ames v. Kansas provides the best example of
this mode of analysis-extrapolating from the nonexclusive provisions of section 13 of the
1789 Act a presumption of nonexclusivity as a constitutional matter. 111 U.S. at 463-69.
Another crumb of possibly relevant evidence is typically not mentioned, perhaps
because it seems ambiguous and, to the extent any judgment can be made on its import, it
would seem to favor Justice Iredell's and Chief Justice Marshall's heretical position of the
wholesale constitutional exclusivity of the Court's original jurisdiction. Recall that the
Committee of Detail's draft of the precursor to the Original Jurisdiction Clause included
provision for the Court's original jurisdiction over "cases of impeachment." See supra note
46. The draft provision also stated that "[t]he Legislature may assign any part of the
jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the United States) in the
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it
shall constitute from time to time." One possible inference from the difference between
this provision and the absence of any mention of congressional power to share the Court's
original jurisdiction in the Original Jurisdiction Clause as it was ratified is that the Framers
intended the Court's original jurisdiction to be exclusive, that in rejecting the excised
language the Framers logically rejected its premise of nonexclusivity.
An alternative possible inference is that the Framers believed that congressional power
to share the Court's original jurisdiction was implicit in the Clause's language, and that
they therefore thought it unnecessary to draw the point out expressly. On this theory, the
Framers rejected the language explicitly affording congressional power to make the
Court's original jurisdiction nonexclusive without rejecting its meaning either for brevity
or for clarity, given that the parenthetical reference to impeachments had to be removed
in any event because of their decision to commit the power of trying impeachments to the
Senate and not the Court. This is the less persuasive view. Article III contains a clear
reference to congressional discretion over the Court's appellatejurisdiction reflected in the
words "with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make,"
which, but for the use of "Congress" instead of "Legislature," were entirely adopted from
the Committee of Detail's draft. In contrast, there is no such "exceptions" or "regulations"
language in the Original Jurisdiction Clause.
137. E.g., Bors, 111 U.S. at 260.
138. E.g., Ames, 111 U.S. at 469 (suit between Kansas and Kansas corporations). The
suit involved a federal question and was decided before the holding in California v. S. Pac.
Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257-58 (1895), limiting the Original Jurisdiction Clause to the partybased Controversies enumerated in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1.
139. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 271.
140. See Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808, 810 (1978)
(amending statute, which, like the 1789 Act, had provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the
Court for suits against ambassadors and public ministers). The modem statute provides
that
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party suits, the current statute, also in contrast to the First Judiciary Act,
provides that the Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive only for Stateversus-State cases, and not for State-as-party cases involving the United
States or a foreign state as the other party. 1 4 1 Indeed, the modern original jurisdiction statute does not even authorize nonexclusive original jurisdiction in the Court over suits by foreign states,1 4 2 but this does not
pose a constitutional difficulty in light of the presumption that the
Court's original jurisdiction is self-executing. (If it were not self-executing, the absence of a congressional statute authorizing exclusive or
nonexclusive jurisdiction over foreign state-versus-State controversies
would be an unconstitutional contraction of the Court's original
jurisdiction.'

43

)

In practice, nonexclusivity means that the Court's original jurisdiction is dramatically curtailed, for the Court is unlikely to exercise its jurisdiction in the first instance when a state court or lower federal court is
available.1 44 Moreover, even in cases such as State-versus-State controversies in which the Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive by statute, the
Court has held its original jurisdiction not to be mandatory, customarily
basing a discretionary denial of leave to file an original action on the
presence of an alternative forum. 1 45 An additional factor appears to be
the extent to which a suit by a State is perceived to be one in which it is

(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)
All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All controversies between the
United States and a State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the
citizens of another State or against aliens.
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251. The statute does not refer to suits against States by foreign
states; indeed, no part of the judicial Code provides explicitly for original jurisdiction over
such suits in federal court, even in the district courts. The diversity statute only provides
forjurisdiction in a suit by a foreign state against "citizens of a State or of different States,"
id. § 1332(a) (4), and a separate part of the Code provides for district court jurisdiction in
certain suits where a foreign state is defendant, see id. § 1330(a) '("The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction .. . of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state ... as to any
claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity .... "). Thus, under present law, a foreign state cannot bring a suit against a
State in any federal court on party status alone as the Original Jurisdiction Clause would
appear to contemplate.
142. See supra note 56 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1251).
143. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
144. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 299-303.
145. See cases cited supra note 9. Members of the Court and commentators have
decried this development. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 474 n.* (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 560-61; cf. McKusick, supra note 57, at
187-88, 198-201 (surveying Court's exercise of original jurisdiction from 1961 to 1993).
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rather than suing to
litigating as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens,
46
validate its own "sovereign" interest "qua State."'
The proposition that the Original Jurisdiction Clause contains no
constitutional mandate of exclusivity is a reasonable inference from the
First Judiciary Act's bifurcation into exclusive and nonexclusive categories of the Court's original jurisdiction, but it is neither the only inference
nor the best one. One could as reasonably (or more reasonably, given
that a narrow reading of the 1789 Act seems preferable when the issue at
stake is Congress's power over the self-executing original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court) assert that the First Congress considered its bifurcation to be descriptive of the Original Jurisdiction Clause rather than a
permissible exercise in legislative discretion. On this view, which I will
assert with one exception explained below, 1 4 7 what the Act says is exclusive to the Supreme Court is exclusive as a constitutional matter.'14 By
contrast, there would be no constitutional requirement of exclusivity for
suits between States and citizens of other States or aliens, suits against
consuls,14 9 and civil suits brought by ambassadors or public ministers,
which are nonexclusive under the terms of the 1789 Act.
To be clear, I am not asserting, as did Justice Iredell, that "the context of the judiciary article of the Constitution seems fairly to justify the
150
interpretation, that the word original, means exclusive, jurisdiction."
Nor am I arguing, as one might infer most sharply from the Senate bill
version of the Act, that the Court's original jurisdiction is constitutionally
exclusive in any cases in which an American or foreign state or ambassador, public minister, or consul is a defendant. 1 51 Finally, my claim is not
146. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 763-68 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Court for allowing original action by Maryland and seven States against
Louisiana for imposing natural gas tax with price effects on consumers in plaintiff States);
see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 77, at 510-15 (arguing that state standing was
traditionally limited to assertion of State's own common-law property or contract interests
and property-like boundary claims and, accordingly, advocating limits generally on parens
patriae suits and specifically on Court's original jurisdiction over State-versus-State suits
that could be litigated by private parties).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 152-164.
148. Cf. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900) (presuming Court's original
jurisdiction over suits between States to be exclusive as a constitutional matter in light of
exclusive provision in First Judiciary Act).
149. The Court has formally held its original jurisdiction to be nonexclusive in only
these two instances. See supra notes 137-138.
150. United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Iredell, J.).
151. The bill states, in pertinent part, that the Supreme Court
shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against
ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls, or their domestics or domestic
servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations;
and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits for trespasses brought by
ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls, or their domestics or domestic
servants.
Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong., at 6 (Thomas Greenleaf printed version) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). Section 13, by contrast, provides for nonexclusive jurisdiction in
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that exclusivity is constitutionally required in all three categories for
which the First Judiciary Act prescribed it: (1) controversies between
States; (2) controversies between a State and a foreign state; and (3)
"suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or
suits against consuls and vice consuls. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80
(affording nonexclusive jurisdiction in the Court of "all suits brought by ambassadors, or
other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul shall be a party."). Section 9
vests in the district courts 'jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all
suits against consuls or vice-consuls" except for certain criminal offenses. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at
77.
The difference between the Senate bill and the enacted version on this point may
have reflected a debate at contemporaneous international law about the diplomatic status
of consuls, whose primary responsibility-to oversee trade interests and umpire disputes
between merchants of his state in a foreign port-was commercial, not diplomatic. As
Vattel notes,
Wicquefort, in his treatise of The Ambassador, Book I § 5 says that consuls do not
enjoy the protection of the law of nations, and that both in civil and criminal
cases they are subject to the justice of the place where they reside. But the very
instances he cites contradict his proposition.
Vattel, supra note 61, Book 2, § 34, at 208. Even under current international law, "Consuls
are in principle distinct in function and legal status from diplomatic agents. Though
agents of the sending state for particular purposes, they are not accorded the type of
immunity from the laws and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving state enjoyed by
diplomatic agents." Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 355 (6th ed.
2003); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 465 cmt. a (1987) (comparing diplomatic and consular immunities). Alternatively,
vesting concurrent jurisdiction in district courts over suits against consuls and vice consuls
may have been a practical accommodation of the fact that such foreign officials would be
based at ports and not the national capital where the First Congress likely contemplated
the Supreme Court would be sited. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
The Senate bill's State-as-party provision, which, in contrast to its ambassadorial
provision for consuls, tracks the enacted portion of section 13, appears to authorize
nonexclusivejurisdiction in suits brought by citizens of other States or aliens against States.
The bill thus seems, at first glance, to contradict the theory that the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction when a party named in the Original Jurisdiction Clause is a
defendant. S. I at 6 ("[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction ...where any
of the United States or a foreign State is a party.., except also between a State and citizens
of other States or foreigners, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.").
It may be, however, that Ellsworth, in line with the future enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment, presumed that States would be entitled to sovereign immunity in suits
brought by foreigners or citizens of other States, and so presumed the exception to apply
solely to suits brought by States against out-of-state private parties, and not at all to suits in
which States might be defendants. This is consistent with Circuit Justice Iredell's opinion
in Farquhar v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga. 1791), reprinted in 5 The Documentary History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, at 154 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1994), in
which he rejected circuit court jurisdiction over a suit brought by an out-of-state citizen
against Georgia, notwithstanding section 13's explicit provision of nonexclusive
jurisdiction, reasoning, in part, "It may also fairly be presumed that the several States
thought it important to stipulate that so awful & important a Trial should not be
cognizable by any Court but the Supreme." The Supreme Court subsequently, and
famously, took the case as an original action without questioning the basis of CircuitJustice
Iredell's denial of circuit court jurisdiction. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793).
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their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations."' 5 2 (The holding in United States
v. Texas, if an accurate interpretation of section 13, would add to the list
controversies between the United States and a State, which are by current
statute concurrently committed to lower federal courts.15 3 ) Rather, the
idea I wish to explore is the possibility of a constitutional requirement of
exclusivity for the two categories of controversies between States and between a State and a foreign state only.
The argument that the First Judiciary Act's specification of exclusivity for suits against ambassadors, public ministers, or members of their
households was not constitutionally required-in contrast to the statute's
prescribed exclusivity in suits between American and foreign states and
among the States-starts with the pertinent language of the Original Jurisdiction Clause. The Clause vests original jurisdiction in the Court over
1 54
"Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.
The word "affecting" appears at first glance to be an expansive term, potentially extending original jurisdiction over any suit in which the interests of an ambassador, minister, or consul might be "affected," even if not
a party to the suit.155 The word is the likely hook for the FirstJudiciary
Act's extension of original jurisdiction to the constitutionally unenumerated category of cases involving an ambassador's or minister's domestics
and domestic servants.
But beyond that, the Act seems to assume that the constitutional
word "affecting" is a term of limitation. For one, the Act does not afford
original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Court over all suits against ambassadors, ministers, and their domestics, but rather only those such suits
"as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations." 15 6 More importantly, notwithstanding the open-ended connotation of "affecting," the Act only extends federal jurisdiction to cases in
which foreign representatives are formally parties, specifically by extending (1) original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Court "of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors," public ministers, or their domestics;
and (2) original and nonexclusive jurisdiction when an ambassador or
152. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2000). For the purposes of this Article, my
argument for the constitutional exclusivity of the Court's original jurisdiction extends to
controversies between States and between States and foreign states only. I can afford to
remain agnostic on the question of whether the Court's original jurisdiction over suits
between the United States and States recognized in United States v. Texas is similarly
exclusive as a constitutional matter. However, because I tend to agree with Chief Justice
Fuller andJustice Frankfurter that the decision was unwarranted in terms of constitutional
text and original intent, see supra text accompanying notes 107-110, I am inclined to the
present statute's position of nonexclusivity for United States-versus-State controversies.
154. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
155. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 306 ("Is the constitutionalcategory of cases
'affecting' foreign envoys exhausted by cases in which they are parties?").
156. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
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minister is a plaintiff, or a litigant on either side is a consul or vice-consul
(of lower rank than an ambassador or public minister, stationed in port
cities, and possibly not even entitled to diplomatic status 1 5 7 ). 1 5 8 The
Court has not taken issue with this party-based interpretation of the word
59
"affecting."1
What the Act's implementation of the Ambassadors Subclause suggests, then, is that the First Congress interpreted the constitutional text to
authorize some flexibility in affording exclusive jurisdiction in the Court
over the suits involving foreign representatives and their households most
likely to upset foreign relations. The textual hook for such legislative discretion is the word "affecting": "Cases affecting ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," might be understood to mean "Cases affecting
ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls in a way that might rupture or seriously disrupt relations with the sending foreign state." The
constitutional "provision, no doubt, was inserted in view of the important
and sometimes delicate nature of our relations and intercourse with foreign governments."1 60 Some disputes were more sensitive than others:
When an ambassador or minister is the plaintiff initiating a suit, or when
the defendant in a suit is a consul or vice-consul, it is not as likely to
matter to the foreign sovereign that the suit is heard in the highest national court. By contrast, when a suit is brought against an ambassador or
minister, the foreign sovereign could be counted on to care more about a
hearing in the supreme tribunal of the host nation. The First Congress
thus assigned suits against ambassadors, public ministers, 16 1 or their
households exclusively to the Supreme Court.
157. See supra notes 61, 151.
158. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81. The district courts were
correspondingly granted "jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all
[civil] suits against consuls or vice-consuls." Id. ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77. Interestingly,
neither federal district courts nor circuit courts were affirmatively granted jurisdiction over
suits by ambassadors or pubic ministers, notwithstanding the section 13 provision assigning
nonexclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. See id. ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77
(district courts); id. ch. 20, § 10, 1 Stat. at 77-78 (district courts for Kentucky and Maine);
id. ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79 (circuit courts). Thus, under the 1789 Act, an ambassador
or public minister could bring a civil suit in the Supreme Court or in a state court only, not
in a lower federal court. The possibility that an ambassador or public minister could sue as
an "alien" under the alien tort provision of section 9 of the 1789 Act is doubtful. See Lee,
Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute Theory, supra note 83 (manuscript at
19-22) (concluding that the word "alien" as it is used in the 1789 Act was confined to
private foreigners, not foreign ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls).
159. Cf United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 469 (1826) (holding that a
federal criminal prosecution for an assault committed against the Spanish charge d'affaires
in the United States is "not a case affecting a public minister" for purposes of the Original
Jurisdiction Clause).
160. Ex Parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925).
161. Vattel describes the range of "public Ministers" the Framers of the Constitution
and the First Congress likely had in mind. See Vattel, supra note 61, Book 4, §§ 69-74, at
520-22. The most important sort of public minister in vogue in the late eighteenth
century was the "envoy extraordinary" and "minister plenipotentiary" combined in the
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An application of legislative discretion to the same jurisdictional
question today would reasonably compel the conclusion that no ambassadorial civil suit is sensitive enough to warrant exclusive assignment to the
Court. For one, diplomatic immunity insulates foreign ambassadors and
ministers from most civil suits. 162 Moreover, the specific impetus for Congress's 1978 repudiation of the two hundred-year-old tradition of Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction in suits against ambassadors
was the proliferation of traffic accidents caused by ambassadors and their
household members. 1 63 The Supreme Court is ill equipped to serve as a
trial court for civil claims relating to traffic accidents, and, more importantly, it seems quite clear that this was not the sort of civil suit the Framers intended to entrust exclusively to the Supreme Court. One would
think that to be absolutely safe, Congress might reserve the Court's exclusive original jurisdiction over civil suits against ambassadors and ministers
for acts or omissions in the performance of their official duties, but it is
hard to see how such conduct would not be entitled to diplomatic
immunity.164
A similar logic of matching exclusivity to the sensitivity of a controversy can be discerned from the exclusivity provisions of the State-as-party
provisions of section 13 of the First Judiciary Act. Recall that section 13
confers exclusive jurisdiction only in controversies under the Original Jurisdiction Clause provision "in which a State shall be Party"' 65 against an-

same person for sensitive, ad hoc foreign-policy tasks, most notably the negotiation of
treaties. For instance, Chief Justice John Jay's status was that of envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary when he was sent to Great Britain to negotiate what is now called
the Jay Treaty of 1794. See infra Part IV.A.1. According to Vattel, ministers
plenipotentiary were "of much greater distinction than simple ministers. These neither
have any particular attribution of rank and character, but by custom are now placed
immediately after the ambassador, on a level with the envoy extraordinary." Vattel, supra
note 61, Book 4, § 74, at 522.
162. In fact, there have only been three cases invoking the Ambassadors Subclause in
the history of the Republic, and all three involved consuls. See Gruber, 269 U.S. at 303;
Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 677 (1877) (failing to consider jurisdictional questions in suit
against vice-consul of Italy); Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384 (1798) (dismissing,
without opinion, action against French consul general). The absence of any civil suits in
U.S. federal courts against foreign ambassadors or ministers is unsurprising when one
considers that the First Congress enacted a criminal statute in 1790 making it a crime
punishable by fine and three years' imprisonment to serve civil or criminal process against
"the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any foreign prince or state ...
or any domestic or domestic servant of any." An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes
against the United States, ch. 9, §25, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (1790); see also id. § 26, 1 Stat. at
118 (prescribing punishments).
163. S. Rep. No. 95-1108, at 3 (1978). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 651-54 (2003) (discussing the state of law of diplomatic
and other immunities); Brownlie, supra note 151, at 349-55.
164. See Brownlie, supra note 151, at 349-55.
165. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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other State or a foreign state.1 6 6 Such sovereign-to-sovereign suits are evidently more important to national or international peace than suits
between States and out-of-state private parties, over which the Act vests
lower courts with concurrent jurisdiction.
The relevant constitutional text, however, seems at first a formidable
impediment to the proposition that the Constitution requires exclusive
vesting in the Court of jurisdiction over the sovereign-to-sovereign suits
the Act makes exclusive but not over State-as-party suits involving private
parties. That is, the words "in which a State shall be Party," do not seem
to permit the sort of flexible interpretation as to a constitutional requirement of exclusivity afforded by the open-ended word "affecting" in the
Ambassadors Subclause. It would appear particularly difficult to see how
those words compel exclusivity in one set of State-as-party cases but not in
another.
The constitutional text, of course, is not necessarily inconsistent with
the belief inferable from the 1789 Act that the Framers of the Constitution intended some suits to be exclusively heard in the Court. The
phrase "in which a State shall be Party" simply does not appear to address
the question of exclusivity at all.
In my view, there is at least a plausible case that the text affirmatively
supports the interpretation that concurrent vesting in lower courts for
suits in which "a State shall be Party" and the other party is not a sovereign state is constitutional, but that such vesting when all the litigants in
the suit are sovereign states (State-versus-State or foreign state-versusState) would be unconstitutional. In the latter case, at least relying on
Ellsworth's Senate bill interpretation of "State" to mean American or foreign state, 16 7 each of the states-parties to the litigation could assert original jurisdiction in the Court on the basis of the words "in which a State
shall be Party," so long as the opponents were Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 "Controversies" enumerated parties and regardless of the specific identity of the opposing enumerated party. 168 By contrast, in a suit
between a private party and a State, the private party would have no free166. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80. Once again, the theory of
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), would add suits between States and the United
States. See text accompanying notes 103-109.
167. The Court has held that "State" as the word is used in the Original Jurisdiction
Clause does not refer to the United States. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
583 n.3 (1943). The consequence of this, in light of my argument here, is that the Court's
original jurisdiction over suits between the United States and the States is not exclusive as a
constitutional matter.
168. For instance, in a State-versus-State suit, State A could invoke the Court's
jurisdiction solely because it was a party regardless of whether its opponent was another
State, a foreign state, or a citizen of another State or a foreign state, and State B could do
the same. In a foreign state-versus-State suit, the foreign state could invoke the Court's
jurisdiction if it were a "State" for purposes of the Original Jurisdiction Clause, regardless
of whether its opponent was a State or a state citizen, and a State could invoke the Court's
jurisdiction regardless of whether the opponent were another State, a foreign state, or a
citizen of another State or a foreign state.
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standing right of access to the Court's jurisdiction: Whether the Court
has jurisdiction under the Original Jurisdiction Clause would depend entirely on the state-party character of his opponent. Accordingly, it seems
plausible that the words "in which a State shall be Party" might be read to
mean that the Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive in a suit 'in which
a State shall be Party' and 'in which a State shall be Party' on the other
side, but nonexclusive in a suit 'in which a State shall be Party' and a nonState shall be Party on the other side. In other words, one could infer
from the State-as-Party Subclause that differing treatment (namely, exclusivity of the Court's jurisdiction) might be justified as between cases in
which the only litigants were state parties and those involving non-state
parties.
But even if one were to conclude that the text is unhelpful one way
or the other, there are strong reasons to conclude that the Constitution
requires exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over suits between
States and between States and foreign states. First, as previously noted,
original jurisdiction in the Court for cases involving ambassadors and
States was intended in important part to match the dignity of sovereign or
sovereign-agent litigants by ensuring a hearing in the supreme national
judicial forum. The forum dignity rationale also justifies exclusivity of the
Court's original jurisdiction in the subset of these cases that most implicates sovereign parties. Indeed, because the Court's original jurisdiction
is self-executing, the only reason for drafting section 13 at all would be to
delineate which parts of it would be, or, in my view, had to be, exclusive.
On this logic, State-versus-State and foreign state-versus-State controversies present a stronger case than ambassadorial suits for an exclusive
hearing in the supreme national tribunal as a constitutional matter. First,
the sovereign foreign state is logically entitled to more forum dignity than
the ambassador or minister who represents it. An ambassador or minister
is a natural person with the legal status of a diplomatic agent; a sovereign
state is the sovereign entity itself.169 Second, for a sovereign state, foreign
or American, to be judged by the tribunal of another sovereign state
(here the United States) implies an inferiority of station at odds with sovereign equality. To entrust a controversy to an inferior tribunal of the
forum state multiplies the sense of inferiority. AsJustice Harlan observed
in discussing the section 13 State-as-party provision for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court, "Such exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court because it best comported with the dignity of a state, that a case in which it
was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in a
subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation." 170 Third, controversies between States or between a State and a foreign state would seem to pose
169. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
170. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892); cf. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 n.11 (2002) (noting that "allowing a private party to
haul a State in front of ...an administrative tribunal" might be "a greater insult to a State's
dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article III court presided over by a judge
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more of a threat to national or international peace than incidents relating to ambassadors or public ministers by virtue of their direct sovereignto-sovereign character. Nor would a suit by a foreign state against a State
alleging violation of a U.S. treaty obligation require the sort of factfinding
necessitated by a traffic suit.
Indeed, while every member of the Supreme Court except Justice
Iredel1171 and Chief Justice Marshall 1 72 has thought concurrent jurisdiction constitutional in cases affecting foreign envoys (albeit only in cases
involving consuls), the Court has repeatedly indicated that original jurisdiction over controversies between a State and American and foreign
states is constitutionally exclusive to the Court. Justice Harlan remarked
on the unique suitability of the Supreme Court for disputes between
States and other sovereign states in a way that shows he believed it a
match made by the Framers of the Constitution:
[T]o what tribunal could a trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than to that which the people of the United
States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice
and insure domestic tranquillity, have constituted with authority
to speak for all the people and all the States, upon questions
173
before it to which the judicial power of the nation extends?
Chief Justice Fuller, in referring to the Court's original jurisdiction
of controversies between States, concluded that "by the Constitution[,]
. . the original jurisdiction of this court is exclusive over suits between
States." 174 Likewise, the Court in United States v. Minnesota opined: "Of
course the immunity of the State is subject to the constitutionalqualification that she may be sued in this Court by the United States, a sister State,
or a foreign State. 1 75 By contrast, no member of the Court has ever
suggested that the Court's original jurisdiction over suits between States
and between States and foreign states is not exclusive as a constitutional
matter. In any event, the question of whether the Court's original jurisdiction over suits against States by foreign states is exclusive has not been
1 76
decided.
*

D. The Ramifications of ConstitutionalExclusivity
It should be noted, however, that there is no specific indication from
the historical materials that the Court's original jurisdiction, even when
with life tenure nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the
United States Senate").
171. See United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298-99 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(Iredell, J.).
172. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
173. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 645.
174. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900).
175. 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926) (emphasis added).
176. Nor, for that matter, has it been decided for suits between States, although that
issue is likely never to come up so long as Congress continues to enact an original and
exclusive jurisdiction statute.
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exclusive, was intended to preclude principled discretion in denying motions for leave to file original actions. The procedure itself-an original
action begins not with process served on a defendant but with a motion
by the plaintiff for leave to file the suit in the Court-implies some
greater measure of latitude in the forum's deciding whether to hear the
suit than in a common civil action. Indeed, every step in an original action must be preceded by a special motion. 177 The apparent reason for
this was the dignified character of sovereign litigants:
This original docket is a thing by itself, and all proceedings in
these cases on the original docket are on motion. No case is
heard, unless the court makes a special order to have it heard.
No proceeding takes place in any of these original cases without
a special order. If, for instance, a suit is brought by Virginia
against West Virginia, as there was such a controversy not long
since, the State of Virginia has to obtain leave to file a bill, to
obtain process and have it served, and so get the State of West
Virginia before the Court. The next thing is, to obtain from the
court an order that West Virginia answer. That is done on motion, by a special order, and the time is fixed. Every step that is
taken in the case is on some special motion. That, I suppose, is
on account of the dignity of the parties, the nature of the agencies they must employ, and the importance of the subject-matter
178
involved.
Given the acute sensitivity of foreign state-versus-State treaty controversies in the early Republic,179 it is plausible that the Framers intended
to allow the Court some flexibility in deciding whether to hear a particularly sensitive original action. 180 For example, although Article III, Section 2, Clause l's specification of controversies "between a State . . . and
foreign States" would seem to encompass suits by States against foreign
states, contemporaneous principles of international law precluded suit
against a foreign sovereign in national courts absent consent, 8 1 and so it
is almost certain that the early Court would have denied leave to file such
a suit in the first place, although the prevailing view today is that there is
no constitutional basis for foreign sovereign immunity.'8 2 The Court, of
177.
178.
(citation
179.

See Sup. Ct. R. 17.
Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 23-24
omitted).
See infra note 291 and accompanying text.

180. Cf. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900) ("[l]t is apparent that the [Court's
original] jurisdiction [over 'Controversies between two or more States'] is of so delicate
and grave a character that it was not contemplated that it would be exercised save when the
necessity was absolute and the matter in itself properly justiciable.").
181. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451 (1793) (Blair, J.) ("[T]he
instances may rarely occur, when a State may have an opportunity of suing in the American
Courts a foreign State .... "); cf. id. at 467 (Cushing, J.) (arguing that "the reason of the
thing, as well as the words of the Constitution, tend to sh[o]w that the Federal Judicial
power extends to a suit brought by a foreign State against any one of the United States.").
182. Cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492-97 (1983) (holding
that a suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
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course, has granted itself discretion to deny leave to file a motion in original actions between States, even though its jurisdiction is exclusive by
83
statute.1
Professor David Shapiro, in a characteristically judicious article, has
taken issue with this line of cases.1 84 His point is not that judicial discretion over whether to hear a case is necessarily a bad thing, but that any
exercise of discretion must be cabined by principles consistent with Article III.
[T]he concept of "principled discretion" is [not] an oxymoron.
In the present context, it means that criteria drawn from the
relevant statutory or constitutional grant of jurisdiction or from
the tradition within which the grant arose guide the choices to
be made in the course of defining and exercising that jurisdiction. Of equal importance, it means that these criteria are capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by critics of the courts' work, and reviewed by the legislative
branch. 185
The need for principled discretion seems particularly acute in suits over
which the Court's jurisdiction is exclusive, since by definition there is no
8 6
alternative forum.'
In identifying principles to guide discretion over foreign state-versusState controversies, it is worth remembering that such suits differ from
State-versus-State original actions. Whatever the merits of the Court's inclination to deny motions for original actions in cases where a State is
suing parens patriae on behalf of its citizens, 18 7 such a rationale does not
apply when a foreign state is plaintiff. As we shall see, a foreign state's
right to sue on behalf of its aggrieved citizen in the Court is grounded in
the international law doctrine of espousal, which, unlike its domestic
cousin of parens patriae, cannot be subjected to question on the ground
of its ultimate private nature.' 8 8 This is because the States, as participants
in the American Union, have surrendered the right to wage war against
the United States to vindicate the claims of their citizens 8 9 and are, at
the same time, participants in the national government through their
representatives in Congress and participation in presidential elections. 190
(1982), arises under federal law for purpose of Article I1l). See generally Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 571-635.
183. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.
184. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 560-61.
185. Id. at 578.
186. See id.
187. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
188. See infra Parts III.C, III.E.
189. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883) (States "can neither
make war nor peace without the consent of the national government.").
190. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558 (1954) (arguing that the States' participation in the national
government is the principal and sufficient safeguard of their semisovereign interests).

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1809

Foreign states, by contrast, retain the right to wage war and do not have
the right of direct participation in the selection of American national government officials. Foreign states' rights to wage war under international
law, though not a concern in the present era of American strength, were
so vivid a concern in the founding era of American weakness that it inspired the Framers of the Constitution to invest the highest national
court with the international function of peacefully mediating U.S. treaty
disputes arising from state violations, to present foreign states with a plausible alternative to war or diplomacy for resolving such disputes. 191
But although the purported principle that a suit by a sovereign is
really a suit on behalf of its citizens cannot validate the Court's declining
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign state-versus-State suits, three other
relevant factors may justify refusal to exercise the Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The first, as already noted, is consideration for the foreign state's
sovereign immunity, whether guaranteed by statute or federal common
law based on international law principles. This principle necessarily acts
191. See infra Part III.A. In a recent article, Professor Ann Woolhandler reached the
contrary conclusion that "[o]n the whole, foreign government standing paralleled state
standing." See Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation
Model, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 757, 765 (2002); see also Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster,
229 F.3d 332, 337-38 (lst Cir. 2000) (concluding that the fact that the States gave up the
right to war was a reason to recognize a broader principle of state standing than foreign
state standing to assert citizen claims). My difference of opinion with her is not so much
about her facts, which are scrupulously researched, but with the conclusions to be drawn
from them. The suits Professor Woolhandler focuses on were the few suits involving
foreign states typically brought under the lower federal courts' in rem admiralty
jurisdiction for sovereign property claims. See Woolhandler, supra, at 765-69. There were
also some suits brought by foreign consuls in their capacity as commercial agents for fellow
citizen merchants concerning ships or other res in dispute in American ports, but these do
not pose a difficulty for her conclusion because, as noted above, consuls were not viewed as
full diplomatic representatives of foreign sovereign states, but rather as commercial agents
for foreign merchants during their sojourns abroad. On her view, alienage jurisdiction
generally assured vindication of individual rights by the directly affected aliens, and the
adjudication of controversies involving foreign states would have additionally implicated
separation of powers concerns. See id. at 768-72. My argument, which is developed in
Part III, infra, is that while private alienage jurisdiction and diplomacy by the executive
branches were the principal lines of defense in treaty disputes, the Framers established as a
war-avoidance, fallback provision specially tailored to the risk of state defection from a U.S.
treaty with a powerful foreign state-the Court's original jurisdiction over controversies
between foreign states and States (importantly, not between foreign states and the United
States). Put another way, Professor Woolhandler may be correct in her view that the
Framers did not particularly care for or favor a broad principle of state or foreign-state
standing to litigate private rights in federal court, but in the foreign-state context, they
strongly preferred a broader conception of standing to the prospect of the foreign state
choosing to prosecute a State's alleged violation of international law by the alternative
instrument of war. Because this preference was fixed in the Constitution, it is not subject
to prudential waiver by the Court as state parens patriae standing might be. This unique
category of constitutional jurisdiction, necessitated by American weakness in international
affairs at the founding, was not in fact invoked until 1934, and then unsuccessfully so,
which is unsurprising given the radical intervening change in America's place in the world
balance of power. See infra Part V.A.
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to protect the foreign state in an original action brought against it by a
State.
The second is the principle of prior resort to other measures by the
foreign state; although the state's decision to espouse is not itself subject
to question,' 9 2 the Court might decline jurisdiction over an original action if the foreign state has not made good-faith efforts to resolve a controversy with a State by diplomacy with the national government. As this
Article will demonstrate, the Framers understood that the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction over foreign state-versus-State disputes
would operate in tandem with diplomatic and private judicial remedies.1 9 3 To be sure, at the founding, the condition of American weakness
in world affairs meant that the Framers would have preferred a foreign
state's resort to the Court over heavy-handed diplomacy or war, but it
seems, in my view, consistent with the Framers' intent for the Court presently to take cognizance of alternative political measures as a prudential
matter in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a particular origi94
nal suit brought by a foreign state against a State.'
The third principle is more fact-bound, and has to do with the specifics of Monaco. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
States, and then foreign states, were assigned or begifted state debt obligations by private noteholders in efforts to make end-runs around the
Eleventh Amendment's express bar on suits by citizens of other States or
foreign citizens or subjects. 195 As a doctrinal matter, the Court turned
such state efforts back under the rationale that the claims at issue were
really private ones 19 6 and, as to foreign state efforts, by the holding in
Monaco that Eleventh Amendment immunity extended to suits against
States by foreign states. Although I contend the reasoning behind the
latter doctrinal holding is fundamentally mistaken, the Court, in my view,
would be justified in upholding the Monaco decision on its facts: A State
192. See infra text accompanying notes 397-400.
193. See infra Part III.A-D.
194. As I elaborate below, the fact that political measures are available does not
trigger a constitutional separation of powers objection to the extension of the Court's
original jurisdiction. Moreover, any prudential separation of powers objection is mitigated
because the specific legal question at issue-the domestic meaning and enforcement of a
ratified U.S. treaty as against a State-is clearly justiciable. See infra text accompanying
notes 335-341, 359-365
195. See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1934)
(charitable gift to Monaco of Mississippi pre-Civil War bonds); Republic of Cuba v. North
Carolina, 242 U.S. 665, 665 (1917) (charitable gift to Republic of Cuba of North Carolina
bonds); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321-22 (1904) (charitable gift to
South Dakota of North Carolina railroad bonds from private donor); New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (assignments to New Hampshire and New York of
Louisiana Civil War-era bonds).
196. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 91 (dismissing suits brought
by New Hampshire on behalf of its citizens); see also infra Part III.E. But see South Dakota
v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. at 321-22 (upholding Court's original jurisdiction in the suit
brought by South Dakota to enforce the railroad bonds).
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is entitled to immunity when a foreign state alleges state law claims, or, I
would add, even federal constitutional or statutory claims, against a State
on behalf of its national, but does not allege the violation of a treaty by
the State. In a case where a foreign state brings a mixed bag of treaty and
other claims, the Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction
only if the core of the suit is an international treaty obligation. 197 Drawing such a distinction seems consistent with original intent and would
also serve as an approximate, but serviceable, screen to filter out suits
brought by foreign states that are not in some way central to the U.S.
national interest in foreign affairs, as signified by the existence of a U.S.
treaty underlying the foreign state's claim.
The conclusion that suits between States and between States and foreign states were the most important suits covered by the Original Jurisdiction Clause, and were accordingly entrusted by the Framers of the Constitution for exclusive resolution by the Supreme Court (as opposed to any
other state or federal court), is relevant to an important debate about the
meaning of the words "Cases" and "Controversies" in Article III, Section
2, Clause 1. To begin with, the classification of those two categories of
sovereign-to-sovereign disputes as "Controversies" suggests that the use of
the word was meant to signify suits of international or quasi-international
(in the sense of interstate)s9 8 character. This is confirmed by the fact
that other "Controversies" in Article III's general grant are those "between a State and Citizens of another State," "between Citizens of different States," "between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the
Grants of different States," and "between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."1 9 9 Civil "Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party, '20 0 in contradistinction to "all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under" federal law 20 1 to which the U.S. might be
party, could also be characterized as quasi-international in nature, "insofar as they might involve the [federal] courts in international governmental functions in the sense of a supra-State governmental body challenging
a State's misconduct (like the United Nations with respect to the United
States' failure to pay dues).-202
197. For instance, the Court would be justified in denying jurisdiction to a foreign
state bringing a class-action tort suit against a State on behalf of its nationals who are U.S.
resident aliens, for instance, on the theory that the tort claims simultaneously stated claims
of violation of basic safe conducts guaranteed by venerable treaties of amity and
commerce. See Lee, Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute Theory, supra note 88
(manuscript at 24-27). But for the fact of the alien status of the plaintiffs, such a suit
would be indistinguishable from a plain-vanilla tort class action.
198. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (using "quasi-international"
in this interstate sense, rather than to describe the Court's role in adjudicating foreign
state-versus-State treaty disputes as the word is used in this Article); supra text
accompanying note 13.
199. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1058.
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This interpretive point suggests the following distinction made by
Professor Robert Pushaw between Article III, Section 2, Clause l's use of
the words "Cases" and "Controversies":
Article III contemplated that the federal courts' main function
in federal question, admiralty, and foreign minister "Cases"
would be to declare the law in matters of national and international importance. By contrast, "controversy" meant a bilateral
dispute wherein a judge served principally as a neutral umpire
whose decision bound only the immediate parties. Hence, the
Framers expected federal courts to act chiefly as independent
arbitrators in resolving20 Article
III "Controversies," with any legal
3
exposition incidental.
Although I agree with Professor Pushaw on the meaning of those
words in Article 111,204 1 disagree with his conclusion as to the significance
of the distinction regarding congressional power over federal jurisdiction. Professor Pushaw uses the interpretive point to support a thesis
presented by Professor Akhil Amar, building upon a theory first suggested by Justice Joseph Story.20 5 In a vivid and thought-provoking article, Professor Amar argued that the Framers intended "two tiers" of federal jurisdiction, with Article III's use of the words "all Cases" signifying
suits of sufficient importance to require congressional vesting in national
courts, and a second tier of Article III "Controversies" of less importance,
without a constitutional mandate of statutory vesting in national
courts. 20 6 On Professor Amar's theory, the Constitution does not require
203. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 449-50 (1994); see also RobertJ.
Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the NeoFederalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 847, 865 (An Article III
"Controversy" referred to "a dispute between two parties (often governments) that was
resolved by a neutral umpire.").
204."Cases" [referred] to jurisdictional headings in which the federal courts were
to adjudicate in a more binding law-like manner as authoritative national
tribunals, paradigmatically on federal criminal matters. On the other hand,
controversies" delineated politically-sensitive international jurisdictional
headings where the federal courts . . . [tended] more to mediation than
adjudication, and to exclusively civil matters as opposed to "cases" that could be
either civil or criminal.
Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1059.
205. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-36 (1816).
206. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 53, at 240-46; see also Amar,
Marbury, supra note 53, at 478-88 (squaring the two-tiered theory with the Original
Jurisdiction Clause and Section 13 of the FirstJudiciary Act); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of
My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651 (1990) (defending
the two-tiered theory against critics); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Theory of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (1990) (interpreting the Act as consistent
with the two-tiered explanation); cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 55-56 (1981) (arguing that the
"history and logic of the Constitution" require Congress to vest original or appellate
jurisdiction over "all Cases ... arising under this Constitution" in Article III federal courts).

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1813

Congress to vest any federal court jurisdiction over "Controversies" at all,
including controversies between States and between States and foreign
states-although should Congress opt to vest such original jurisdiction,
his interpretation of the Original Jurisdiction Clause would require con20 7
gressional vesting in the Supreme Court.
Professor Amar's argument is inconsistent with the position taken in
this Article that the Framers thought "Controversies" between States and
between States and foreign states to be so important and sensitive as to
warrant exclusive assignment to the Supreme Court as a constitutional
matter. A necessary consequence of the Court's constitutionally self-executing original and exclusive jurisdiction over these two sets of "Controversies" is that Congress lacks any power to alter this jurisdiction, whether
to make it concurrent or to choose not to vest it at all. As others have
noted, it is entirely implausible that the Framers would have thought that
controversies between States, in particular, might be committed to resolution in state courts alone at Congress's discretion. 20 8
But to argue the counterthesis to Professors Amar and Pushaw-that
all controversies were considered important enough by the Framers to
require congressional vesting-seems, in my view, an equally mistaken
proposition. The better view is to conclude that although the Framers
appear to have understood "Cases" and "Controversies" as different in
character, they did not think that one group or the other, as a general
matter, was more important with respect to Congress's decision to vest
federal jurisdiction. 20 9 The Framers likely thought federal jurisdiction
207. See Amar, Marbury, supra note 53, at 480-83.
208. See Meltzer, supra note 63, at 1607-08; cf. Harrison, supra note 53, at 248-49
(analyzing use of word "all" in Article III to illustrate "serious textual difficulties" in
"Amar's mandatory-permissive division").
209. See William Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
131, 133 (1990) (reaching same conclusion based on interpretive theory that "cases"
signified criminal or civil matters and "controversies" applied to civil matters only). The
distinction between the two words, in my view, does have force in interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1059.
Most scholars believe the Amendment restricts only suits against States brought by citizens
of other States or foreign citizens or subjects on the basis of diversity. Thus, they contend,
the Amendment would not bar suits brought by such private parties arising under federal
law. See articles cited supra note 71. A textual problem with this theory is that the word
"Controversies" is used in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 in both the underlying provisions;
in light of this fact, why does the Amendment bar "any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against" a State by citizens of other States and foreign citizens or subjects, and
not "controversies commenced or prosecuted against" a State? It may be that the Framers
of the Amendment used the words "any suit in law or equity" to signify an intent to extend
state sovereign immunity in "Controversies" between States and noncitizens to suits that
might also be "Cases, in law or equity" arising under federal law such as, for instance, suits
by British creditors under article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace. See Definitive Treaty of
Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace]. Under the
diversity theory, the private plaintiff in such a suit could easily avoid the Amendment by
pleading federal question jurisdiction only if a general federal question statute were
available (which was not the case in 1798) or, even without such a statute, by invoking the
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was more important for some controversies (e.g., between States and
other States or foreign states) than some cases (e.g., affecting consuls).
Conversely, some cases (e.g., arising under federal law) were likely viewed
as more important than some controversies (e.g., between citizens of different States), just as not all cases (e.g., cases affecting consuls as compared to cases arising under the Constitution) or controversies (e.g., controversies between citizens of different States as opposed to controversies
among two or more States) were created equal. 2 10 What this Article's
thesis as to the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between foreign states and States indicates, however, is that such
suits, along with controversies between States, were the most sensitive disputes on Article III's jurisdictional menu and accordingly were suitable
for entrustment to the highest national tribunal and no other. They
were, therefore, constitutionally excepted from the cognizance of state
courts or lower federal courts.
To summarize Part I, the Original Jurisdiction Clause grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits between States and foreign
states, the First Judiciary Act makes this jurisdiction exclusive to the
Court, and, more controversially, there is a plausible argument that exclusive jurisdiction in such suits, as well as in suits between States, is constitutionally mandated. Although there is no statute presently conferring
original jurisdiction of suits by foreign states against States on the Supreme Court (or any federal court), the Court's original jurisdiction is
self-executing, so all the Court would have to do is grant a foreign state's
motion for leave to file an original action against a State.
II.

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND SUITS BY
FOREIGN STATES AGAINST STATES

Whatever might be said about the text of the Original Jurisdiction
Clause and theories of why it was drafted, in order to make the case for
constitutional authorization of original actions in the Supreme Court by
foreign states against States on treaty-based claims today, one must adCourt's self-executing original but nonexclusive jurisdiction over State-as-party suits
involving aliens or citizens of other States.
210. For example, one constitutional amendment proposed in 1789 in the House of
Representatives that was never ratified would have limited Article III, Section 2, Clause l's
"Controversies" grant to "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and foreign States, and
between citizens of the United States claiming the same lands under grants of different
States." Journal of the House of Representatives 82-83 (Aug. 18, 1789), reprinted in 3
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 1, 154
(Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1977) (providing as to Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, "Strike
out the words, 'between a State and citizens of another State,' &c to the end; and amend to
read thus: 'between a State and foreign States, and between citizens of the United States,
claiming the same lands under grants of different States"). Those who proposed the
amendment appear to have perceived no need for federal jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship and State-noncitizen suits.
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dress the subsequent evolution of state sovereign immunity doctrine.
The ratification of the Eleventh Amendment-the textual basis for state
immunity-was certified in 1798,211 eleven years after the drafting of the
Constitution and nine years after the First Judiciary Act. The Amendment limits the possible construction of the Article III, Section 2, Clause
1 jurisdictional grants involving suits against a State. Since it is established that the Original Jurisdiction Clause can confer only what the general grant authorizes, the Court's original jurisdiction would be similarly
constitutionally circumscribed. In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, the
Supreme Court held that the general grant did not extend to suits by
2 12
foreign states against nonconsenting States.
The prevailing doctrine acknowledges, however, that the States are
not immune in certain circumstances. For instance, a State may waive its
immunity by consenting to appear in a suit against it 21 3 or litigating the
suit. 214 Second, Congress may abrogate a State's sovereign immunity by

making a clear statement of intent to abrogate in legislation to enforce
the later enacted Fourteenth Amendment. 21 5 Third, a State does not
211. See Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America 56-57 (1993)
("By February 7, 1795, the Eleventh Amendment had won the support of enough states to
be added to the Constitution, though it was not promulgated as such for nearly three
years.").
212. 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
213. E.g., Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
214. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620-24 (2002) (holding that
State waived immunity by voluntarily agreeing to remove case to federal court).
215. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Although Congress logically may
be presumed to have such powers of abrogation in enacting laws to enforce the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, the Court has recently held that it may not abrogate sovereign
immunity when legislating under its Article I powers. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 364 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000); Coll. Say. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). Treaties, to the extent they are not self-executing,
would require congressional legislation of "necessary and proper" laws under Article I and,
therefore, most likely would not suffice to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Mitchell
N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How
to "Fix" FloridaPrepaid (and How Not To), 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1037, 1189-94 (2001); Carlos
Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 713, 741-42
(2002). But see Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1399, 1460-61
(2000) (arguing that because "state sovereignty has never been understood to extend to
international affairs," Congress may be empowered under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the interest of international diplomacy).
Professor Vdzquez plausibly assumes that the "conclusion . . . that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity in implementing non-self-executing treaties means a
fortiori that the treaty-makers may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to selfexecuting treaties." Vdzquez, supra, at 725 n.62. Of course, if I am right that foreign states
have a right to sue States for treaty breach on the theory of ratification consent, abrogation
of state sovereign immunity by treaty would be unnecessary, at least where the foreign state
brings its treaty claim directly against a State in an original action before the Supreme
Court.
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have immunity as a litigant in certain in rem proceedings before a federal
2 16
court with legal custody of the res.
The "exception" at issue here, however, is not really an exception, so
to speak. It is, rather, a theory of prior, durable consent by ratification of
the Constitution-that the States, in accepting the original constitutional
bargain, consented to special categories of suits as a necessary condition
of union-essentially, constitutional nonimmunity. The specific goal of
such consent by ratification was to maintain peace by enabling judicial
resolution of sovereign controversies as an alternative to war. Certainly,
everything said in Part I of this Article supports the proposition of ratification consent, limited to the Court's original jurisdiction, in suits against
States by foreign states. Under present doctrine, however, ratification
consent is confined to two categories of sovereign litigants: other States
and the United States. The point of this Part is to show why the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, historical evidence, and the sovereign dignity
justification for sovereign immunity compel the conclusion that the
States similarly gave ratification consent to suit by foreign sovereign
states, notwithstanding the holding in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi.
A. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi
In 1933, the legation of the Principality of Monaco in Paris, France,
received an "unconditional gift... to be applied to the causes of any of its
charities, to the furtherance of its internal development or to the benefit
of its citizens in such manner as it may select. '2 17 The gift consisted of
fifty-five bonds totaling $100,000 in aggregate face value that Mississippi
had issued between 1833 and 1838. The bonds had come due between
218
1850 and 1866, but the State had refused to make payment.
The gift came with a letter from private American donors attesting to
the legality of transfers over the years from the original bondholders. 21 9
The letter explained that Mississippi had long since defaulted on the
bonds. The donors, it continued, had been advised by their lawyers that
they, as private parties, could not bring suit against the State on the
bonds, "but that such a suit could only be maintained by a foreign government or one of the United States." 220 The donation thus appears to
have been a litigation stratagem to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment,
which by its literal terms barred suits against a State "by Citizens of an216. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 1912-13
(2004) (finding State not immune in federal bankruptcy proceeding with State-owned
student loan debt as res); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 507 (1998)
(finding State not immune from in rem admiralty suit because disputed res was subject to
federal jurisdiction).
217. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. at 317.
219. Id. at 317-18.
220. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State," 22 1 and had
been extended by Hans v. Louisiana to prohibit suits brought by citizens
of the State itself.222 The Amendment did not say anything about suits by
foreign states or other States. Hence the American bondholders conferred the gift to Monaco, a presumptive foreign state.
Monaco promptly commenced litigation to collect on the bonds. It
filed a motion in the Supreme Court for leave to file an original action
against Mississippi under the Court's original jurisdiction in cases "in
which a State shall be Party." 223 The suit itself appears to have involved
nothing more than a simple state law breach-of-contract claim. Mississippi rejoined that "[tihe compact of the States in the Constitution imposed no duties and conferred no rights upon any foreign nation."2 2 4
Logically, then, Mississippi's consent was prerequisite to suit in the Court.
The State pointed out that any statutory consent to suit enacted by its
legislature had long since expired (in 1880), that it had additionally disavowed any obligation to redeem the bonds by an amendment to its constitution in 1890, and "that since [the Amendment's] adoption no foreign State could accept the bonds in question as a charitable donation in
2 25
good faith."
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by ChiefJustice Hughes, agreed
that Mississippi had not consented and denied Monaco's motion for leave
to file suit under its original jurisdiction. It could have done so on a
narrow ground such as a ruling of untimeliness on the Mississippi statute
of limitations or on the ground that the assignment to Monaco was collusively made to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. 226 Both subconstitutional
grounds, however, were fraught with annoying complexity: The first
would have required a foray into muddy Mississippi law, and the second
would have required a factual investigation into the circumstances of the
227
donation that the Court as an institution was ill equipped to handle.
221. U.S. Const. amend. XI. The inspiration for the stratagem was clearly the success
of South Dakota in an analogous suit against North Carolina. See South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321-22 (1904).
222. See 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890).
223. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
224. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 316.
225. Id. at 319.
226. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) ("A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.").
227. Cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971) ("This Court is
...structured to perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of factfinding
and so forced, in original cases, awkwardly to play the role of factfinder without actually
presiding over the introduction of evidence."). Another option would have been for the
Court to conclude that the Principality was not a "foreign State[ ]" for purposes of Article
III, Section 2, given that Monaco had entrusted its conduct of foreign affairs-its
"external" sovereignty-to France. See James J. Lenoir, Suit by a Foreign State against a
State of the Union: Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 7 Miss. L.J. 134, 139 n.30 (1934)
(quoting Mississippi's Answer to Rule to Show Cause at 7-10).
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The Court chose instead to rest on the broader ground of constitutional sovereign immunity-the right of a State to be free from suit in
federal court.2 2 8 Its basic approach was, first, to conclude that the text
was unhelpful in deciding the issue. 2 29 Second, the Court addressed and
rejected the theory of ratification consent by the States to suits brought by
2 30
foreign states, in contrast to suits by other States and the United States.
Third, it concluded that suits against nonconsenting States by foreign
states were foreclosed by the same principle justifying state sovereign immunity against private persons. 23 1 That principle-that permitting suits
against nonconsenting States is a constitutional affront to their sovereign
dignity-has come to play a preeminent part in justifying the Court's
modern state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 2 32 Finally, the Court
suggested in dictum that extending its original jurisdiction to such suits
was inconsistent with separation of powers. 233 This Part's discussion of
state sovereign immunity implications for the Article's thesis uses these
steps in the Court's opinion as a roadmap.
B. Contratextualismand Supratextualism in Interpretingthe Eleventh
Amendment
The Monaco Court began its analysis of the constitutional text by conceding that there was nothing in Article III or the Eleventh Amendment
explicitly providing that a foreign state may sue a State only with its consent. 234 The Court, however, dismissed this as "inconclusive." 23 5 As to
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, the relevant provision simply says that the
federal judicial power shall extend to "Controversies ...between a State
...and foreign States." While the Court admitted that the provision did
not expressly require "the consent of the State in the case of a suit by a
foreign State," it observed that Article III likewise did not expressly require the consent of the United States in a suit against it in federal court,
despite "the established doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from
'236
suit except upon consent.
Although it is true that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity
from suit in its own courts absent consent, it does not follow that States
should enjoy sovereign immunity in the national courts without their consent. The principle of home court immunity justifies a State's sovereign
immunity in its own state courts, but whether one should imply the
phrase "only with consent when the State is sued" to the language of Arti228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 321-30.
See id. at 321-22.
See id. at 328-29.
See id. at 329-30.
See supra note 29.
See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330-31.
See id. at 320-21.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 320-21.
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cle III concerning States in federal court is an altogether different question. The answer to this question necessarily depends on the terms of the
constitutional bargain by which the States formed a union, and my point
is precisely that consent to foreign state treaty-based claims was part of
the bargain owing to the founding-era danger of war arising from state
violations of the 1783 Treaty of Peace. 237 Additionally, how does one, by
text alone, reconcile the Court's implicit position that "consent" need not
be implied in Article III, Section 2, Clause l's similarly unadorned provisions, which have been construed to permit suits against States by the
United States ("Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party") and other States ("Controversies between two or more States")?
From a textual standpoint, the Eleventh Amendment poses a more
serious problem for Monaco's holding. 23 8 Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
lists three categories of "Controversies" involving a State as party to which
the federal judicial power "shall extend." They are Controversies (1) "between two or more States; [ (2) ] between a State and Citizens of another
State; . .. [(3)] and between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."2 39 Accordingly, there are five potential litigants against States
in Article III controversies in which States are named as parties: (1) one
or more States; (2) citizens of another State; (3) foreign states; (4) foreign citizens; and (5) foreign subjects.
Article III does not say whether the State may both sue and be sued
by each of these five potential litigants. The Supreme Court in Chisholm
v. Georgia,a breach-of-contract suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina
against Georgia, plausibly interpreted the constitutional words "the judicial power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State" to mean that a State could be sued by a citizen
of another State without its consent. 240 The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "[j]udicial power ... shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State," overruling Chisholm. It also
proscribes suits brought by two other of the five categories of potential
litigants: "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The Amendment
does not prohibit, or even mention, suits against States brought by other
American or foreign states-the two remaining categories of litigants in
Article III, Section 2, Clause l's original list of controversies in which
24 1
States are named as parties.
The only plausible interpretation is that as to Controversies "between
two or more States" or "between a State ... and foreign States," a State
237. See infra note 291.
238. This discussion builds upon my prior discussion of the contratextualism of
Monaco's holding, see Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at
1088-90, and Professor Manning's textual exegesis, Manning, supra note 25, at 1738-43.
239. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
240. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (1793).
241. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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may still be sued without its consent. In other words, Article III, Section
2, Clause 1 retains its potential bidirectional meaning as to suits involving
a State by these two types of sovereign state parties. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has concluded on numerous occasions that the Constitution continues to authorize suit against a nonconsenting State by an equally sovereign American State. 2 42 And, as we shall see, the Court for 150 years had
no problem thinking that States could be sued without their consent by
2 43
foreign sovereign states.

One might call this conclusion of suability in foreign state-versusAmerican State suits an unambiguous interpretation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 as amended by the Eleventh Amendment. To be sure,
the Amendment is not "formally interlineated with Article III,"244 but "its

relationship to the prior text could hardly be more direct,"24 5 for it
speaks in terms of how that text "shall not be construed." 246 Statutory
interpretation aficionados, however, might take umbrage at this characterization, choosing to identify the textual exegesis above as an application of the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the
words of the Eleventh Amendment. 2 47 This is fair but analytically irrelevant. Regardless of the nomenclature, there is an ironclad argument that
the text is plain enough to decide the matter without reference to legislative intent, which, in this constitutional case, would be the intent of the
Framers of the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Supreme Court has said, "[T] he canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius... has force only when the items expressed are members of
an 'associated group or series,' justifying the inference that items not
248
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence."
Whatever might be said about proposed applications of the canon in
other contexts, 249 there can be no question of its applicability here, given
two constitutional provisions, the latter of which explicitly addresses how
the prior provision "shall not be construed."
Expressio unius operates here on not just one, but two levels. First,
of the five litigants named in Article III controversies to which a State may
be party, only three (citizens of other States, foreign citizens, and foreign
subjects) are mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment, compelling the inference that the exclusion of the other two (American and foreign states)
242. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
243. See infra Part IV.B.
244. Manning, supra note 25, at 1742.
245. Id.
246. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
247. See Manning, supra note 25, at 1738.
248. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
249. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (rejecting
plaintiffs proposed use of the canon previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit). When the
Supreme Court rejects application of the canon, it is usually because it is not obvious that
the hypothesized exclusion was part of an original associated series. See, e.g., id. at 81.
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was deliberate. This is essentially a rehashing of my previous plain-language argument based on textual juxtaposition of Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 and the Eleventh Amendment in expressio unius terms. 250 Second, the specific State-foreign parties provision in Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 says " [t] he Judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies...
between a State... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." The foreign
party half of the Eleventh Amendment says "[t] he judicial power shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States . . . by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." By expressing only two ("Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State") of the original associated series of three items ("foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects") in a single, precise phrase of original constitutional text, the Eleventh Amendment excludes from its prohibition the
unmentioned item ("foreign States"). Thus, Article III's State-foreign
parties provision may still "be construed to extend to" suits brought by
"foreign States."
One might argue, as a matter of logic, that given an original proposition that might reasonably be construed to permit a potential act (i.e.,
suit against a State without consent) by A, B, C, D, and E, and a subsequent proposition that the first statement "shall not be construed" to permit the act by A, B, and C, it does not necessarily follow that the initial
proposition "shall be construed" to permit the act by D and E. At the very
least, however, the juxtaposition must mean that nothing would block
such a construction, i.e., that the original proposition "may be construed"
to permit the act by D and E. This solution suffices for the purposes of
this Article, since it is consistent with the view that the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict the preexisting original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to hear cases brought by foreign states against
States.
The contrary argument, that the Framers of the Amendment inadvertently neglected to mention foreign states, is exceedingly weak. First,
the proposition that exclusion of "foreign States" from the Eleventh
Amendment's reach was intentional, not inadvertent, seems particularly
true given that the words "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State" were
used in its utterance, rather than "foreign ... Citizens or Subjects," which
were the original words in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1. It is implausible to conclude that the Framers of the Amendment intended to include
"foreign states" in the nominal phrase but simply forgot to do so given
the use of those two very words in the modifying adjectival phrase they
ultimately ratified-"of any Foreign State."
Second, the argument that the Framers of the Amendment inadvertently forgot to mention foreign states because they only intended to
overrule Chisholm v. Georgia25 1 is not credible given that the Framers did
250. See supra text accompanying notes 238-243.
251. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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think to proscribe suits brought by "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State," who were similarly not parties to the Chisholm case. Moreover, two
Justices in Chisholm expressly concluded that Article III permitted suits
against States by foreign states, 252 making it highly unlikely that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment intended the Amendment's proscription
to apply to foreign states and merely forgot to mention them.
A possible response is that foreign citizens or subjects were
remembered because they were considered similar to citizens of other
States, unlike foreign states. That, of course, raises the further question
why foreign states, like American States, were thought to be so different
from out-of-state private persons as to escape the attention of the Framers, who wrote a mere forty-three words that were debated in Congress
and in every state legislature across the country. Indeed, the suggestion
that the absence of reference in the Eleventh Amendment to foreign
states was inadvertent is so much a stretch that it has yet to be proposed
seriously.
The Monaco Court, instead, took another tack. It listed its prior decisions holding that a State could not be sued without its consent by its
citizens, 25 3 by congressionally created corporations, 25 4 or in admiralty (by
individuals),255 notwithstanding that none of these cases was "within the
express prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment." 25 6 The Court thus implied that the decisional gloss on the Amendment had extended its scope
so far beyond the bounds of its language that the text was no longer a
factor in constitutional interpretation. Certainly, the notion that a constitutional right (here, of States) exceeds the four corners of the document
is not unheard of, 2 5 7 and the claim here is not about the propriety of
generously interpreting reasonable ambiguity in favor of the right. This
cannot possibly mean, however, that explicit words can be openly contradicted by virtue of being unhappily embedded in a textually suspect constitutional provision. In general terms, supratextualism does not authorize contratextualism.

252. See id. at 451 (Blair, J.) (noting inconsistency if Constitution was construed to
grant States right to sue foreign states but not the other way around); id. at 467 (Cushing,
J.) ("But I conceive the reason of the thing, as well as the words of the Constitution, tend to
sh[o]w that the Federal Judicial power extends to a suit brought by a foreign State against
any one of the United States.").
253. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (citing Duhne
v. NewJersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1890)).
254. Id. (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900)).
255. Id. (citing Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921)).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("[T]he full
scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by
the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution."
(alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
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More precisely, the decisions in Hans2 58 and Smith v. Reeves 259 holding States immune in suits brought by in-state citizens and federal corporations, respectively, dealt with litigants unaddressed by the literal lan26°
guage of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 and the Eleventh Amendment.
The Amendment prohibits suits against States by citizens of other States
or foreign citizens or subjects, nothing more. Nor did it need to name
"in-state citizens" or "federal corporations," because neither is mentioned
in Article III's general grant. Those cases accordingly represented
supratextual moves to fill gaps in the text, not contratextual interpretations, such as the effect of Monaco's holding as to foreign states. Indeed,
there is an argument that Hans, notwithstanding its supratextual holding,
in fact supports the thesis of this Article-that state sovereign immunity
does not apply to suits brought by foreign states against States under the
Court's original jurisdiction. The Hans Court opined,
[N]either a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in
the limited class of cases in which a State may be made a party in the
Supreme Court of the United States by virtue of
the originaljurisdiction
26 1
conferred on this court by the Constitution.
The Court's decision in Ex parte New York holding that States are immune in in personam admiralty suits by private parties 262 appears to be
contratextual in the same way as the Monaco Court's foreign state move.
As an initial matter, however, the textual departure in Ex parte New York
relates to the words "any suit in law or equity," not the foreign party specification (or more correctly, lack of specification of foreign state) of the
Eleventh Amendment, which is the subject of this Article. The contratex258. 134 U.S. at 14-16.
259. 178 U.S. at 449.
260. The Supreme Court has more recently sanctioned similar supratextual
extensions of state sovereign immunity. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002) (upholding state sovereign immunity in an Article I federalagency proceeding, although the words 'Judicial power" in Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment are universally understood to refer to the Article III federal courts); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (upholding state sovereign immunity in federal question
suit brought in state court, ignoring fact that the words "judicial power" in Article IlI and
the Eleventh Amendment refer only to federal "judicial power"). For all its recent
extrapolations, though, the Court has never purported to contradict the Amendment's
language, choosing, rather, to characterize the Amendment as one instantiation of a
metatextual constitutional principle of sovereign dignity-a robust principle, but a
principle, nonetheless, that the case of the foreign state does not fit. See infra Part II.D.
Even in the midst of its present federalism renaissance, the Court still occasionally quotes
language in the Amendment to support its holdings, as, for instance, in a recent
unanimous decision where the Court referred to the Amendment's words "commenced or
prosecuted against [a State]" in support of the proposition that "Eleventh Amendment
waiver rules are different when a State's federal-court participation is involuntary."
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002).
261. 134 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1888)).
262. 256 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1921).
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tualism in this instance is as follows: Since "admiralty" is not mentioned
in the Amendment, the plain language implication is that States may still
be sued by private parties in admiralty cases, yet Ex parte New York held
otherwise.
As I explained in a prior article, 2 63 in personam admiralty suits
against States, or anyone for that matter, appear to have been quite rare
in the late eighteenth century. Accordingly, the Framers may very well
have intended to extend sovereign immunity to this category of admiralty
suits but did not conceive of the need to do so. By contrast, "the vast
majority of admiralty cases in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were in rem, and an admiralty court could only exercise its in rem
jurisdiction with respect to property actually before it or in the custody of
private persons. ' 26 4 Unsurprisingly, and consistently with the Amendment's plain language, the Court has recently held that States may be
sued by private parties in admiralty when the State does not have posses2 65
sion of the res.
To summarize the discussion of the constitutional text, the Monaco
Court offered little to rebut the incontrovertible language of Article III as
amended by the Eleventh Amendment. That constitutional text, in precise and unambiguous terms, compels the conclusion that States are not
immune in federal suits by foreign states. 266 But unless one is an uncompromising textualist, the preceding discussion is not dispositive; we must
consider the rationales the Monaco Court supplied in its affirmative case
for immunity after it dismissed the text. In the Court's famous words:
"Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control." 267 The two postulates the Monaco Court focused on
were ratification consent-whether "there has been 'a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention' " 268-and, in dictum, concern
with the justiciability of foreign state-versus-State suits from the perspec269
tive of separation of powers.
C. The States' Ratification Consent to Suit by Foreign States
As the Monaco Court acknowledged, it has long been established that
the States, by ratification of the Constitution, acceded to suit by two domestic sovereigns. Accordingly, a State's specific consent to a suit was
263. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1074-75.
There is an erratum in the previous discussion of admiralty: At page 1074, in the second
line of the second full paragraph, the word "not" should be inserted after "it would" in the
parenthetical.
264. Id. at 1075.
265. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1998).
266. See Manning, supra note 25, at 1725-26 (reaching same conclusion).
267. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
268. Id. at 322-23 (quoting The Federalist No. 81, supra note 131, at 487 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
269. See id. at 331-32.
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unnecessary as a constitutional matter if the plaintiff were a State 2 70 or
the United States. 27 1 The Court concluded, however, that there was no
evidence of similar consent by ratification as to foreign sovereign states.
The Court reasoned that a suit by a foreign state against a nonconsenting State was different from suits brought by a State or the United
States because "[t]he foreign State lies outside the structure of the
Union. The waiver or consent, on the part of a State, which inheres in
the acceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to the other States who
have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United States as the sovereign .... "272 Additionally, the Court thought it only fair to require a
State's consent to suit by a foreign state, as "[t]he foreign State enjoys a
similar sovereign immunity and without her consent may not be sued by a
273
State of the Union."
With specific respect to the category of suits by other States, the
Court added that " [t]he establishment of a permanent tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the States, in place of
an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the
Union." 2 7 4 Accordingly, the Court reasoned,
the States by the adoption of the Constitution, acting in their
highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people,
waived their exemption from judicial power. Thejurisdiction of
this Court over the parties in such cases was thus established by
their own consent and delegated authority as a necessary feature
275
of the formation of a more perfect Union.
The right of a State to sue a State without consent was thus "a distinct and
2 76
essential principle of the constitutional plan."
As to suits by the United States against a nonconsenting State, the
Court concluded that its original jurisdiction rested "[u]pon a similar ba270. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
271. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
272. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330; see also Caminker, supra note 11, at 108-09 (stating
that the reasoning in Monaco "envisions anthropomorphized states . . . agreeing to a
mutual pact waiving their immunity for certain kinds of suits but not for others").
273. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330. But cf. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907)
("It does not follow that because a State may be sued by the United States without its
consent, therefore the United States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public
policy forbids that conclusion."). It is unclear whether the Court meant the foreign state
may not be reciprocally sued without its consent in the Supreme Court or in its own
national courts. If the Court meant the former, which seems more likely, foreign sovereign
immunity in federal courts has been significantly scaled back since 1934 by statute, most
notably for the commercial activity of a foreign state occurring within the United States or
causing "a direct effect" in the United States. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000). Section 1605(a) (2) delineates the commercial activity
exception. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 585-600 (discussing cases and
scholarship on the commercial activity exception).
274. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 328.
275. Id. at 328-29 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. at 328.
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sis." 2 7 7 Although no "express words" in the Constitution conferred the

judicial power to hear such suits, it was also "inherent in the constitutional plan" in the Court's view because without it, "the permanence of
the Union might be endangered." 278 The Court said no more, but the
operative presumption appears to have been that a feature of the welltempered state is that the political branches of the national government,
which make and must "faithfully execute[ ]" its supreme laws, 2 79 have recourse to national courts for relief against political subdivisions should
28 0
they break those laws.
The Court admitted that there was little direct evidence to support
its interpretation of what the Framers intended. There was, for one, no
discussion at the federal Constitutional Convention of Article III, Section
2, Clause l's grant of jurisdiction in "Controversies between ... a State
• . . and foreign States"-the State-foreign States provision.28 1 What we
do have, and what the Court considered dispositive, were two remarks at
the Virginia ratifying convention by eminent members of the founding
group.
James Madison addressed the State-foreign States provision in a comment he made at the Virginia convention on June 20, 1788. Below is his
comment, which the Monaco Court quoted, with the italicized addition of
an important part of his remarks the Court omitted:
The next case provides for disputes between a foreign State, and
one of our States, should such a case ever arise; and between a
citizen and a foreign citizen or subject. I do not conceive that
any controversy can ever be decided in these Courts, between an
American State and a foreign State, without the consent of the
parties. If they consent, provision is here made. The disputes
ought to be tried by the national tribunal. This is consonant to the law
of nations. Could there be a more favourable or eligible provision to
avoid controversies with foreign powers? Ought it to be put in the power
28 2
of a member of the Union to drag the whole community into war?
277. Id. at 329.
278. Id.
279. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
280. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). But see supra text accompanying notes 107-109 (questioning
this logic). An alternative rationale, suggested in Alden, is that suits brought by the
national government are the result of a political process in a way that individual private
suits are not: "Suits brought by the United States itself require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a
broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States." 527 U.S. at 756. Outlier
suits and demands are therefore logically filtered out, and one can safely assume that the
suit serves the public interest. Alden's functional sovereign-process argument applies with
equal force to suits brought by foreign sovereign states.
281. Sec Monaco, 292 U.S. at 323 ("The debates in the Constitutional Convention do
not disclose a discussion of this question.").
282. James Madison, Remarks at Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10
Documentary History of Ratification, supra note 102, at 1414-15 (emphasis added). A
fascinating implication of the first sentence of Madison's comment is that the Article III,

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1827

The Court also quoted a peroration delivered by John Marshall the
same day at the Virginia convention in response to comments made the
previous day by George Mason. Once again, the Court omitted a crucial
sentence:
He objects in the next place to its jurisdiction in controversies
between a State, and a foreign State. Suppose, says he, in such a
suit, a foreign State is cast, will she be bound by the decision? If
a foreign State brought a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the Federal
Judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties
is necessary. And, as the Federal Judiciary will decide, each
party will acquiesce.
It will be the means of preventing disputes with
28 3
foreign nations.
The excerpts the Court quoted seem to support its conclusion that a
State could not be sued by a foreign state without its specific consent in
the case. Madison opined, "I do not conceive that any controversy can
ever be decided in these Courts, between an American State and a foreign State, without the consent of the parties." Marshall said, "The previous consent of the parties is necessary."
Closer investigation of the substance and context of their remarks,
however, supports the theory of ratification consent-that the State's
"consent" they were talking about was a durable consent conferred by the
States' ratification of the Constitution, including Article III's State-foreign
States provision, similar to the States' ratification consent with respect to
Article III "Controversies between two or more States."
First, the rationales Madison and Marshall gave for the State-foreign
States provision support the theory of ratification consent. Madison and
Marshall admitted that the underlying purpose of the "State . . . foreign
States" provision was "preventing disputes with foreign nations" 2 84 by ensuring that it was not "in the power of a member of the Union to drag the
whole community into war." 28 5 This goal is inconsistent with the theory
of specific consent their preceding words imply. If the Constitution required the consent of the State in each case where it was sued by a foreign state, then it would be unlikely that "the national tribunal" would
ever hear the case, since the State could hardly be expected to consent to
Section 2, Clause 1 grant of federal jurisdiction over "Controversies ... between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects" intended "a State . . . and
foreign States" and state "Citizens" and "foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects" to be two
matched pairs of litigants.
283. John Marshall, Remarks at Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10
Documentary History of Ratification, supra note 102, at 1434-35 (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 1435.
285. Madison, supra note 282, at 1415; see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 451 (1793) (Blair, J.) (pointing out "the policy which, no doubt, suggested [the Stateforeign States] provision, viz. That no State in the Union should, by withholding justice,
have it in its power to embroil the whole confederacy in disputes of another nature").
Justice Blair was being subtle: "[D] isputes of another nature" was, of course, a reference to
war.
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suit where it was accused of having breached a U.S. treaty obligation. By
contrast, if the States' consent to this scheme of treaty arbitration in the
national court was prospectively effected by ratification, then the reason
for establishing it could be better achieved. A State would have no choice
in the matter if a foreign state were to bring a dispute to the Supreme
Court alleging that the State had broken a U.S. treaty.
One response, suggested by Marshall's comment that "as the Federal
Judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce," is that even if specific
consent were required, a State would have enough confidence in the national judiciary and regard for the collective stakes at issue to consent.
This seems at first glance a plausible point (though, from Marshall, perhaps guilefully naive). For example, modern arbitration agreements purport to arbitrate not all possible disputes between the parties, but only
those pertaining to the subject matter of an agreement. 28 6 Within that
ambit, the parties voluntarily submit.
But upon more careful thought, the analogy works more in the other
direction. A party to a modern arbitration agreement does not typically
reserve the right to consent or not to consent each time a specific controversy arises that is covered by the agreement; rather, the agreement covers a category of prospective contemplated disputes. 28 7 If that were not
the case, arbitrations would be infrequent, as the party benefiting from a
favorable status quo would likely withhold specific consent, defeating the
purpose of the arbitration agreement. The idea of ratification consent is
that the Constitution was in the nature of a durable agreement to arbitrate sensitive disputes between States and other sovereign states in the
Supreme Court. The Monaco Court observed, with respect to suits by
other States, that "[t] he establishment of a permanent tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the States, in place of
an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the
Union." 28 8 If state ratification consent to suits by other States is to be
presumed given the interest in interstate peace, then how much more
justified is a conclusion of state consent to suit by foreign states, given the
acute interest in international peace with the more powerful European
states? Indeed, while the Constitution expressly proscribes a State from
waging war without the consent of the national government against anyone (unless invaded or in "imminent danger"), including another
286. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) ("[W]e look first
to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to
determine the scope of the agreement [to arbitrate]." (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985))); United Steel Workers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("[A] rbitration is a matter of contract and a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so
to submit.").
287. See, e.g., Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282 & n.1 (involving an employment contract
arbitration clause providing that "any dispute or claim" concerning employment would be
"settled by binding arbitration").
288. 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934).
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State, 28 9 there is no such limitation on the right of foreign states to wage
war.
The documentary record is replete with affirmations of Madison's
and Marshall's acute concern that a State's particular difficulties in adhering to U.S. treaty obligations with a foreign state would drag the entire
United States into war, and that the intent behind the constitutional
State-foreign parties jurisdiction over controversies "between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects" 290 was to
address this precise concern. 29 ' As the Supreme Court recently observed,
289. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace ... or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
290. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
291. A brief sample of the evidence drawn from The FederalistPapersand debates at the
federal Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions-in particular the
Virginia convention where Madison and Marshall made their remarks-should suffice to
support the point, which is uncontroversial. Alexander Hamilton, in FederalistNo. 80, put it
this way:
[T]he peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with
the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion ofjustice by the sentences
of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of
all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less
essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of the public
tranquility.
The Federalist No. 80, supra note 131, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted).
James Madison, in objecting to the more State-deferential New Jersey plan at the federal
Constitutional Convention, had the same problem in mind when he asked,
Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not
prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the
States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of
Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties
have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been sh[o]wn to us. This cannot be
the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is
among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually
provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the
whole.
James Madison, Remarks at the Federal Convention, in I Farrand, supra note 46, at 316.
James Wilson, at the Pennsylvania ratification convention, defended the State-foreign
parties jurisdiction in a similar but more comprehensive fashion:
[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that
foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they
may resort? ... Is it not an important object to extend our manufactures and our
commerce? . . . Further, it is necessary, in order to preserve peace with foreign
nations. Let us suppose the case, that a wicked law is made in some one of the
states, enabling a debtor to pay his creditor with the fourth, fifth, or sixth part of
the real value of the debt, and this creditor, a foreigner, complains to his prince
or sovereign, of the injustice that has been done him. What can that prince or
sovereign do? Bound by inclination as well as duty to redress the wrong his
subject sustains from the hand of perfidy, he cannot apply to the particular guilty
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Both during and after the Revolution, state courts were notoriously frosty to British creditors trying to collect debts from
American citizens, and state legislators went so far as to hobble
British debt collection by statute, despite the specific provision
of the 1783 Treaty of Paris that creditors in the courts of either
country would "meet with no lawful impediment" to debt collection. Ultimately, the States' refusal to honor the treaty became
serious enough to prompt protests by the British Secretary of
State, particularly when irked by American demands for treaty
compliance on the British side.
This penchant of the state courts to disrupt international
relations and discourage foreign investment led directly to the
alienage jurisdiction provided by Article III of the Constitution
.. . (federal jurisdiction "extend[s] to . . . Controversies ...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects"). "IT]he proponents of the Constitution ...
made it quite clear that the elimination or amelioration of difficulties with credit was the principal reason for having the alienage and diversity jurisdictions, and that it was one of the most
important reasons for a federal judiciary."29 2
state, because he knows that by the Articles of Confederation, it is declared that
no state shall enter into treaties. He must therefore apply to the United States.
The United States must be accountable. "My subject has received a flagrant
injury; do me justice, or I will do myself justice." If the United States are
answerable for the injury, ought they not to possess the means of compelling the
faulty state to repair it? They ought, and this is what is done here. For now, if
complaint is made in consequence of such injustice, Congress can answer, "why
did not your subject apply to the General Court, where the unequal and partial
laws of a particular state would have had no force?"
James Wilson, Remarks at Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 519-20 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
Indeed, other notable delegates at the Virginia ratifying convention expressed the
same concern. Francis Corbin, on the day before Madison and Marshall made the remarks
quoted by the Monaco Court, observed:
Fatal experience has proved, that treaties would never be complied with, if their
observance depended on the will of the States; and the consequences would be
constant war.-For, if any one State could counteract any treaty, how could the
United States avoid hostility with foreign nations?-Do not Gentlemen see the
infinite dangers that would result from it, if a small part of the community could
drag the whole Confederacy into war?
Francis Corbin, Remarks at Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 Documentary
History of Ratification, supra note 102, at 1392.
On the day after Madison and Marshall made their remarks, Edmund Randolph,
Governor of Virginia at its ratification convention, summarized the reasons for creating a
federal judiciary in the following way: "That it shall be an auxiliary to the Federal
Government, support and maintain harmony between the United States and foreign
powers, and between different States, and prevent a failure of justice in cases to which
particular State Courts are incompetent." Edmund Randolph, Remarks at Virginia
Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 Documentary History of Ratification, supra note 102, at
1450-51.
292. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88,
94-95 (2002) (alteration in original, citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
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A second reason why the theory of ratification consent seems more
persuasive involves the context in which Madison and Marshall made
their remarks. The obvious problem with ratification consent from a
States' rights perspective was the fact that the Constitution could not, as
an American legal document, bind foreign states to reciprocal consent to
suit in a U.S. or foreign court. By contrast, it is axiomatic that other
States would be reciprocally bound, although the point deflates when one
considers that the United States is not reciprocally bound. Nor did international law require a foreign state to provide a reciprocal privilege in its
own courts if granted the privilege in the national court of a treaty partner. 293 William Grayson, who with Richard Henry Lee would represent
Virginia as a U.S. Senator in the first Congress, made precisely this point
in response to Madison, who tellingly offered no rebuttal:
My honorable friend [Madison], whom I much respect, said that
the consent of the parties must be previously obtained. I agree
that the consent of foreign States must be had before they become parties: But it is not so with our States. It is fixed in the
Constitution that they shall become parties.... There is no reciprocity in this, that a foreign State should have a right to sue
one of our States, whereas a foreign State cannot be sued without its own29 4consent. The idea to me is monstrous and
extravagant.
Two days earlier, George Mason-who, unlike Marshall, had attended the federal Constitutional Convention, although he refused to
sign the Constitution 295-made the exact same point as Grayson with respect to the lack of reciprocity of consent. He remarked:
Let us consider the operation of the last subject of its cognizance.-Controversies between a State, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign States, citizens or subjects.-There is a confusion in
this case. This much, however, may be raised out of it-that a
suit will be brought against Virginia.-She may be sued by a foreign State.-What reciprocity is there in it?-In a suit between
Virginia and a foreign State, is the foreign State to be bound by
the decision?-Is there a similar privilege given to us in foreign
1; Treaty of Peace, supra note 209, art. IV, 8 Stat. at 82; Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice":
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J.
1421, 1473).
293. The concern was addressed to the extent that treaties, like the Definitive Treaty
of Peace, implicitly provided such reciprocity. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, supra note 209,
art. IV, 8 Stat. at 82 ("It is agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful
impediment ....
" (emphasis added)). Moreover, the Republic's most important early
treaty partners-France, Great Britain, and Spain-were not federated states presenting
the prospect of treaty defection by quasi-sovereign political subdivisions.
294. William Grayson, Remarks at Virginia Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10
Documentary History of Ratification, supra note 102, at 1448.
295. See The Constitution and the States: The Role of the Original Thirteen in the
Framing and Adoption of the Federal Constitution 208 (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminski eds., 1988).
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States?-Where will you find a parallel regulation? How will
the
29 6
decision be enforced?-Only by the ultima ratio regum.
In sum, the only direct evidence against the States' ratification consent to suit in the Court by foreign states are two stray remarks by ardent
federalists in the heat (literal and figurative) of the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788. Whatever support these words lend to the theory of specific consent is diminished by the war-avoidance rationale Madison and
Marshall jointly offered for the constitutional provision of jurisdiction of
controversies between States and foreign states, which validates ratification consent. Even putting aside the internal contradictions in their
statements, Madison's and Marshall's suggestion of specific consent was
strenuously challenged by prominent antifederalists, whose key point of
nonreciprocity Madison and Marshall did not rebut.
In any event, legislative history from one State's ratifying convention
in 1788 can only go so far in answering the question of whether the States
presently have sovereign immunity in original actions brought by foreign
states given the later enactment of the Eleventh Amendment. How the
text of the Amendment unambiguously commands nonimmunity in suits
by foreign states has already been demonstrated. 29 7 And as we shall
see, 29 8 John Marshall, as Chief Justice of the United States, on two occasions in the early nineteenth century indicated that the Court retained
jurisdiction in "controversies between two or more States, or between a
State and a foreign State."299 If the Monaco Court was correct in construing Marshall's remarks as a delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention
in 1788 as probative of a theory of constitutional immunity in controversies between a State and a foreign state, then one can only conclude that
Marshall, as Chief Justice, understood the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment a decade later in 1798 to reverse that understanding. In
contrast, if, as this Article has argued, the complete context of Marshall's
comments in 1788 is consistent with the theory of the States' ratification
consent to suits by foreign states, then it would indicate that Marshall's
statements in 1788 possibly implying otherwise were made strategically to
speed ratification, and that his pronouncements as ChiefJustice presuming ratification consent were consistent with his true opinion in 1788.
Either way, one can only conclude that by 1798, there remained in the
Constitution a right of foreign states to sue a State, albeit on the thesis of
this Article, one that could be exercised only in the Supreme Court.
296. Mason, supra note 102, at 1406. It is in response to Mason that Marshall made
his statement quoted supra text accompanying note 283.
297. See supra Part II.B.
298. See infra Part IV.B.
299. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); see also Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-20 (1831) (holding that an Indian tribe is barred from
bringing an original action against a State in the Supreme Court because it was not "a
foreign state in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution").
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D. Sovereign Dignity as an Argument Against State Sovereign Immunity in
Suits by Foreign States
In conjunction with the defensive tack that the foreign state was unlike an American State and the United States for purposes of ratification
consent, the Monaco Court argued offensively that, for purposes of state
sovereign immunity, foreign states were very much like private persons.
And the Court noted that "[t]o suits against a State, without her consent,
brought by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, the Eleventh Amendment erected an absolute bar."3 00 The "same
fundamental principle" afforded the State immunity absent consent in
federal suits brought by its own citizens.3 0 1 The Court continued: "We
are of the opinion that the same principle applies to suits against a State
30 2
by a foreign State."
That principle, which has come to be known as sovereign dignity,
was, as the Monaco Court implicitly recognized, born with the supratextualism of Hans v. Louisiana.30 3 To extend state sovereign immunity to a
litigant who was unspecified by the Eleventh Amendment, it was necessary for the Hans Court to articulate a general historical principle that
could justify both the textual manifestations of sovereign immunity (citizens of other states and foreign citizens or subjects) and the supratextual
one at issue (in-state citizens). The obvious choice was the idea of unconstitutional affront to the dignity of a sovereign state to be haled into court
against its will by an individual. The Monaco Court quoted Alexander
Hamilton's articulation of this "general principle of immunity: 'It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.' ",304 Using this originalist principle and fol300. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 330.
303. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
304. 292 U.S. at 324 (quoting The Federalist No. 81, supra note 131, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton)). There is language in Hans v. Louisiana, which the Monaco Court
also quoted liberally, that hints at a broader principle-that a State may not be sued by
anyone absent consent. See id. at 327 ("The suability of a State without its consent was a
thing unknown to the law." (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 16)). But the Monaco Court also
cited language from Hans in line with the narrower principle of sovereign immunity vis-avis private persons (including corporations). See id. at 326 ("Any such power as that of
authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against the States, had
been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by the great defenders of the Constitution,
whilst it was on its trial before the American people." (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 12)).
Even under the more general principle-that a State may not be sued by anyone absent its
consent-the fact that the doctrine nonetheless recognizes that other States and the
United States may sue a State without its express consent means at the very least that
ratification consent suffices to waive immunity under the principle. The Hans Court
explicitly recognized the exception for ratification consent to suit in the Supreme Court in
noting "that neither a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court...
without their consent, except in the limited class of cases in which a State may be made a
party in the Supreme Court . .. by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred . . . by the
Constitution." 134 U.S. at 17 (quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109
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lowing Hans's supratextual cue, the Rehnquist Court has extended state
sovereign immunity to federal agency proceedings and state court
suits,3 0 5 notwithstanding that neither circumstance implicates the Article
IIIjudicial power, to which the Eleventh Amendment is solely addressed.
I have elsewhere argued that the Framers' conception of state sovereign immunity was indeed centrally concerned with the larger principle
of sovereign dignity, but dignity of a different sort than the Hans Court
had in mind. 30 6 The starting premise of this different conception of sovereign dignity is the literal language of the Eleventh Amendment, which
extends immunity to suits by citizens of other States and foreign citizens
or subjects without mention of in-state citizens. This, to the Hans Court,
30 7
was "startling and unexpected."
I explained the seeming implausibility by reference to principles of
contemporaneous international law, which, like the Eleventh Amendment, would not have been thought to answer the question of a sovereign
state's suability by its own citizens-a domestic law question.3 0 8 As such,
the Eleventh Amendment does not go so far as to say that federal question suits by in-state citizens were permitted-it simply does not say anything on the issue. I suggested, however, that international legalists of
the time were normatively inclined to think in-state citizens should be
able to seek redress for fundamental violations in republican states, which
the Constitution requires the American States to be. 30 9 Any such republican "privilege" to sue one's State for fundamental violations was extended
to all U.S. citizens by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
31 0
Fourteenth Amendment.
Foreign individuals, by contrast, had no claim to another state's sovereignty at contemporaneous international law, being fractions of their
U.S. 446, 451 (1888)).

It is, of course, a purpose of this Article to show that the

constitutional plan incorporated ratification consent to original actions exclusively in the
Supreme Court by foreign states against States to avoid war and disruption of trade with
powerful foreign states.
305. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(noting that "[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities" in holding State immune in
a federal agency proceeding); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (concluding that
"[p] rivate suits against nonconsenting States... present the indignity of subjecting a State
to the coercive process ofjudicial tribunals at the instance of private parties regardless of
the forum" to hold a State immune on federal law claims in state court (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)).
306. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1095-97.
307. 134 U.S. at 11.
308. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1028-29.
309. See id. at 1036-37. The Republican Government Clause reads, "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government....
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
310. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .... U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Lee,
Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1087-88.
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own state's sovereignty and therefore inferior in dignity as compared to
other sovereign states, each comprised of many persons. As Vattel put it:
[E]very sovereign and independent state, deserves consideration and respect, because it ... is an assemblage of a great number of men who are, doubtless, more considerable than any individual. The sovereign represents his whole nation, he united in
his person all its majesty. No individual, though ever so free and
independent, can be placed in competition with the sovereign;
this would be to put a single person alone upon an equality with
an united multitude of his equals. Nations and sovereigns, are
then, at the same time under an obligation, have a right to
maintain their dignity, and to cause it to be respected
as of the
3 11
utmost importance to their safety and tranquility.
Late eighteenth-century international law accordingly limited
remediation against a sovereign state by a noncitizen to the possibility
that his own equally sovereign state might espouse the private claim and
thereby make it public, whether by an appeal to legal resolution in an
international forum such as treaty-based ad hoc arbitration or by diplo3 12
macy or war.
The operative rationale of this theory of the Eleventh Amendment
based on Enlightenment-era international law, then, was the equalitybased idea of sovereign dignity that Vattel described. 31 3 Each State's sovereignty, because it is republican in nature, was created by the collective
will of its numerous citizens, and so demands due respect for its collectivity. Each State is the equal of any other; thus, to recognize a noncitizen's
(whether a foreign citizen or subject, or a citizen of another State) legal
311. Vattel, supra note 61, Book 2, § 35, at 208-09. The one exception in terms of
comparable sovereign dignity was the king of a foreign monarchy (or the emperor of an
empire), to whom the technical constitutional term of "foreign citizen" (the Framers used
"citizen" in a precise sense to denote an individual participating in the sovereignty of a
republic like Switzerland or republican France) or "foreign subject" (of a monarchy like
Great Britain or pre-revolutionary France) would not apply. See Hennessey v. Richardson
Drug Co., 189 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1903) ("The term 'citizen,' as understood in our law, is
precisely analogous to the term 'subject' in the common law, and the change of phrase has
entirely resulted from the change of government.. .. [H] e who before was a 'subject of the
King' is now 'a citizen of the State."' (internal citations omitted)); Penhallow v. Doane's
Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 93 (1795) (Iredell, J.) ("The great distinction between
Monarchies and Republics ... in general, is, that in the former the monarch is considered
as the sovereign, and each individual of his nation as subject to him . . . [b]ut in a
Republic, all the citizens, as such, are equal ..
.
312. As Justice Iredell noted,
When any individual, therefore, of any nation, has cause of complaint against
another nation, or any individual of it, not immediately amenable to authority of
his own, he may complain to that power in his own nation, which is entrusted with
the sovereignty of it as to foreign negotiations, and he will be entitled to all the
redress which the nature of his case requires, and the situation of his own country
will enable him to obtain.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259 (1796) (Iredell, J.).
313. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1032-37.
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right against the State in federal court would presume the unconsciona3 14
ble equality of the one against the many.
The demands of sovereign dignity in this sense cast the right to sue a
State as something like a mathematical equation: A noncitizen, a mere
fraction of his own State (or a foreign state), does not equal another State
and so cannot sue it. Of course, affirmatively stated, the same concept of
sovereign dignity would seem to compel nonimmunity in suits against
States by other semisovereign States: A State equals a State and so can sue
it. Because a fully sovereign state is greater in sovereignty than a semisovereign State, it has a greater right to sue a semisovereign State than an
equally semisovereign State would. Of course, this international lawbased sovereign dignity principle cannot answer the question of a State's
suability by its own citizens, but the separate principle of republican government which is a constitutional feature of a State's sovereignty and resultant dignity surely suggests a measure of nonimmunity with respect to
these citizens.
For the Rehnquist Court, however, the sovereign dignity of the State
operates without an anchor in the political theory of republican sovereignty based on the collective consent of the governed. 31 5 In the Court's
apparent view, dignity is due to the State qua sovereign-a governmental
entity possessed of coercive sovereign power without regard to the basis
of the power. Sovereign liability is a matter of sovereign grace, not of
republican right, and therefore is indistinguishable in scope as between,
say, an absolute monarchy and a republic. This statist formulation of sovereign dignity ignores the fact, which would have been self-evident to the
Framers, that the citizen of a republican State possesses a share of his
State and should be able to sue to vindicate his share. The Court's conception of dignity thus compels state immunity in federal court as against
all private citizens, even citizens of a State necessarily republican in form
31 6
who have a claim to its sovereignty.
314. See id. at 1033.
315. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (describing state sovereign
immunity as "a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the
dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status" without regard to what the
representative nature of this sovereignty might entail in terms of sovereign liability).
316. Many constitutionalists have decried as unfounded the Rehnquist Court's
reliance on sovereign dignity as a justification for doctrines of sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 802-03 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("Whatever justification there may be
for an American government's immunity from private suit, it is not dignity."); Evan H.
Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 81,
85 (2001) (criticizing the dignity concern as "a category mistake"); DanielJ. Meltzer, State
Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1011,
1038-42 (2000) (arguing that the use of state dignity to deny private suits is "difficult to
integrate with the American constitutional tradition"); cf. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 788 (2002) (Breyer, J.,dissenting) ("Just as this principle [of
sovereign dignity] has no logical starting place, I fear that neither does it have any logical
stopping point."); Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1962
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As noted above, however, even presuming arguendo the Court's statist vision of sovereign dignity as a protection against any private suit, that
principle cannot be coherently applied to require immunity from a suit
brought by another sovereign state. The doctrines of state sovereign immunity are consistent with this logical limitation insofar as the Supreme
Court has held that a State may be sued without its consent by another
State3 t 7 or by the United States. 3 18 It bears repeating that a foreign state
is, in terms of relative sovereign dignity, superior to an American State
because it is a full-fledged member of the community of sovereign nationstates rather than one of fifty semisovereign States that together comprise
one sovereign state. Thus, tojustify constitutional state sovereign immunity in a suit brought by a foreign state, one cannot rely on the principle
of sovereign dignity, but must turn to other arguments such as text or
history, both of which this Article has already demonstrated to be
unavailing.
Indeed, the principle of sovereign dignity fairly compels the conclusion of nonimmunity in suits by foreign states against States in the Supreme Court. First, any affront to a State's sovereign dignity is mitigated
by forum dignity-the fact that the suit may be brought in the Supreme
Court only31 9 and initiated not by the service of process but by a more
respectful motion for leave to file by the foreign state. 320 Second, there is
the straightforward mathematical argument mentioned above: A fully
sovereign foreign state's quantum of sovereignty exceeds that of a semisovereign American State, and so to accord the former the right to sue the
latter cannot diminish the sovereignty of the latter. Third, underlying
the mathematical argument is the functional point that sovereign suits
(2003) ("[R]equiring governments to participate in litigation ... enhanc[es], rather than
diminish[es], the role-dignity appropriate to sovereignty."). My position is similarly critical
but differs from others inasmuch as I agree with the Court that dignity is indeed the
foundation of state sovereign immunity, but that "it is a dignity that is based on the private
citizens who constitute the State, not a dignity that is separate from and superior to its
citizens." Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1097; cf.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 802 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("It would be hard to imagine anything more
inimical to the republican conception, which rests on the understanding of its citizens
precisely that the government is not above them, but of them, its actions being governed
by law just like their own.").
317. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
318. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
319. As the Court has noted,
One, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front of
... an administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a State's dignity than
requiring a State to appear in an Article III court presided over by a judge with
life tenure nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the
United States Senate.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. at 760 n.il.
320. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 1561, 1595-99 (2002) (grounding doctrine of state sovereign immunity in
personal jurisdiction idea of the impropriety of a court assuming power over State as
defendant).
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are different from private suits inasmuch as they are the result of a political process. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Alden v. Maine, "Suits
[against States by the United States] require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is
absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting
States. '321 The point also holds for suits against States by foreign sovereign states.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the historical context of
the founding, it would enlarge, not diminish, the national sovereign dignity of the American Republic for a powerful foreign state like Great Britain to agree to allow the new Supreme Court of the United States to decide a controversy between it and one of the United States. The foreign
state's willingness to appeal to the decisionmaking authority of a less powerful national sovereign's tribunal in an international dispute rather than
resort to diplomacy or war itself pays homage to the dignity of the national sovereign. Future Justice Benjamin Curtis put it this way in 1844:
Certainly it would not be a subject of complaint or regret on our
part ... that the foreign sovereign should submit the question to
the decision of our own highest tribunal, instead of resorting
[W]e should look upon an applicadirectly to negotiation ....
tion to the Supreme Court of the United States as not only practicable but desirable, and we should feel thankful for . . . that
wise provision in our own Constitution, which ... was created to
establish [the Court's jurisdiction of suits by foreign states
against States]-a tribunal known to the world as elevated far
above all State biases and prejudices, whose members come together from the North and the South, from the East and the
West, across distances wider than half of Europe [; ]... a tribunal
which is our own ark of safety, and to which offended Europe
justice as war and reprimay come confidently and obtain such
3 22
sals never gave and never can give.
E. Separation of Powers: A Judicial, Not a Political, Question
After holding that Mississippi was entitled to sovereign immunity, the
Monaco Court opined in dictum that the general category of suits by foreign states against States might not be "of ajusticiable character." 323 The
Court noted, "The question of the right of suit by a foreign State against a
State of the Union is not limited to cases of alleged debts or of obligations
3 -2 4
issued by a State and claimed to have been acquired by transfer."
Rather, "[c]ontroversies between a State and a foreign State may involve
international questions in relation to which the United States has a sovereign prerogative," 32 5 and in which, correspondingly, "a State has no pre321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

527 U.S. at 756.
2 Memoir of Benjamin Curtis, supra note 1, at 146-47.
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 331.
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rogative of adjustment."3 26 Analogizing to controversies between States,
the Court gave as examples of such international questions, "disputes
over territorial boundaries [,] . .. the obstruction of navigation, the pollution of streams, and the diversion of navigable waters. ' 327 As to such disputes, the Court continued:
The National Government, by virtue of its control of our foreign
relations is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect such an international settlement as may be
found to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement of arbitration, or otherwise. It cannot be supposed that it was the intention that a controversy growing out of the action of a State,
which involves a matter of national concern and which is said to
affect injuriously the interests of a foreign State, or a dispute
arising from conflicting claims of a State of the Union and a
foreign State as to territorial boundaries, should be taken out of
the sphere of international negotiations and adjustment
through a resort by the foreign State to a suit under the provisions of § 2 of Article III. In such a case, the State has immunity
from suit without her consent and the National Government is
protected by the provision prohibiting agreements between
States and foreign powers in the absence of the consent of the
Congress. While, in this instance, the proposed suit does not
raise a question of national concern, the constitutional provision which is said to confer jurisdiction should be construed in
3 28
light of all its applications.
The Court's express words were "international questions," but it appeared to be invoking the subconstitutional policy of constitutional avoidance 32 9 in light of what is more commonly known as the political question doctrine. The doctrine, which exempts political subject matter from
judicial review, is as old as judicial review itself.3- ° Chief Justice Marshall
offered the foundational articulation in Marbury v. Madison:
326. Id.
327. Id. (internal citations omitted).
328. Id. at 331-32.
329. See id. at 332 ("[T]he constitutional provision which is said to confer jurisdiction
should be construed in light of all its applications."); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court [has] developed,
for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules
under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision.").
330. The two most common domestic invocations concern (1) state governance
under the rubric of the Republican Government Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, §4 ("The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government ....
); see, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900) (legality of State's
resolution of gubernatorial election); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (validity
of state constitution); cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (validity of state procedures
for party primary and selecting delegates for national party convention without invocation
of the Republican Government Clause); and (2) congressional governance, see, e.g.,
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Senate procedures for impeachment); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (passing of a bill). The application of the political question
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The province of the court is ... not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the constitution and laws,
submitted to the executive, can never
3 31
be made in this Court.
In the Monaco Court's view, controversies between a State and foreign states were best resolved not by original actions brought by foreign
states in the Supreme Court, but by diplomatic negotiations, treaty revisions, reparations, and other such means as might be employed by the
political branches. 33 2 It is a telling omission that the Court, in 1934,
could not conceive of the possibility that a foreign state might resort to
the ultimate political sanction of war and that the United States should
greatly fear the possibility.
The political question doctrine is thought to have both a constitutional and a prudential version. 33 3 The precise distinction between the
two has been the subject of disagreement, but the basic line is that a political question objection is
constitutional if it is thought to be based on separation of powers or textual commitments to other branches of government.
On the other hand, the doctrine is prudential if it reflects the

doctrine in both domestic contexts has been questioned by members of the Court, see,
e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1992) ("[T]he Court has suggested
that perhaps not all claims under the [Republican Government] Clause present
nonjusticiable political questions."); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393
(1990) ("[T]he fact that one institution of Government has mechanisms available to guard
against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that
the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy by labeling the issue a political question.");
cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If the Senate were to
act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a
coin-toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply
a bad guy, judicial interference might well be appropriate." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Indeed, Baker v. Carr, the foundational modern political question case, rejected
application of the Republican Government Clause-based prong of the political question
doctrine in a case involving redistricting for the state legislature, holding the redistricting
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 369 U.S. 186, 228 (1962); cf. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam) (finding justiciable and unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause a state supreme court decision ordering an outcomedeterminative manual recount of contested ballots in a U.S. presidential election).
Constitutionalists have also been critical of overenthusiastic application of the political
question doctrine in the foreign affairs context. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 ("[lIt is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance."); David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as
Political Questions, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1439, 1445-46 (1999); PeterJ. Spiro, Globalization
and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 649, 675-86 (2002).
331. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
332. See 292 U.S. at 331.
333. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 244-67 (discussing the political
question doctrine).
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Court's concerns about preserving judicial credibility and limit33 4
ing the role of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society.
Ajusticiability objection of the prudential sort is consistent with the
thesis of this Article: There is no constitutional bar to federal suit by
foreign states against States, at least with respect to claims "arising under"
treaty law. It would be a Pyrrhic victory, though, to conclude that there is
no constitutional problem under the doctrinal rubrics of state sovereign
immunity and separation of powers, but that the Court should decline
jurisdiction in the entire class of foreign state-versus-State cases as a prudential, subconstitutional matter.
A constitutional political question objection is patently off the mark.
We can dispense with any argument that there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."33 5 There are two potential textual provisions in play. The national government alone makes treaties under the Constitution, 3 36 which
also provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty." 3 37 It is the
latter text to which the Monaco Court alluded when it mentioned "the
provision prohibiting agreements between States and foreign powers in
33 8
the absence of the consent of the Congress."
The problem that concerns us, the breach by a State of a treaty the
United States has ratified and wants to keep, has nothing to do with
treatymaking by the United States or the States. There is no plausible
argument that in deciding a case in which a foreign state alleges that a
State has broken a U.S. treaty, the judicial power is infringing upon Congress's and the President's treatymaking powers. The treaty has already
been made, and the foreign state, by bringing suit in the highest U.S.
national court against a State, is not alleging that the United States qua
national government has breached it. Nor is it even remotely persuasive
to say that the State, by breaking the U.S. treaty, is in fact "making" its
own separate treaty.
In contrast, as the preceding discussion of other constitutional
text-Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, the Original Jurisdiction Clause,
and the Eleventh Amendment-and its legislative history indicates, the
Framers intended the power to hear and decide on a foreign state's claim
against a State, specifically concerning state breach of U.S. treaty obligations, to be ajudicial power.33 9 That this power was intended to be original and exclusive to the Supreme Court is also consistent with the text
and confirmed by the historical evidence, most notably by the implemen334. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 150 (3d ed. 1999); see also Spiro, supra
note 330, at 675-86 (discussing application of the political question doctrine in foreign
relations).
335. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
336. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
337. Id. art. I, § 10.
338. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934).
339. See supra Part II.B-C.
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tation of the Original Jurisdiction Clause by the First Congress. 340 The
specific function of declaring a State in breach of a U.S. treaty obligation
was never intended for the political branches (or for the self-interested
States themselves)-an assignment of powers that makes sense when one
considers the importance of the issue to the early Republic coupled with
the structural incapacity of the political branches to apply effective coercion to a defecting State. 34 1 The political question doctrine in its core,
constitutional sense, thus, seems an argument for, not against, judicial
review in this instance.
That the Framers gave the Supreme Court the power to decide U.S.
treaty-based controversies between States and foreign states is confirmed
by the pattern of appointments to the early Supreme Court. Consider, as
prologue, the text of Article II on the subject:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
342
Court, and all other Officers of the United States ....
From the list of named officials in the Appointments Clause, the Clause's
juxtaposition to the Treaties Clause, and the senatorial "Advice and Consent" role common to both clauses, it seems reasonable to infer that the
Framers intended some foreign affairs function for the Supreme Court.
George Washington's inaugural presidential nominations to the
Court support the inference that the Framers envisioned a forum with a
quasi-international function of arbitrating controversies between States
and between States and foreign states. 3 4 3 As one historian has noted,
"Washington nominated men with wide experience of the world" and
from a broad "geographical distribution." 3 44 John Jay of New York, the
first Chief Justice of the United States (a position he accepted after turning down Washington's offer to be Secretary of State), had been Minister
Plenipotentiary to Spain in 1779, a principal negotiator of the 1783
Treaty of Peace, 345 and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the thirteen former colonies from 1784 to 1789. While he was still Chief Justice, Wash340. See supra Part LB-C.
341. This incapacity of the political branches to enforce treaty discipline on the States
continued through the nineteenth century and persists in the present day. See infra Parts
1V.A.2, IV.A.3, IV.C. (discussing national government's failure to ensure compliance in the
Southern Port Quarantine Act incidents, mob lynchings, and the consular notification
controversy).
342. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
343. See generally Casto, supra note 120, at 56-65; 1 Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (1971);
Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998).
The following analysis draws from these fine works on the pre-Marshall Court.
344. Maeva Marcus, George Washington's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 24J.
Sup. Ct. Hist. 243, 245, 253 (1999).
345. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 209, 8 Stat. 80.
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ington sent Jay as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
Great Britain as war over breaches of the 1783 Treaty of Peace seemed
imminent, and he negotiated the so-called Jay Treaty of 1794.346 Jay,
apart from any affection he might be expected to have for the treaties
from pride of authorship, was also one of the most pro-British of the
founding Federalists, 347 and so his appointment as the first Chief Justice
is particularly supportive of this Article's argument that the Framers intended the Supreme Court to be an attractive, credibly neutral tribunal
for Great Britain if that nation were at all inclined to seek peaceful vindication of Treaty of Peace claims against a specific State by judicial
resolution.
All of Washington's inaugural appointments to the Court were consistent with the conception of the Supreme Court as a diplomatic tribunal
vested with the power to arbitrate controversies between States, and between States and foreign states. Among Washington's Associate Justice
appointments were James Iredell of North Carolina and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, both comparatively recent immigrants from Great Britain
(in 1768 and 1765, respectively). The two, who were dear friends, had
reputations as brilliant, cosmopolitan lawyers with a shared veneration of
international law.3 48 As Justices, they revealed a particular affection for
international law's foundational precept of pacta sunt servanda (treaties
must be kept), which they, along with their colleagues, unanimously
voiced in the famous case of Ware v. Hylton, where the Court struck down
Virginia debtor relief laws as inconsistent with article IV of the 1783
349
Treaty of Peace.
346. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].
347. See Casto, supra note 120, at 89 ("In the Senate, Jay's nomination was
strenuously opposed by those who believed that he was pro-British and would negotiate an
agreement that would draw the United States closer to Britain and away from France.").
348. See Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1078-88
(describing their respect and understanding of international law).
349. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 220, 245, 281, 281 (1796) (opinions of Chase,J., Paterson,J.,
Wilson, J., Cushing, J., respectively). Justice Iredell, who did not participate in the
disposition of the case, nonetheless delivered this memorable paean to the sanctity of the
1783 Treaty of Peace:
None can reverence the obligation of treaties more than I do. The peace of
mankind, the honour of the human race, the welfare, perhaps the being of future
generations, must in no inconsiderable degree depend on the sacred observance
of national conventions. If ever any people on account of the importance of a
treaty, were under additional obligations to observe it, the people of the United
States surely are to observe the Treaty in question. It gave peace to our country,
after a war attended with many calamities, and, in some of its periods, presenting
a most melancholy prospect. It insured, so far as peace could insure them, the
freest forms of government, and the greatest share of individual liberty, of which,
perhaps, the world had seen any example. It presented boundless views of future
happiness and greatness, which almost overpower the imagination, and which, I
trust, will not be altogether unrealized: The means are in our power; wisdom and
virtue are alone required to avail ourselves of them. Such was the peace which
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Associate Justices John Blair of Virginia and John Rutledge of South
Carolina were both American-born but trained in law at the Middle Temple in London.3 50 Rutledge, a recess appointment as Chief Justice from
August to December of 1795, was, as it turned out, not internationalist
enough. The Senate rejected him for a permanent appointment as Chief
Justice because of his outspoken opposition to the 1794 Jay Treaty35 1-a
litmus test consistent with the thesis of this Article, but surely utterly foreign to Americans accustomed to modem Supreme Court appointment
controversies. Washington then offered the position to William Cushing,
another early Associate Justice appointee, who, although neither educated nor born in Great Britain, had served on the Massachusetts Superior Court during the colonial period from 1772 to 1775 and thereafter
352
until his appointment to the Court in 1789 under a state commission.
Unsurprisingly, Cushing was, like Wilson and Iredell, with whom he
agreed in Ware v. Hylton, a rock-solid pacta sunt servanda man: "[I] t can
hardly be considered as an odious thing, to [e]nforce the payment of an
honest debt, according to the true intent and meaning of the parties contracting . . . ,,353 When Cushing refused to replace Rutledge as Chief
3 54
Justice for health reasons, Washington nominated Oliver Ellsworth,
who we know was the principal architect of the First Judiciary Act, which
provided original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for
suits brought by foreign states against States.3 55 When Ellsworth resigned
as Chief Justice owing to health problems arising from his other job as
U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to France, PresidentJohn Adams replaced him with his chief diplomat, Secretary of State
was procured by the Treaty now in question-a treaty which, when it shall be fully
executed in all its parts, on both sides, future generations will look up to with
gratitude and admiration, and with no small degree of fervour towards those who
had an active share in procuring it.
In proceeding to examine the treaty with these sentiments, it may well be
imagined I do it with a reverential and sacred awe, lest by any misconstruction of
mine, I should weaken any one of its provisions.
Id. at 270-71 (Iredell,J.); cf. id. at 281 (Wilson,J.) (striking down Virginia statute on basis
of a rule of the law of nations that sovereign state at war may not confiscate debts of its
enemies and, alternatively, on grounds that 1783 Treaty of Peace annulled the Virginia law
in question).
350. See Robert M. Ireland, Blair, John, Jr., in The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 1, at 77-78; Robert M. Ireland, Rutledge,
John, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 1,
at 750-51.
351. See Casto, supra note 120, at 92 ("Although charges of insanity and bankruptcy
were leveled against Rutledge, the available evidence indicates that these allegations were
essentially pretextual and the true basis for the negative was Rutledge's strident and public
opposition to the Jay Treaty."); Goebel, supra note 343, at 748 & n.120; infra Part IV.A
(discussing the Jay Treaty).
352. See Casto, supra note 120, at 59.
353. 3 U.S. (3 Dal).) at 283 (Cushing, J.).
354. See Goebel, supra note 343, at 749.
355. See Goebel, supra note 343, at 458-60; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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John Marshall.3 56 But before enlisting Marshall, Adams asked John Jay,
the Republic's preeminent diplomat, if he wanted his old job back. 35 7 It
is a particularly telling insight into the founding group's conception of
the Court that President Adams's first choice as Chief Justice was Jay, the
very person who had negotiated a controversial treaty upon which the
Court might have future cause to pass.
As a group, then, the first appointments to the Court exhibited traits
supporting the inference that the Court was intended to act as a quasiinternational tribunal, particularly with regard to potential disputes
among the States and between the States and Great Britain. All of the
firstJustices were "initially leery of an outright separation with Great Britain. ''35 8 All three Chief Justices had, or would have, significant diplomatic experience. Two were trained for the practice of law in Britain;
others had practiced under British colonial rule. They were all widely
respected in their home States.
Although the cosmopolitan and diplomatic background of the first
Justices of the Court is common knowledge, the logical inferences that
follow as to the Framers' conception of the Court's institutional role are
not so often made. One such inference is that the Framers intended an
international role for the Court, and that original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits by foreign states directly against States for treaty violations
was an important part of this function. Another is that the modem tendency to label matters touching upon foreign affairs as political questions
implicating the separation of powers is overinclusive as an originalist matter. What good would come of appointing diplomats to the Court if they
could not bring their expertise to bear on the cases they were constitutionally empowered to decide? A particularly poignant confirmation of
this is that President Washington asked one sitting Chief Justice (Jay) to
negotiate a treaty with Great Britain and another (Ellsworth) to smooth
over difficulties with France, and his successor President Adams saw no
problem in asking the former to come out of retirement to replace the
latter in a second go as Chief Justice.
The most dispositive objection to the contention that it would offend
the constitutional separation of powers for the Supreme Court to hear a
case brought by a foreign state alleging treaty breach by a State is the
nature of the underlying problem in such a suit. When a foreign state
alleges that a State has breached a U.S. treaty obligation, the issue is internal treaty discipline within the borders of the United States. This has
nothing to do with "the sphere of international negotiations and adjustment" 359 delegated to the political branches in the constitutional structural scheme. The puzzle is how to get a recalcitrant State to live up to a
treaty the United States has ratified and wishes to honor, not how to ne356.
357.
358.
359.

See Casto, supra note 120, at 118-19, 124-25.
See id. at 124.
Id. at 64.
See supra text accompanying note 328.
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gotiate a treaty, revise it, or even to go about breaking it as a matter of
national policy. Deciding whether a State has violated a U.S. treaty involves treaty interpretation as the domestic law of the United States, a
quintessentially judicial function, 36 °1as opposed to, for example, the job
of deciding whether a foreign government should be recognized, 361 or
more relevantly, the meaning of the treaty in international law and relations.i 62 Any remedy in the event of a determination of breach would be
inward-looking, that is, ordered and enforced against the breaching
360. "The courts . . . have the final say as to the meaning of an international
agreement insofar as it is law of the United States applicable to cases and controversies
before the courts." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 326 cmt. b (1987); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 254 (1984) ("We are bound to uphold [the executive branch's] determination [under
a multilateral treaty convention] unless we find it to be contrary to law established by
domestic legislation or by the Convention itself."); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 336-39
(1939) (supplanting Secretary of Labor's interpretation of 1869 treaty with Sweden with
Court's own interpretation); David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty
Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 956 (1994) ("In the United States, courts ultimately
decide the meaning of treaties."); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty
Delegation, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1263, 1268 (2002) ("[WIhile some form of calibrated deference
may be appropriate, foreign affairs and executive expertise rhetoric does not justify
absolute judicial abdication in favor of fleeting executive views on the interpretation of all
treaties."). But see John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 851, 864 (2001) (reviewing
Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the
Cold War (2000)) ("Both formalist and functionalist approaches to the separation of
powers indicate that the President should enjoy substantial freedom in defining the
meaning of international agreements."). For an example of cases in which the Supreme
Court interpreted treaties as domestic law in contravention of the meaning assigned by the
political branches (to the point of requiring diplomatic renegotiation of treaty terms),
compare Maiorano v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909), which held,
contrary to what the State Department argued, that the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, Feb. 26, 1871, U.S.-Italy, 17 Stat. 845, did not provide a right of action for
damages to Italian citizens in U.S. courts, with Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535, 538-39
(1926), which interpreted the same treaty, as amended by Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, Feb. 25, 1913, U.S.-Italy, 38 Star. 1669, to uphold a right of action for damages
by an Italian citizen in U.S. courts.
361. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938) ("What
government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a
political rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined by the political
department of the government."); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
("Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not ajudicial, but is a political
question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges .... This principle has always been upheld by
this court . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202, 212 (1890))); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818)
(arguing that recognition of foreign governments rests with Congress because it alone "can
place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own judgment
shall appear wise").
362. "The President has authority to interpret international agreements for the
purpose of United States foreign relations since he is the country's 'sole organ' in its
international relations and is responsible for carrying out agreements with other nations."
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326 cmt. a.
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American State, and would thus raise fewer concerns for interference in
the national government's extraterritorial conduct of foreign policy. Relief in the case of a State's defection from a binding treaty regime is, thus,
much like relief in a suit asserting that state law or action is unconstitutional or preempted by a federal statute.
Any other prudential objection on the basis of separation of powers
seems similarly weak. It is hard to see how the Supreme Court, in deciding whether a State has breached a binding U.S. treaty obligation, would
tarnish its institutional credibility or be perceived as acting antidemocratically. Moreover, doctrinal evolution recognizing the Court's discretion in
granting leave to file original actions, 3 6 3 however controversial, 364 provides a useful safety valve for the Court to exercise principled discretion
consistent with Article III in declining jurisdiction over cases where it is
apparent that the political branches are dealing with state defection in an
effective way, or that the foreign state has not undertaken a good-faith
effort to redress treaty breach through diplomatic or other political
means.

365

Before moving on, it may be worth making one metapoint about the
Monaco Court's presumptive invocation of political question doctrine in
dictum. Application of the political question doctrine, or any justiciability doctrine, though it may potentially reach the same result as a
holding based on sovereign immunity-namely, no original jurisdiction
in the Court of suits by foreign states against nonconsenting States alleging U.S. treaty violations-is premised not on a respect for the States'
sovereignty, but rather on New Deal era deference to the intrastate reach
of the political branches of the national government. It differs in this
respect from an argument based on state sovereign immunity in the constitutional plan, which is rooted in respect for federalism. The nonjusticiability claim is that, notwithstanding text and history, the Supreme
Court ought not to have the power to determine the veracity of a foreign
state's allegation that a State has breached a treaty, because this is the job
not of the States, but of the executive and legislative branches. To the
contrary, the reasoning in Monaco is in fact dismissive of state sovereignty
in its assumption that a suit involving U.S. treaty obligations colliding
with state law or action is necessarily a foreign relations matter to be
taken up by the political branches, despite the potential for interference
in state affairs. The assignment of this particular function to the judicial
branch would have been, in this sense, the truly profederalism move.
Ironically, then, Monaco could be justified on an antitextualist, antioriginalist constitutional theory; this is ironic because members of the
Court inclined to both textualism and originalism have stood behind
Monaco and other precedents extending state sovereign immunity well
363. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.
364. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 561 ("This development elicited strong (and in my
view unanswerable) dissent within the Court." (citation omitted)).
365. See supra Part I.D.
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beyond the words of the Eleventh Amendment and careful examination
of the intent of its Framers. 3 66 The argument would be that the need to
provide for original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Court over suits
against States by powerful foreign states in 1787 notwithstanding, by 1934
America was itself a powerful nation, the dogma of dual sovereignties had
become anathema, and the political branches of the national government held supreme power to enact and enforce all ratified treaties
against the States, no matter the encroachment on the traditional province of the States' internal sovereignty. There would thus be no need for
the Court to decide, on the direct appeal of a foreign state and without
the involvement of the political branches, whether a State has unlawfully
defected from a treaty regime by failing to honor its obligations.3 6 7 The
implication is that such a controversy, by virtue of being a treaty claim,
can and always should be resolved by the political branches of the national government. Such a conclusion produces the ultimate of many
ironies of the Monaco decision: A New Deal era opinion profoundly nationalistic and anti-States' rights in sentiment and logic has been embraced by a profederalism Court by virtue of a happy coincidence in its
implications for state sovereign immunity.
The better view is to acknowledge what the evidence shows-the
Framers had in mind a more complex and flexible plan. On the one
hand, fearful of the wars and ruinous economic retaliation that might
result from States' refusals to honor fundamental peace treaty obligations
of the United States, the Framers viewed the Supreme Court as an essential peacekeeping, war-avoidance institution, a quasi-international arbitral
tribunal to handle foreign state-versus-State treaty disputes. On the other
hand, the very same realities of state power and dogmatic belief in internal States' sovereignty that vivified the threat of treaty-breaking by States'
defection in the first place created a fear of rebellion in the event that the
political branches of the national government attempted heavy-handed
tactics of national treaty enforcement on behalf of aggrieved foreign
states. Even when that fear had subsided, the structure of American federalism handcuffed the ability of the political branches to redress state
violations of treaties of the United States. 368 Moreover, for the executive
366. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002)
(Thomas, J., opinion of the Court, joined by Scalia, J.) (dismissing the language of the
Eleventh Amendment on the basis that "[iinstead of explicitly memorializing the full
breadth of the sovereign immunity retained by the States when the Constitution was
ratified, Congress chose.., only to 'address the specific provisions of the Constitution that
had raised concerns during the ratification debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm
decision."' (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999))); Blatchford v. Native Vill.
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court) ("[W]e have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms .... ").
367. Of course, the executive branch might intervene in some instances as amicus
curiae to give its opinion regarding breach and effect on the national interest.
368. See infra text accompanying notes 463-471, 504-506.
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branch to sue for or otherwise seek treaty enforcement against the States
would appear to concede what might be an arguable treaty violation, to
the detriment of the national government's negotiating position vis-A-vis
foreign state treaty partners. Once again, a Supreme Court staffed by
eminent jurists from a cross-section of the States, with diplomatic experience and internationalist sensibilities, suggested itself as a useful means
to deal with sensitive U.S. treaty controversies in a way the States might
perceive as mindful of their respective internal sovereignties, and foreign
states might perceive as credibly neutral.
III. WHY

ORIGINAL ACTIONS AGAINST STATES IN THE SUPREME COURT?

The previous Part's discussion of ratification consent touched briefly
on the war-avoidance rationale for authorizing the Supreme Court to
hear suits by foreign states against States.3 69 This Part addresses the puzzle of seemingly redundant remedies: If the paradigm problem redressed
by the Court's jurisdiction was state defection from obligations to British
creditors under the 1783 Treaty of Peace, why was such jurisdiction necessary given the alternative measures of diplomacy-such as the negotiation
of the 1794Jay Treaty-and provisions for lower federal courts and appellate review from state courts to provide redress directly to aggrieved
aliens, as demonstrated by the aforementioned result in Ware v. Hylton?370 The solution to the puzzle requires an understanding of late
eighteenth-century international law and relations.
A. How to Deal with States Breaking Treaties
The place to begin is with a judicial remedy the Constitution does
not authorize. The Court has held that the word "State" in the Original
37 1
Jurisdiction Clause does not include the sovereign United States.
Thus, the Constitution does not permit original jurisdiction in the Court
for disputes between the collective United States and a foreign state, regardless of the fact that such a suit would fall under a controversies subheading of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1-"Controversies to which the
37v 2
United States shall be a Party.
There are three rationales for this conclusion. First, as a matter of
common sense, the Supreme Court-itself a national governmental institution-would not be perceived by a foreign state as likely to act as a
neutral arbiter in a dispute between it and a coordinate branch of the
same national government. 373 Second, although, as mentioned above,
369. See supra Part II.C.
370. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
371. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 n.3 (1943) ("The United States
has never been held to be a 'State' within [U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2] .....
372. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
373. Cf. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 131, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) ("No
man ought certainly to be ajudge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he
has the least interest or bias.").
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the international law principle of home court immunity as against another sovereign has no force as to a State in a national court, it is certainly
applicable to a suit by a foreign sovereign against the national government in the national court. 374 This is not wholly persuasive, however,
because the national government could waive its own immunity if it
375
thought a waiver of immunity would advance the national interest.
Thus, the third and most important reason why the Framers did not provide for treaty-based original actions in the Court by foreign states against
the United States seems to be the Framers' impression that States, not the
national government, would be the domestic sovereigns likely to breach
treaty obligations of importance to the survivability of the Republic.
As a matter of international law, however, it was immaterial whether
the national government or a State occasioned breach of a ratified treaty
of the United States. The treaty had been breached, and the offended
sovereign treaty partner had legal rights of redress.3 76 In the late eighteenth century, lawful recourse included the right of the aggrieved foreign
sovereign to wage war against the entire United States, particularly if the
breached treaty was a peace treaty.3 7 7 In this way, the principal internal
threat for the Republic-States' defection from national policy-was simultaneously the cause of the principal external threat-war with a foreign state over the alleged breach of a peace treaty. Doing away with
American federalism altogether was, theoretically, the best solution to the
lack of a federalism affirmative defense to treaty breach, but that expedient was inconceivable to many, and impracticable given the circumstances of the Republic's founding.
This left few options to deal with the problem of potential treaty
breach by States. The more obvious option was diplomacy, but that was
too blunt an instrument. Negotiations, treaties, reparations, and settlements were serviceable (if possibly costly) options when treaty breach was

374. See supra text accompanying notes 234-236. This discussion of why there is no
provision in the Original Jurisdiction Clause for foreign state-versus-United States
controversies parallels the earlier discussion about why the Framers might not have
intended the Original Jurisdiction Clause to cover United States-versus-State controversies.
See supra text accompanying notes 107-110.
375. See, e.g., Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (2000) (waiver of
United States immunity for certain nontort claims); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2000) (primary jurisdictional and waiver provision).
376. As a precaution against subunit breach, a sovereign state could draft explicit
"federalism" clauses, usually in the form of a "best efforts" or "recommend" provision, with
respect to the national authority's securing subunit cooperation in treaty enforcement.
See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, supra note 209, art. V, 8 Stat. at 82.
377. Vattel, supra note 61, Book 4, § 54, at 513 ("[I]f [the offended party] determines
on demanding ajust indemnification, and the party in fault refuses it, the treaty is then, of
consequence, broke, and the injured contractor has a very just cause for taking up arms
again.").

2004] SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1851

systemic-when a large number of States were backsliding on a treaty. 378
But if the culprit were one or a couple of States defecting from a U.S.
treaty, it would be giving away too much for the national government to
negotiate and pay a settlement on behalf of all of the United States. At
the same time, to defend the isolated defections would risk war and disruption of trade, which would be contrary to the interests of the majority
of States remaining faithful to the treaty.
Conversely, heavy-handed coercion by the political branches of the
national government to enforce treaty discipline on a recalcitrant State
was fraught with danger. This was particularly true in the case of a powerful State like Virginia. True, the States had conceded to the inexorable
logic of a "more perfect Union" 379 in the wake of the war for revolution,
but the national government lacked the military resources to force treaty
compliance on a stubborn State.
To do nothing and run the risk of war was another option, at least in
theory. In reality, it was no option at all for the young Republic in the
late eighteenth century. War weary, militarily weak, financially strapped,
and internally divided notwithstanding the wave of nationalism that carried through the Constitution, the last thing the Framers wanted was reprise of war with Great Britain or any other European power. They had
barely won the war of revolution, and that only with the military and financial assistance of France, a great power and Great Britain's adversary.
Only slightly less distressing for the Republic was the risk that Great Britain would order a naval blockade or take other economic sanctions. The
colonies had been too long weaned as a cog of the British mercantilist
empire to be able to flourish without access to Britain and her retained
colonial possessions through trade with other powers. A British naval
blockade, difficult to do but within the capability of the greatest navy in
the world, would have choked the young nation's economic growth.
A fourth option was to provide a network of national courts as an
alternative or supplement to state courts for the vindication of foreigners'
legal claims direcfly. This was the most responsive measure to the paradigm threat, which, as we have seen, involved state denials of access to
justice for British creditors in contravention of the 1783 Treaty of Peace
with Great Britain. Article IV famously dealt with debts: "It is agreed that
creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted. '3 0 As the Supreme Court held in Ware v. Hylton, the
article was explicit and broad enough to encompass any sort of statutory
378. Moreover, in the event of systemic breach, the option of suit in the Court by
foreign states against States would be unwieldy and perhaps impracticable given the need
for multiple lawsuits.
379. U.S. Const. pmbl.
380. Treaty of Peace, supra note 209, art. IV, 8 Stat. at 82. Article V concerned
restitution for confiscated properties. The argument that this treaty provision might be
breached by state action was more difficult for the British sovereign to make, because it
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or judicial "impediment" a State might interpose to disable full payment
of debts in valuable specie. 38 1 The Framers of the Constitution left Congress the option of availing itself of this solution.
B. Suits by Foreign Citizens or Subjects
Thus, the State-foreign parties provision of Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1382 broadly authorized federaljudicial power over suits by foreign
citizens or subjects, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 intricately and parsimoniously doled out this power to the lower federal courts the Act created. 38 3 Under the Act, in certain disputes between private parties, an
alien could sue a state citizen in (1) federal circuit or district court rather
than state court, or (2) in state court, with a right to appeal to the Supreme Court or to remove to federal court in cases that could have been
brought in the district or circuit courts. The circuit courts were specifically invested with jurisdiction over such disputes involving greater sums
of money, regardless of the specific cause of action. Section 11 of the Act
provided,
That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party ....384
Section 12 of the Act afforded defendants the right to remove state court
cases brought against aliens to federal court when the claims met the
38 5
amount-in-controversy requirement.
contained a primitive federalism clause that cast the national government's basic treaty

obligation as one of merely "recommending" remedial measures to the States.
It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of
the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights and
properties, which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects ....
[A]nd that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several states a
reconsideration and revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so as to
render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent, not only with justice and equity,
but with that spirit of conciliation, which on the return of the blessings of peace
should universally prevail.
Id. art. V, 8 Stat. at 82-83. A subsequent clause of article V provided, like article IV, that
"all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands . . . shall meet with no lawful
impediment in the prosecution of theirjust rights," but as there was no treaty obligation to
reverse the confiscations defining baseline 'Just rights," the clause lacked teeth. Article VI
prohibited any "future Confiscations" or "Prosecutions" for participation in the war. Id.
art. VI, 8 Stat. at 83.
381. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239-42 (1796) (Patterson, J.).
382. "The judicial Power shall extend to... Controversies... between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
383. See generally Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1478-1517 (detailing
drafting and passage of Judiciary Act of 1789).
384. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
385. Id. ch. 20, § 12, 1 Star. at 79-80.
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The federal district courts were assigned jurisdiction of suits by aliens
regardless of amount, but for a "tort only in violation of a treaty or the law
of nations," not for simple breach-of-contract causes of action, such as the
writ in debt.3 8 6 Thus, debt or other nontort causes of action involving
five hundred dollars or less in controversy, which would appear authorized under a plain reading of Article III, Section 2, Clause I's alienage
jurisdiction, were simply left out in the inaugural statutory grant, presumably because denial of justice in small-potato disputes was thought unlikely to raise the ire of the alien creditor's home state. The alien was
thus stuck with state court without even a right of appeal to the Supreme
Court in debt actions for five hundred dollars or less (since the right of
appeal depended on the presence of a right to file in or remove to a
federal district or circuit court). By contrast, in all cases in which federal
circuit and district courts were afforded concurrent jurisdiction, an alien
who chose to sue in state court had a right of appeal to the Supreme
Court.

387

From the perspective of the Framers, as thorough as the First Judiciary Act's scheme of national forums of first instance for foreign private
litigants was, it, like diplomacy, had shortcomings in addressing the signal
problem of treaty-based controversies between foreign states and States.
First, the Framers would not have known in 1787 that the First Congress
in 1789 would do what it did. By virtue of the so-called Madisonian compromise, the Constitution did not require Congress to create lower
courts,3 88 and there was a strong lobby that believed the only lower courts
necessary would be admiralty courts.3 89 Thus, the Framers had to plan
386. Section 9 of the Act, the "Alien Tort Statute" (ATS), granted jurisdiction in the
federal district courts "concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77. In enacting
the ATS, the First Congress appears to have had in mind suits that presented both federal
questions and alien-diverse parties. See Lee, Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute Theory, supra note 88 (manuscript at 44-50). In addition, the State might be a
defendant in a suit by an alien in the Supreme Court, at least for the short nine years
between enactment of the 1789 Judiciary Act, of which the ATS was a part, and the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798. See id. at 46 n.155.
387. "The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts
and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for . ..."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 81. This would include suits originating under
§ 11 in the district courts, via the right of appeal to the circuit courts. See id. ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. at 79 ("And the circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the district
courts under the regulations and restrictions herein after provided.").
388. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. Const. art III, § 1.
389. The possibility of inferior federal courts of admiralty was first presented in a draft
proposal for Article III that was likely presented at the federal Constitutional Convention.
The proposal was found among the papers of George Mason, but in the handwriting of his
codelegateJohn Blair of Virginia, one of George Washington's inaugural appointments to
the Court. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 5 & n.23; 2 Farrand, supra note 46, at 432
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for the possibility that the only way an alien creditor's suit against a state
citizen debtor might reach a national court would be by a time-consuming process of appeal to the Supreme Court from a state court.
Second, even if the Framers of the Constitution did expect statutory
establishment of a network of lower federal courts affording access to private foreigners along the lines actually set up by the First Congress, such a
network would have been unavailing for direct claims by foreign states
against States. Foreign sovereign-to-State sovereign lending apparently
did not constitute a significant portion of debt at the founding of the
Republic,3 90 but it was certainly something to worry about. In Chief Justice Marshall's words, although "[t] here was not much reason to fear that
foreign or sister States would be creditors [of States] to any considerable
amount, ... there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the [Supreme
Court] in [these] cases, because it might be essential to the preservation
39
of peace." '
Third, there was a greater chance that a State might be liable to foreign citizens or subjects in violation of the 1783 Treaty of Peace. A State
might have directly owed money to the foreigner, whether for a debt, a
contractual obligation, or payment for confiscation of property or goods.
In addition, a State might have denied justice to a class of foreign claimants in violation of the treaty by, for example, enacting a statute impeding
the payment of debts in full and in pounds sterling or by systemic denial
of justice in its courts. If the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, holding
("The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such Courts of Admiralty as Congress shall establish in any of the States."). In 1789,
constitutional amendments were proposed in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to limit Congress's power to establish inferior federal courts to those with
jurisdiction only over admiralty and maritime suits. See Journal of the House of
Representatives, supra note 210, at 82 (Aug. 18, 1789) (proposing the following
amendment to "Article 3, section 1: From each sentence strike out the words, 'inferior
courts,' and insert the words, 'courts of admiralty'"); Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 67 (1923) (citing an
amendment proposed in the Senate in 1789 "[t]hat no subordinate federal jurisdiction be
established in any State, other than for admiralty or maritime causes"); cf. Casto, supra
note 120, at 38 ("Virtually every member of the first Congress agreed on the necessity of
creating federal trial courts with an admiralty jurisdiction over maritime disputes."); Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the
Federal Judicial System 7 (1927) ("Maritime commerce was then the jugular vein of the
Thirteen States. The need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation was
recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional Convention." (citation
omitted)); The Federalist No. 80, supra note 131, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The
most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the
national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes.").
390. See Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the
Confederation, 1781-1789, at 303 (1950) ("At the end of the war state debts consisted
largely of money owing to farmers and merchants for supplies, the remnants of
depreciated currencies, and sums due to soldiers for back payments or inadequate pay.").
It is possible that States accumulated some sovereign-to-sovereign debts in the four years
between the end of the war in 1783 and the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787.
391. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821).
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392
Georgia suable on a contract obligation to a citizen of South Carolina,
was incorrect as a matter of the Framers' intent, then constitutional immunity precluded any such suits directly by aggrieved foreign citizens or
subjects in federal court. That would certainly be the case after the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, because of home court
immunity in state courts, if Congress chose not to set up any lower federal
courts other than admiralty courts, any private foreign claims against
States could not have reached the Supreme Court even in the exercise of
its appellate function over claims arising under federal treaty law.
But even if Chisholm were right, and state sovereign immunity did not
stand as a bar to suit in federal court by foreigners against States from the
perspective of the Framers in 1787, a rule of contemporaneous international law called "espousal" recognized the right of an aggrieved for3 93
eigner's sovereign state to adopt his claim and advance it in his stead.
The foreign state could espouse both sorts of claims its citizen or subject
might have against a State: (1) individual espousal of a debt owed by a
State to the citizen or subject; or (2) class espousal of the claims of a class
of citizens or subjects alleging systemic denial ofjustice by the State's legislature or courts. Equally important, the foreign state could employ
whatever means it elected, including the waging of war, regardless of the
provision of a private judicial remedy in the American national courts. In
order to understand the sovereign's espousal right and how it operated,
the best place to begin may be long after the Framers had perished, at the
dawn of the twentieth century.

C. The InternationalLaw Doctrine of Espousal
The United States under President Theodore Roosevelt was the moving force behind the first modern multilateral treaty prohibiting a specific reason for a sovereign state to go to war. Article I of the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for
the Recovery of Contract Debts, which the United States ratified in 1910,
392. See 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 453 (1793) (Blair, J.) ("The order, I think, should be
thus: 'Ordered, that unless the State of Georgia should, after due notice of this order...
cause an appearance to be entered in behalf of the State ... or then sh[o]w cause to the
contrary, judgment be then entered up against the State .... '); id. at 466 (Wilson, J.) ("I
have now tried this question [whether a State may be sued in federal court by a citizen of
another State] by the principles of general jurisprudence; by the laws and practice of States
... and by the Constitution .... From all, the combined inference is; that the action lies.");
id. at 468 (Cushing, J.) ("[I]f a State is entitled to Justice in the Federal Court, against a
citizen of another State, why not such citizen against the State, when the same language
equally comprehends both?"); id. at 479 (Jay, C.J.) ("I am clearly of opinion, that a State is
suable by citizens of another State .... ").
393. The doctrine of parens patriae, by which a State has standing to litigate the quasisovereign claims of a class of its citizens, is a weaker, domestic cousin of the international
espousal right. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 287-94 (discussing
standing of a State to sue as parens patriae); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 77, at
490-94.
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provided, "The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed
force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of
one country by the Government of another country as being due to its
nationals." 394 The Convention also provided for arbitration in a permanent international tribunal in lieu of a sovereign state's exercise of the
now forfeited right to wage war on behalf of its private citizen's or subject's contract debt claim.3 95 The contemplated international tribunal
was established, but no sovereign state invoked its jurisdiction for the specific purpose intended by article I of the Hague Convention.
Original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over foreign state-versusState treaty disputes was, in principal part, the Framers' solution to the
same issue addressed by the 1907 Hague Convention: how to disable the
venerable right at international law of a sovereign state to wage war
against another state on behalf of its citizen or subject, when the latter
state (or in the American case, a subnational State) had defaulted on a
contract debt in violation of international law (such as article IV of the
1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain).-96 The technical and general
term for this sovereign right was espousal: A sovereign's espousal of its
citizen's private grievance rendered it a public claim on the international
plane, 3 97 and the sovereign could lawfully wage war to vindicate the espoused claim. Notwithstanding the Hague Convention's abolition of an
espousal right to war for private contract debt, espousal is still the rule at
international law in debt and other contexts, although typically by means
of diplomatic negotiations, for instance, for compensation arising from
expropriations:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State, from whom they
have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary
channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rightsof its subjects, respect for the
its right to ensure, in the 3person
98
rules of international law.

394. Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for
the Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2241, 2251, 1 Bevans 607,
614.
395. Id. arts. 1-2, 36 Stat. at 2251-52, 1 Bevans at 614.
396. See supra text accompanying note 380.
397. See generally Anthony D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect
205-33 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining the concept of espousal and its ramifications); Espousal
and Settlement of Claim, 8 Whiteman Digest § 37, at 1216-33 (describing espousal and
significant twentieth-century applications).
398. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
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Espousal was a necessary axiom of traditional international law, under
which individuals lacked standing to pursue claims of international law,
violations against other sovereign states on their own.
Because espousal was considered a domestic political decision by a
sovereign state, international law recognized no right on the part of other
sovereign states to question its merits.3 99 Nor, importantly, could another sovereign require exhaustion of available peaceful diplomatic or
judicial measures by the state of the offended citizen or subject before
recourse to war to vindicate the espoused claim. To do so would undermine the espousing state's discretionary sovereign power to decide on its
own what was important enough to press as a national grievance on the
international plane and how to go about vindicating it-whether by arbi40 0
tration, diplomacy, or war.
But notwithstanding the sovereign's uninhibited discretion to press
its citizen's complaint of international law violation, the doctrine of espousal made sense from a policy perspective given the safeguards inherent in conferring a legal right upon a sovereign state.
Because a sovereign state aggregated the preferences of many
citizens for the good of the state, the more extreme and trivial
legal claims of individuals aggrieved in their dealings with foreign states could be filtered and mitigated through the domestic
political process. Moreover, sovereign states could resort to a
range of political and diplomatic measures besides lawsuits, and
they could be counted upon to think strategically about the merits of pursuing a claim versus countervailing costs to valuable
political and economic relationships that might be jeopardized.
For instance, pursuing a suit against another state concerning
defaulted debt obligations might invite similar claims in the fu399. The insulation from judicial inquiry by a U.S. federal court of a foreign
sovereign's decision to espouse its citizen's or subject's claim and how to vindicate it fits
under the general rubric of the act-of-state doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909) ("[Tlhe improbabil[i]ty of the United States
attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious . . .");
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.").
400. See, e.g., David A. Levy, The Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, International Law in Brief
(1998), at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0105.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(summarizing the decisions of Hau v. Dep't of State, No. CV-F-94-5964 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13,
1995) (unpublished opinion), which held that the State Department's decision not to
espouse plaintiffs claim of expropriation of their hotel by Vietnam because they were not
U.S. citizens at the time of espousal is political question insulated from judicial review, and
Brown v. Christopher, No. 93-1375-CIV (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion),
which denied court's authority to issue writ of mandamus ordering U.S. Secretary of State
to espouse U.S. citizen plaintiffs' claim against Brazil for torture and death of her husband
because espousal is discretionary to the executive branch); Espousal and Settlement of
Claim, supra note 397, § 37, at 1216-33 (providing examples of State Department
discretion regarding espousal).
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ture against the plaintiff state. The end result would be that
state-to-state lawsuits would be relatively rare and confined40 to
1
issues that were more national than individual in character.
The Supreme Court made this very point in Alden v. Maine, in explaining
why suits by the United States against nonconsenting States posed an altogether different issue from suits by private individuals: "Suits brought by
the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for
each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a
40 2
broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States."
The Framers understood and embraced espousal. 40 3 Justice Iredell,
the famous dissenter in Chisholm v. Georgia,404 endorsed the doctrine
from the American perspective:
When any individual, therefore, of any nation, has cause of
complaint against another nation, or any individual of it, not
immediately amenable to authority of his own, he may complain
to that power in his own nation, which is entrusted with the sovereignty of it as to foreign nego[lt]iations, and he will be
en[lt]itled to all the redress which the nature of his case requires, and the si [tu] ation of his own country will enable him to
obtain.
Miserable and disgraceful indeed, would be the situation of
the citizens of the United States, if they were obliged to comply
with a treaty on their part, and had no means of redress for a
non-compliance by the other contracting power.
But they have, and the law of nations points out the remedy. The remedy depends40 on
the discretion and sense of duty
5
of their own government.
Implicit in Justice Iredell's statement is a broader presumption of the
scope of a sovereign's espousal right than that advanced in this Article.
Iredell believed that a sovereign could espouse the private claim of its
citizen notjust against another sovereign (which is the prevailing modern
opinion) ,406 but even as against "any individual of it."40 7 If Iredell's view
401. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 25, at 1034.
402. 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
403. The Supreme Court, in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883), has
since disavowed the doctrine of espousal as between American States. See discussion infra
Part III.E.
404. 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J.).
405. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259-60 (1796) (statement of Iredell, J., who
did not participate in the disposition of the case).
406. "The diplomatic protection afforded by the Government of the United States to
its nationals for injuries suffered at the hands of foreign governments contrary to accepted
principles of international law is not a matter of [the nationals'] legal right."
Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Claims (Kwiatek),
Department of State, to the Legal Adviser (Hager), Department of State (Jan. 21, 1960),
reprinted in Espousal and Settlement of Claim, supra note 397, § 37, at 1216 (internal
citation omitted).
407. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 259.
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was typical of the Framers' understanding of the scope of the espousal
right-and there is no reason to believe it was not-then a foreign sovereign could lawfully go to war even on the basis of its citizen's or subject's
claims against a citizen of a State.
The Supreme Court of the United States, as late as 1883, specifically
acknowledged that a sovereign state's failure to pay a debt owed to a citizen or subject of another state was an acceptable ground under international law for the sovereign to go to war on the private creditor's behalf:
There is no doubt but one nation may, if it sees fit, demand of
another nation the payment of a debt owing by the latter to a
citizen of the former. Such power is well recognized as an incident of national sovereignty, but it involves also the national
powers of levying war and making treaties ....

[I]f a sovereign

assumes the responsibility of presenting the claim of one of his
subjects against another sovereign, the prosecution will be "as
one nation proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts,
as of 08
right, but by diplomatic negotiation, or, if need be, by
4
war."
The Framers confronted the functionally identical problem posed by
the sovereign's right to war on espoused private contract claims as
Roosevelt did in the early twentieth century with the Hague Convention,
but under radically different circumstances. First, in the late eighteenth
century, the American States and their citizens had accumulated significant prewar and postwar debts to British and other foreign creditorsmany with enough influence with their governments to mobilize sovereign intercession on their behalf rather than risk litigation on their own
in American state or lower federal courts. The United States was, by a
gross margin, a net debtor nation and thus particularly vulnerable to espousal claims. Given this circumstance, the Framers were in an exceedingly poor position to negotiate a treaty proscribing debt espousals as a
lawful reason for war.
Second, given the primitive nature of international politics in 1787,
the Framers could not conceive of the Convention's twin solution of forbidding the specific casus belli by treaty and setting up a truly international tribunal. Nor did they have the power in world affairs to act to
implement such a proposal. The sovereign right to wage war on espoused private contract debts was considered inviolate at the time. 40 9 It
was therefore unlikely that civilized nations would universally agree to
4 10
surrender that right in exchange for a tribunal to arbitrate the claims.
408. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 90 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875)).
409. See id. (citing the power of Congress to declare war in the event of a treaty
infraction); Diekelman, 92 U.S. at 524 (citing diplomacy or war as the only means of citizen
redress against another nation).
410. Contrast this with the concern in the late eighteenth century about piracy along
the North African coast-a practice commanding sufficient universal condemnation that
Vattel went so far as to urge the formation of an international league to fight the pirates.
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Third, the espousal problem the Framers confronted was importandy different insofar as it was quasi-international in the sense that the
national government itself had no interest in preventing the recovery of
private contract debts owed to citizens or subjects of foreign states.
Rather, the root of the danger was a domestic artifact of American federalism-the States and their citizens had sufficient scope for independent
action to breach U.S. treaties on their own. Fourth, and most important,
the espousal problem in its eighteenth-century incarnation was one of life
or death for a weak, agrarian, and heavily indebted republic in a world of
powerful monarchies. War or the disruption of vital foreign trade and
credit posed a more urgent threat to national interests than it would in
the early twentieth century.
Under these circumstances, the Framers assigned to the Supreme
Court the quasi-international function of deciding treaty disputes between American States and foreign states. It is worth quoting again James
Madison's description of the intent behind the Constitution's extension
of federal judicial power to "Controversies . . .between a State ... and
foreign States":
The next case provides for disputes between a foreign State, and
one of our States, should such a case ever arise .... The disputes ought to be tried by the national tribunal. This is consonant to the law of nations. Could there be a more favourable or
eligible provision to avoid controversies with foreign powers?
of the Union to
Ought it to be put in the power of a4 member
11
drag the whole community into war?
4 12

D. A Two-Tiered System of National Courts for International Controversies

To summarize, then, the Framers of the Constitution created an
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as the capstone
"Christian nations have no less a fight to unite against the barbarous republics, in order to
destroy those haunts of pirates, among whom the love of plunder, or the fear of a just
chastisement, are the only rules of peace and war." Vattel, supra note 61, Book 2, § 78, at
224. Vattel offers a similar sentiment in a more general context of possible relevance
today:
If then there is any where a nation of a restless and mischievous disposition,
always ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to raise domestic
troubles; it is not to be doubted that all have a fight to join, in order to repress,
chastise, and put it ever after out of its power to injure them.
Id. Book 2, § 53, at 215. Thomas Jefferson sought to put Vattel's suggestion into practice
in 1786 by proposing an international "confederation" of naval forces to protect shipping
in the Mediterranean from the pirates. Proposed Confederation Against the Barbary
States (Oct. 1786), in 10 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 569-70 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1954); see David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1697, 1726-34 (2003) (discussing
Jefferson's efforts to construct a confederation of states to challenge the Barbary pirates).
411. Madison, supra note 282, at 1414-15.
412. The use of the term "two-tiered" in this Article is different from that employed by
Professor Amar in his articles discussed supra text accompanying notes 206-210. As used
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of a layered strategy to enable peaceful settlement of disputes between
States or their citizens and foreign states or their citizens or subjects, most
notably involving enforcement of article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace
with Great Britain. They had to invest this quasi-international role in the
Supreme Court because there were no international courts at the time to
serve this crucial function. At stake was nothing less than the survival of
the Republic, for an aggrieved treaty partner had a right at international
law to break off diplomatic or crucial trade relations and even to wage
war against all of the United States to remedy the breach.
Two primary mechanisms existed to deal with the problem of state
defection from treaty obligations to foreign creditors: (1) diplomacy and
(2) a system of lower national courts. From the Framers' perspective,
though, each of these posed significant problems. Diplomacy necessarily
shifted costs to guiltless States and the national government, and was
therefore unattractive when defections were isolated to one or a couple
of States. Pressure by the national government's political branches on a
recalcitrant State was stymied by the same dogma and practice of federalism that gave birth to the problem of state defection. The provision of
lower federal courts would help by affording an alternative forum to state
courts for private disputes, but the Framers of the Constitution could not
be sure that Congress would create such courts, and the solution did not
address direct claims by foreign states against States; even as to private
foreign claims, the solution was rendered in theory inadequate by the
contemporaneous international law doctrine of espousal. A foreign state
could espouse, without question or explanation, the private claims of its
citizens or subjects alleging a violation of international law. The foreign
state could then demand satisfaction, whether by peaceful means or by
war, regardless of whether an avenue of private relief was afforded in the
courts of the transgressing sovereign state.
Consequently, the Framers made explicit provision in the Constitution for federal judicial power as to "Controversies" between States and
foreign states as well as between state citizens and foreign citizens or subjects. The drafters of the FirstJudiciary Act of 1789 availed themselves of
the two constitutional authorizations by crafting a two-tiered framework
of national-court jurisdiction. A lower tier of national district and circuit
courts provided alternative forums to inhospitable state courts for private
alien suits. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court provided an
avenue of appeal from state courts for those foreigners with treaty claims
who chose to take their chances in the state courts. An upper tier consisted of the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
deal with the residual risk of class espousal, individual espousal, and the
smaller but significant category of sovereign-to-sovereign direct claims.
in this section, the term refers to a lower tier of federal district and circuit courts
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 to hear controversies between state citizens and
private foreign citizens or subjects, and an upper tier consisting of the Supreme Court to
decide controversies between foreign states and States.
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The Court's jurisdiction over foreign state-versus-State controversies
was a shrewd but risky innovation, since the only institutional asset the
early Court could rely on to enforce an adverse decision against a State
(and its militia) or a foreign state (and its army and navy) was the belief
of both sides that the Court would reach a just and fair decision as to
whether the State had breached the treaty and what the remedy should
be. For that reason, the earliest members of the Court were jurists with
credibility in important States, foreign states, or, preferably, both.
Original intent, on this theory, provides a narrower grant of constitutional jurisdiction than the text would appear to require. Although reliance on the unambiguous text alone compels the conclusion that Monaco
was wrongly decided, the Framers specifically intended nonconsenting
States to be sued by foreign states in the Supreme Court only with respect
to those claims alleging U.S. treaty violations by a State. It is plausible to
think that the Framers did not intend to extend the federal judicial
power to purely state law claims a foreign state might bring against a
State. Certainly, state law claims alone did not provide a ground for espousal of private claims absent some colorable allegation of international
law violation. Indeed, the Framers may not have even conceived that a
foreign state might have a purely state law claim against an American
State given the prevalent, if flawed, presumption that international law
alone would govern the rights and duties of sovereign states as against
each other.
E. The Interaction of Espousal and State Sovereign Immunity
Yet another puzzle raised by the subject of this Article is the interaction of the international law doctrine of espousal and the American domestic doctrine of state sovereign immunity for controversies between
States. To the extent that States are semisovereign, are they entitled to
espousal? In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, an undervalued gem of a case,
the Court ruled that the States surrendered their right of espousal at international law by ratification of the Constitution. 4 13 This question is not
directly relevant for the purposes of this Article, which deals with suits by
foreign states against States. An understanding of this 1883 decision,
however, provides powerful insight into how nineteenth-century American jurists, who were not so different from the late eighteenth-century
Framers in their traditional view of international law, understood espousal to operate.
The author of the unanimous opinion for the Court in New Hampshire v. Louisiana was Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite. 41 4 Waite was intimately acquainted with international law, for he had represented the U.S.
delegation in a treaty-based international arbitration in 1872 to negotiate
Great Britain's liability and reparations arising from British involvement
413. 108 U.S. at 90.
414. Id. at 85.

20041 SUPREME COURT AS QUASI-INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

1863

in outfitting the C.S.S. Alabama, a Confederate raider that wreaked havoc
on Union merchant shipping during the Civil War.4 t5 The arbitration
resulted in an award of fifteen million dollars for the United States, a
result that brought Waite public acclaim and likely contributed to his
nomination by President Ulysses Grant to be Chief Justice. 4 16 The arbitration was also a watershed event in U.S.-British relations, for it signalled
the effective end of the prospect of war between the two nations and the
start of their special relationship, which has endured into the twenty-first
century.
The principal and more famous holding was that, notwithstanding
the general rule of nonimmunity in controversies between States, Louisiana retained its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a suit brought by New
Hampshire under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. 417 New
Hampshire sued pursuant to a law its legislature had enacted authorizing
the attorney general to espouse meritorious private claims against other
States on defaulted debt obligations upon assignment of a share of the
claims and a deposit to cover litigation costs. 4 18 The intent of the law
appears to have been to enable an end-run around the Eleventh Amendment, which clearly barred a citizen of New Hampshire from bringing the
41 9
suit against Louisiana directly.
Under then and present international law, New Hampshire's decision to prosecute the claim would have sufficed to effect a legitimate espousal at international law, and the Court admitted as much. If the doctrine of espousal were applicable, New Hampshire would be free to
prosecute the claim in whatever manner it pleased, whether by negotiating with Louisiana, filing an original action in the Supreme Court, or "if
need be, by war." 4 20 But the Court concluded that the American States
were not "sovereign" with respect to espousal rights at international law
because, as part of their constitutional bargain, they had given up their
rights to engage in diplomacy and wage war:
All the rights of the States as independent nations were surrendered to the United States. The States are not nations, either as
between themselves or towards foreign nations. They are sovereign within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops short of
nationality. Their political status at home and abroad is that of
415. See John V. Orth, Waite, Morrison Remick, in The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 1, at 906-07. See generally C. Peter
Magrath, Morrison R. Waite (1963).
416. See Orth, supra note 415, at 906.
417. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 91. The opinion also adjudicated
an analogous suit brought by New York against Louisiana.
418. See id. at 76-78.
419. "The Judicial power.. . shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law ...
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State
U.S.
. Const. amend. XI.
420. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 90 (quoting United States v.
Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875)).
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States in the United States. They can neither make war nor
peace without the consent of the national government. Neither
can they, except with like consent, "enter into any agreement or
'42 1
compact with another State.
New Hampshire, however, had readied a rejoinder. "[E]ven if a
State, as sovereign trustee for its citizens, did surrender to the national
government its power of prosecuting the claims of its citizens against another State by force," the State argued, "it got in lieu the constitutional
right of suit in the national courts. '422 It takes only a very small step to
see how New Hampshire's argument, with a twist, might have occurred to
the Framers with respect to the problem of state defection from U.S.
treaty obligations vis-a-vis foreign states. A foreign state just might be persuaded to put aside its "power of prosecuting the claims of its citizens
against [a S]tate by force" if "it got in lieu the constitutional right of suit
in the national courts."
The Court, however, rejected New Hampshire's argument, and in so
doing crafted an ingenious theory on the complicated interaction of
noncitizen remedies against States and espousal in the founding
blueprint for the federal court system. First, the Court proposed that
"[t]here is no principle of international law which makes it the duty of
one nation to assume the collection of the claims of its citizens against
another nation, if the citizens themselves have ample means of redress
without the intervention of their government. '4 23 In other words, there
is no obligation for a sovereign state to espouse the claims of a citizen,
even if they are public in nature, if the citizen has an option of direct
redress in the other sovereign state. This is, of course, true-a sovereign
state has no obligation to espouse the claim of its citizens; the decision to
espouse is entirely within the sovereign's discretion. The Court did not
say, nor could it say, that a sovereign state's choice to espouse, even with
the provision of direct private remedies, would not be consistent with international law, even though it had no obligation to espouse.
Second, Chief Justice Waite continued, New Hampshire's citizens
had, before the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the right to sue
Louisiana directly on a private debt claim. 424 Interestingly, the Court's
point here flatly contradicts the view that Chisholm v. Georgia was wrongly
decided: It necessarily presumes that citizens of other States and foreign
citizens or subjects had direct rights against a State in federal court
before the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798.425 In other
words, when Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, as unamended, extended
421. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl.3).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 91 ("Under the Constitution, as it was originally construed, a citizen of one
State could sue another State in the courts of the United States for himself, and obtain the
same relief his State could get for him if it should sue.").
425. For a statement of the standard view that Chisholm was so wrong that it produced
a "profound shock" across the nation, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719-27 (1999)
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judicial power to "Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State [or] ... between a State ... and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects," the Framers intended to give those out-of-state private parties
the right to sue States.
Third, said the Court, it followed that "[c]ertainly, when he can sue
for himself, there is no necessity for power in his State to sue in his behalf, and we cannot believe it was the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to allow both remedies in such a case."'4 26 The grant of the
direct remedy to the noncitizen necessarily made the noncitizen's indirect remedy-the espousal of his claim by his sovereign-redundant.
The Court then concluded:
Therefore, the special remedy, granted to the citizen himself,
must be deemed to have been the only remedy the citizen of
one State could have under the Constitution against another
State for redress of his grievances, except such as the delinquent
State saw fit to grant. In other words, the giving of the direct
remedy to the citizen himself was equivalent to taking away any
indirect remedy he might otherwise have claimed, through the
intervention of his State, upon any principle of the law of nations. It follows that when the [Eleventh] amendment took
42 7
away the special remedy there was no other left.
On the theory of the Court, Article III, Section 2, Clause l's grant of
judicial power over "Controversies between two or more States" did not
include espousal cases, which were taken away in the original Constitution when a direct right to sue a State was given instead to citizens of
other States in that Clause's separate grant of judicial power over "Controversies between a State and Citizens of another State." This substituted
right to sue the State accorded to citizens of other States was subsequently
taken away by the Eleventh Amendment in 1798. Thus, a State might still
bring a direct sovereign claim against another State under the "between
two or more States" grant, but not an espousal claim on behalf of its citizen who, by the Eleventh Amendment, could no longer sue.
What about espousal claims by a foreign state, the subject of interest
in this Article? In dictum, the Court indicated that the original Constitution effected an identical substitution, thereby abrogating the foreign
state's espousal right, and that the Eleventh Amendment in turn abrogated the alien's direct right to sue just as it did for citizens of other
States: "The evident purpose of the amendment, so promptly proposed
and finally adopted, was to prohibit all suits against a State by or for citizens of other States, or aliens, without the consent of the State to be
sued." 4 2 8 Context suggests that the words "by or for" applied to "aliens,"
(quoting
1926)).
426.
427.
428.

1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 96 (rev. ed.
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 91.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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implying that, after the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, neither a
foreign citizen or subject directly, nor a foreign state on his behalf, could
bring suit against a State. That would mean, necessarily, that the Framers
had not intended the State-foreign States provision of the Article III
State-foreign parties Controversies subheading 429 to encompass espousal
actions against States. Rather, this implies that the Framers intended that
only direct claims by the foreign state against a State could be pursued
(in the Supreme Court) -for instance, on debts owed to the foreign state
by the State, or with respect to territorial boundary disputes.
Chief Justice Waite, in this way, weaved a complicated, fascinating
theory of how espousal interacted with Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 and
the Eleventh Amendment, but was it correct? For the purposes of this
Article, it is unnecessary to challenge his story as to the States' espousal
rights, although, as noted above, it necessarily presumes that Chisholm was
rightly decided-that noncitizens did have a right to sue States from 1788
to 1793.430
Even assuming that Waite was right about the constitutional substitution of a direct right by a state citizen in the place of his State's espousal
right on his behalf, Waite's dictum as to Article III's effect on foreign
state espousals seems indubitably mistaken. First, although it may be true
that a State did "surrender" its espousal "power of prosecuting the claims
of its citizens against another State by force" as part of the constitutional
bargain 4 3 1 a foreign state was not a part of the bargain and did not surrender anything. Thus, any "constitutional right of suit in the [American] national courts" 432 the Framers gave to the foreign state was a bonus
gift to appease in the name of peace, not a condition. Indeed, the very
fact that vastly more powerful foreign states retained the right to espouse
to war was why the Framers sought to create an alternative, peaceful vehicle for the foreign state to exercise its espousal right in the Supreme
Court in the first place.
On a related point, the citizen of another State or alien was stripped
of access to the national courts by the effect of the Eleventh Amendment
on Waite's theory. The noncitizen could not bring his own suit against a
State, nor could his own State, or, if an alien, his sovereign state bring it
in his stead. Leaving an out-of-state American without recourse to the
national courts was one thing: The most his State could do was to complain to the other State's government, and his State benefited from the
same protection against espousal by other States. By contrast, freezing a
foreigner from national courts altogether increased the risk of war, which
foreign states, as a matter of contemporaneous international law, had a
sovereign right to choose as a means of espousal.
429. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
430. This is, of course, contrary to everything the Court has said in its state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
431. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 90.
432. Id.
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RECLAIMING THE SUPREME COURT'S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF

TREATY-BASED SUITS BY FOREIGN STATES AGAINST STATES

If the text and history are so clear, why was Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi the first original action brought in the Court by a foreign state
against a State, and what was the opinion of the Court on the issue of
state suability by foreign states between 1798 and 1934? Furthermore,
why should we revive the Court's original jurisdiction of treaty-based suits
by foreign states against States today?
A. Explaining Why Monaco Was the First Original Action
In fact, Monaco was nearly not the first suit by a foreign state against a
State in the Supreme Court. In November 1916, the Republic of Cuba,
represented by the same lawyers who would represent Monaco, began a
lawsuit against North Carolina on defaulted bonds the State had issued. 4 33 Cuba, however, moved to dismiss the motion for leave to file an
original action on the day the motion was set to be argued. 43 4 More than
a half-century earlier, former Justice Curtis, in his capacity as private
counsel for Queen Victoria's Governor General in Canada, had given a
legal opinion urging suit in the Supreme Court by Great Britain on behalf of Cayuga Indians resident in Canada, whose claims arose from a
transfer of tribal lands to New York. 4 35 The year was 1860, and in light of
the sensitive situation in the United States and the delicate relations with
did not pursue the
Great Britain the situation occasioned, the 43Queen
6
original action her American lawyer advised.
As a general matter, there were four reasons why there were no original actions in the Court by a foreign state against a State until 1934. The
first and most important reason was the fact that problems were typically
successfully resolved by diplomacy and private suits by aliens in national
courts-the avenues devised by the Framers as the primary lines of defense against state treaty defections. The second was uncertainty among
potential litigants about whether the Court, in its early and middle years,
had sufficient institutional capital to solve the problem by effecting state
compliance with an adverse decision. 43 7 Third, as American power and
sophistication in foreign affairs grew, the United States was better able to
433. Republic of Cuba v. North Carolina, 242 U.S. 665 (1917); see also Lenoir, supra
note 227, at 135 & n.6.
434. See James Brown Scott, Judicial Settlement of Controversies between States of
the American Union: An Analysis of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States 106 (1919); see also Smith, supra note 25, at 75. It is interesting to speculate why
Cuba chose to withdraw its motion for leave to file on the eve of its hearing. My own
surmise is that North Carolina may have made an offer to settle, having been stung by
South Dakota's success in South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321-22 (1904).
435. See 1 Memoir of Benjamin Curtis, supra note 1, at 283-84.
436. See Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 18
n.3.

437. See supra note 38.
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negotiate favorable treaty terms, most notably federalism clauses in treaties of potential domestic effect. This precluded onerous treaty obligations, like article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 4 38 that
carried high risks of state defection. Fourth, as the Republic itself expanded its frontiers, the Court's original jurisdiction revealed itself to be
more useful as a means of solving interstate disputes, overshadowing the
international dispute resolution function the Framers also intended. To
understand how the Court's original jurisdiction over treaty-based controversies between foreign states and States came into disuse, it is helpful to
review instances from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries,
when state treaty defections became an issue in foreign affairs, and examine how they were resolved.
1. The Jay Treaty of 1794. - Diplomacy gained prominence as a tool
for conflict resolution-and original jurisdiction consequently lost prominence-when States began to defect en masse from treaty terms. Epidemic defection meant that the Supreme Court, as a national court,
could no longer command the mantle of a neutral tribunal vis-a-vis the
foreign state since the treaty breach itself seemed national in scope. And
as a practical matter, multiple state defections would have required multiple suits in the Court for resolution. The best illustration of this was the
Jay Treaty of 1794, 4 3 9 which was negotiated when the States' broad noncompliance with the 1783 Treaty of Peace 4 40 contributed to bringing the
United States to the brink of war with Great Britain. The Jay Treaty preempted resort to the Supreme Court as a quasi-international tribunal by
the implementation of an ad hoc binational arbitral solution of a sort
proposed by Vattel:
When sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions, and yet
desire to maintain, or to restore peace, they sometimes trust the
decision of their disputes to arbitrators, chosen by common
agreement. As soon as the compromise is concluded, the parties ought to submit to the sentence of the arbitrators; they have
engaged to do this, and the faith of the treaties should be
44
regarded. '
Article VI of the Jay Treaty created a binational tribunal to arbitrate
claims by British subjects concerning
[d] ebts, to a considerable amount, which were bona fide contracted before the peace.., and that by the operation of various
lawful impediments since the peace, not only the full recovery of
the said debts has been delayed, but also the value and security
thereof have been, in several instances, impaired and lessened,
so that by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the Brit438. See supra text accompanying note 380.
439. Jay Treaty, supra note 346, 8 Stat. 116; see also Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick,
The Age of Federalism 375-449 (1993) (discussing events surrounding the treaty's
negotiation and ratification).
440. Treaty of Peace, supra note 209, 8 Stat. 80.
441. Vattel, supra note 61, Book 2, § 329, at 342-43.
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compensation.
The tribunal was to be composed of two American commissioners, two
4 43
British commissioners, and a neutral to be picked by the four or by lot.
The Jay Treaty tribunal, however, ultimately failed to achieve a satisfactory result. Less than a decade later, in an 1802 convention to the Jay
Treaty, the United States agreed to render payment of six-hundred thousand pounds sterling to "his Britannic Majesty... for the use of the persons described in the said sixth article." 444 Note that the recipient of the
payment was the British sovereign, not his subjects to whom the debts
were directly due. This was, of course, consonant with the principle of
espousal: The claim at the international level was between sovereigns,
regardless of the private character of the parties directly involved. The
convention "cancelled and annulled" article VI and necessarily the com445
mission of the binational tribunal.
The creation and fate of the Jay Treaty article VI tribunals confirms
the resolute innovation the Framers applied to the most important and
enduring foreign policy issue of their time-state defection from U.S.
treaties essential to national peace and trade. In this sense, it reinforces
rather than contradicts this Article's thesis as to the Framers' initial solution to the problem-a durable national tribunal to perform the same
function that, owing to systemic state defection from the 1783 Treaty of
Peace, the Republic's leaders committed first to treaty-based arbitration
and then to the payment of reparations.
After the War of 1812 a decade later, it became evident that the chief
axis of threat to peace and harmony for the Union was internal, not external, and so the domestic sovereign peacekeeping function of the
Court's original jurisdiction became preeminent. The first original action between States filed (though not adjudicated) in the Court was a
dispute between Connecticut and New York in 1799 involving contesting
land grants to territory in dispute. 44 6 In the first quarter of the nine442. Jay Treaty, supra note 346, art. VI, 8 Stat. at 119.
443. Id. art. VI, 8 Stat. at 120. Article VII of theJay Treaty ordained a similar bilateral
tribunal for the arbitration of claims by American merchants whose ships were captured or
damaged by British vessels. Id. art. VII, 8 Stat. at 121.
444. Convention Between the United States and Great-Britain, Jan. 8, 1802, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., art. I, 8 Stat. 196, 196-97.
445. Id. art. I, 8 Stat. at 196. The article VII tribunal was likewise suspended in favor
of single plenipotentiary negotiators for each side, although its awards prior to suspension
were validated, albeit made payable under different conditions. Id. art. III, 8 Stat. at 197.
446. See New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 (1799) (deeming sufficient
New York's notice to Connecticut of motion to enjoin actions of ejectment in Connecticut
court against New York grantees); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 3, 6 (1799)
(denying New York's motion for an injunction because it was not party to the suits it sought
to enjoin); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 6, 6 (1799) (counsel for New York
moved for ex parte proceedings if Connecticut were to fail to appear on the first day of the
next term, then withdrew the motion upon acknowledgement that Connecticut had not
been subpoenaed).
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teenth century, no original actions between States were filed in the Court.
In the second quarter and up to the outbreak of the Civil War, the Court
heard six original actions between States, 447 and one original action filed
by the Cherokee Nation against Georgia. 4 48 Between 1870 and the end
of the First World War in 1918, the Court published forty-nine dispositions of motions and findings in original actions between States (many of
them in the same protracted controversies, including ten in a protracted,
fifty-year border dispute between West Virginia and Virginia), and nine
published dispositions in original actions between a State and the United
States. 449 As these figures indicate, the Court's original docket of controversies between States grew exponentially after the Civil War, when the
failure of secession and the prominence of the Supreme Court as an institution made judicial resolution of controversies between States more important and more enforceable.
2. The Southern Port QuarantineActs of 1822-1860. - The next significant treaty-based controversy between States and foreign states began
nearly forty years after the Jay Treaty, with the discovery that a free black
man had been complicit in the planning of a slave insurrection in
Charleston, South Carolina. 4 50 The ensuing hysteria prompted the
South Carolina legislature to pass a law in 1822 requiring free black
sailors entering the State's ports on ships to be imprisoned, and requiring
their captains to pay housing costs and take them away at egress. 4 51 A
free black sailor was to be enslaved and sold if his captain did not comply
with these conditions. 4 52 Over the next several decades, other Southern
States enacted similar laws: Georgia passed a law in 1829 quarantining
free black sailors and passengers for forty days, North Carolina enacted a
statute like Georgia's in 1831, Florida in 1832, Alabama in 1839 and 1841,
453
and Louisiana in 1842.
The British, who bore the brunt of the indignity and inconvenience
caused by the state statutes, argued that the acts violated the bilateral
Commerce and Navigation Convention of 1815. 4 5 4 The first article of the
treaty provided that
447. Scott, supra note 434, at 118-207 (cataloguing, describing, and analyzing these
opinions in excruciating detail).
448. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
449. Scott, supra note 434, at 220-535 (cataloguing these opinions in detail).
450. See Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 27, at 1211-37. See
generally Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts,
1822-1848, 1 J. S. Hist. 3 (1935) (describing the impact of the resulting law restraining free
black sailors and British protests against such laws).
451. Negro Seaman Act, ch. 3, § 4, 1822 S.C. Acts 12.
452. Id.
453. See Hamer, supra note 450, at 12-26; Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1874 nn.260-261
(1993).
454. Commerce and Navigation Convention, July 3, 1815, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 228
[hereinafter Commerce and Navigation Convention].
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[t]he inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes
to all such places, ports, and rivers, in the territories . . .and,
generally, the merchants and traders of each nation, respectively, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for
their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of
455
the two countries, respectively.
Accordingly, the British authorities leveled diplomatic pressure on
the executive branch of the national government to impress upon the
States the importance of honoring the treaty commitment. 4 56 As a practical matter, the British had no credible threat of recourse to reciprocal
breach, as similarly quarantining free black American sailors or passengers were not politically viable options in Great Britain. The resulting
asymmetry in reciprocity meant that the costs borne by the national government in this episode of States' defection were primarily reputational.
Perhaps for that reason, efforts at intercession by the national government were not as strenuous as they might have been and were largely
unsuccessful. Intercession took the form of executive branch recommendations to state governors, 45 7 of appeals to members of Congress representing the States, 458 and even of a Supreme Court Justice riding circuit
opining that South Carolina's law was unconstitutional when it was challenged in the posture of a private habeas corpus petition. 459 It seems
clear from the history that many officials of the national government, particularly in the early years of the controversy, were genuinely sympathetic
with the British position but effectively powerless to push it in anything
more than an advisory fashion. 460 In frustration, British consuls in the
United States interceded directly with the States themselves to obtain relief. Professor Hamer sums up the history nicely:
455. Id. art. I, 8 Stat. at 228.
456. See Hamer, supra note 450, at 4, 9, 15-17, 24-25, 27 (describing notes by British
ministers to various Presidents and U.S. Secretaries of State demanding action against the
state statutes).
457. See id. at 10 ("By direction of the President, [Secretary of State John Quincy]
Adams . . . expressed to [the governor of South Carolina] the hope that the state's
legislature would remedy the 'inconveniences' against which the British had protested.").
458. See id. at. 4-5 (Secretary Adams "had communicated regarding the situation
with at least two of the South Carolina delegation in Congress.").
459. See Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 27, at 1214-21; Hamer,
supra note 450, at 4-7. This substantive holding was dictum, however, as Justice Johnson
held that he lacked the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against South Carolina
officials. See Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 27, at 1216 n.465; Hamer,
supra note 450, at 7.
460. Compare, e.g., Hamer, supra note 450, at 8 ("The British charge [d'affaires in
Washington] was so impressed with the truth of what [Secretary Adams] said and with his
evidently sincere desire to do everything he could to remedy the situation [in 1823], that
he was reluctant to press the matter.... ."), with id. at 27 ("With regret [the British charge]
found that the Secretary of State [James Buchanan] was even more firmly convinced than
in the preceding year [1847] of 'the utter hopelessness of any attempt' on the part of the
Federal government to get rid of the objectionable laws.").
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For a quarter of a century the British government had sought to
protect her free Negro subjects from imprisonment while in
southern ports. It had sought to do this through the instrumentality of the Federal government. But the repeated requests, remonstrances, protests, and demands which it addressed to secretaries of state failed to secure any effective action from the
government in Washington or, through it, from the states.
Whatever its theoretical authority, the Federal government was
without power, practically, to compel the states to repeal their
laws regarding Negro seamen. It was without influence sufficient to persuade them to accede to Great Britain's wishes. In
1848 it was not willing to attempt either to compel or to persuade. Finally convinced that she could get nothing through
the government of the United States, Britain turned to the states
themselves.4 61 Her consuls became lobbyists and quasidiplomats.
It is puzzling at first glance why the British did not think to bring an
original action in the Court alleging violation of the 1815 Convention by
any of the Southern States that had enacted quarantines. It is particularly
puzzling in light of the fact (which this Article will develop below) that
members of the Court during the period virtually unanimously indicated
in dictum that a foreign state could bring suit in the Court against a
State. 462 But the mystery fades upon an inspection of the above quoted
terms of the treaty. British efforts were fatally hamstrung as a matter of
law by the treaty's expansive qualification that any protections be "subject
always to the law and statutes of the two countries, respectively," 463 which
seemed conclusively, as British diplomats conceded in exasperation, 4 64 to
include state as well as national laws. In effect, if not in intent, the provision created an insurmountable federalism defense that made it nearly
impossible for the British to make the case for a flat-out treaty violation.
It is important to point out before moving on to our postbellum case
study that the problem of state defection from treaties underwent an important transformation due to the Civil War. Because the States no
longer wielded substantial independent military power, the danger of
open rebellion arising from the national government's effort to police
defection from treaty regimes had abated. So, too, diminished regard for
the States' internal sovereignty meant that the States lacked the sort of
political independence that formerly made it seem imperative for foreign
states seeking remedies for defection on treaty-based claims to lobby the
States directly. Finally, the brute military power displayed by the victori461. Id. at 28.
462. See infra Part IV.B.
463. Commerce and Navigation Convention, supra note 454, art. I, 8 Stat. at 228.
464. See Hamer, supra note 450, at 13-14 (describing 1830 legal opinion to the
British Foreign Office that Georgia's quarantine act did not violate the treaty by virtue of
this qualification); id. at 28 (noting the following comment from British foreign minister
Palmerston in 1848: "In this clause lies the whole difficulty.").
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ous Union during the Civil War virtually guaranteed that no foreign state
would resort to war to rectify breach of a U.S. treaty obligation by States'
defection. But even if war, the ultimate potential harm of States' defection, was no longer a viable threat, unwanted defections could still cause
much trouble for the national government in its mission to protect and
advance the national interest abroad.
3. Mob Violence Against Chinese Nationals in the Late Nineteenth Century.
- Near the end of the nineteenth century, mob violence resulted in the
deaths of Chinese and other foreign nationals by lynching, shooting, or
other means. 4 65 As was the case with respect to the Quarantine Acts, the
national government appears to have genuinely abhorred this violence. 466 In many cases, state or local officials were complicit or sanctioned by passivity the excesses of the mobs. Once again, this conduct by
the States created colorable claims of violation of treaties of commerce,
amity, and navigation, and once again there was precious little the national government could do to stop the violations. But China, in its beleaguered and economically backward quasi-sovereign status, was in no
position to assert its treaty claims in the Supreme Court which were not
hampered by a federalism clause of the sort that had frustrated British
officials during the Southern Port Quarantine controversies.
Nevertheless, the United States took conciliatory diplomatic measures. Congress voted reparations and the executive branch conveyed
condolences to the affected signatory nations along with the appropriated monies. 4 67 Such ad hoc measures, however, were inadequate to ad465. See Mob Violence, 6 Moore Digest § 1025, at 820-37 ("Attacks on Chinese at
Rock Springs and Elsewhere"); id. § 1026, at 837-49 ("Lynchings of Italians at New
Orleans and Elsewhere").
466. Id. §§ 1025-1026. Notwithstanding the Exclusionary Acts, which were famously
discriminatory in immigration policy, federal laws were surprisingly protective of Chinese
and Japanese aliens when they were inside the United States. Italians, Irish, and
immigrants from Eastern Europe were similarly targets of intermittent mob violence in the
States. See id. § 1026, at 837-49 (describing the lynching of Italians in Louisiana and
Colorado).
467. For instance, Congress, upon the recommendation of President Grover
Cleveland, enacted a statute on February 24, 1887, ordering
paid to the Chinese Government, in consideration of the losses unhappily
sustained by certain Chinese subjects by mob violence at Rock Springs, in the
Territory of Wyoming, Sept. 2, 1885; the said sum being intended for distribution
among the sufferers and their legal representatives, in the discretion of the
Chinese Government.
Id. § 1025, at 835 (quoting Act of Feb. 24, 1887, ch. 253, 24 Stat. 418, 418). The Act made
no reservation on the question of liability. See id. A subsequent appropriations Act of
October 19, 1888, did not concede liability in providing for the payment of $276,619.75
out of the U.S. treasury for injuries and deaths suffered by Chinese nationals in California,
and the Washington, Montana, and Alaska Territories. See id. § 1025, at 836. The Act
stated the payment was being made "out of humane consideration and without reference
to the question of liability ... to the Chinese Government as full indemnity for all losses
and injuries sustained by Chinese subjects within the United States at the hands of
residents thereof." Id. (quoting Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566).
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dress the systemic root of the troubles, which lay in state action or inaction, notwithstanding binding U.S. treaty obligations of reciprocal
protection.
That the national government, while hedging on the question of liability, expeditiously authorized reparations in these cases may be explained in part by humanitarianism, but also in large part as prophylaxis
against the threat of reciprocal governmental laissez faire or complicity in
mob violence against United States citizens abroad. As Secretary of State
Bayard explained to President Cleveland in a memorandum on compenin the 1888 Immigration
sation for Chinese victims of mob violence 468
Treaty between the United States and China,
[T]he fact remains that [the Chinese] have suffered grievously
in person and property, and whilst the liability of the United
States is wholly inadmissible, as is recited in Art. V. of the treaty
now submitted, yet it is competent for this Government, in humane consideration of these occurrences, so discreditable to the
community in which they have taken place, and outside of the
punitive powers of the National Government, to make voluntary
and generous provisions for those who have been made the innocent victims of lawless violence within our borders, and to
that end, following the dictates of humanity, and, it may be added, the example of the Chinese Government in sundry cases
where American citizens who were the subjects of mob violence
in China have been indemnified by that Government,4 69 the
present treaty provides for the payment of a sum of money....
This payment will, in a measure, remove the reproach to our
civilization caused by the crimes referred to, as well as redress
the grievance so seriously complained of by the Chinese reprebeneficially
sentative, and unquestionably will also reflect most
47 0
upon the welfare of American residents in China.
The concern about "the welfare of American residents in China"
proved prescient, and appropriation of reparations for States' defection
prudent, as the very next year the Chinese Government expeditiously reciprocated by settling "claims growing out of the then recent riots at Chin
Kiang by the payment of 156,000 taels and the offering of apologies and
'4 7
the firing of salutes." '
Beyond the utilitarian calculus of reciprocity, Secretary Bayard's remarks hint at yet another cost of States' defection having to do with damage to honor ("the firing of salutes") and norms of civilized conduct ("the
468. The treaty was not ratified for reasons unrelated to article V, but Congress, by an
appropriations act, provided for a payment to the Chinese government in the same
amount as provided for in article V. See id. § 1025, at 836.
469. The prior indemnifications made by the Chinese government referred to
prompt payments made to the United States for losses sustained by United States citizens
in riots that took place in 1878 in the French concession at Shanghai. See id. § 1026, at
837.
470. Id. § 1025, at 836 (alterations in original).
471. Id. § 1025, at 837.
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dictates of humanity") distinct from realpolitik. Certainly, China at the
turn of the century was no threat to the national security of the United
States, nor did it possess sufficient power to exert its will on American
citizens doing business or proselytizing within its borders. Banking credibility for future treaty negotiations was likewise an insignificant concern
for the United States, as American "gunboat diplomacy" ensured that the
national government could obtain favorable terms in agreements with
the Chinese regardless of its track record in honoring prior treaty commitments such as the treaties of amity and commerce plausibly violated by
the instances of mob violence in the States and territories.
In the case of mob violence against Chinese nationals, recourse to
the Court was made unnecessary by the national government's resort to
diplomacy, as in the case of the Jay Treaty and its 1802 reparations supplement. The reasons for diplomacy, however, were importantly different. The United States did not act for fear that treaty disputes occasioned
by state defection might lead to a war it would lose. Rather, the principal
reason was a concern for reciprocal violence against American nationals
abroad. What had not changed by the turn of the century, however, even
in the face of growing national power in the wake of the failed secession
of the Southern States, was the capacity of the States to defect from U.S.
treaty obligations of collective benefit to the country and the inability of
the national government's political branches to solve the problem by enforcing state treaty compliance. The durability of this structural problem,
despite radical changes in the American condition, supports the case for
retaining the Framers' intended constitutional solution of original and
exclusive jurisdiction in the Court over foreign state-versus-State treaty
controversies.
B. Dormant But Not Forgotten: Affirmations of the Court'sJurisdiction of Suits
by Foreign States Against States from 1821 to 1926
Different circumstances, then, led to the resolution, without resort to
the Supreme Court, of disruptions in foreign relations caused by state
violations of United States treaty obligations in the years between 1787
and 1934. But during the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the
twentieth century, Justices of the Court virtually unanimously agreed that
the Original Jurisdiction Clause permitted suit in the Court by a foreign
state against a State to vindicate a treaty claim if the need arose. Necessarily, these Justices presumed that such suits survived the passage of the
Eleventh Amendment in 1798, consistent with the inevitable import of its
precise language.
It was Chief Justice Marshall who first broached the subject after the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. 472 He remarked in Cohens v.
472. As previously noted, two Justices of the Court expressed the view that foreign
states could sue States in the Court without consent before the enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment. See supra note 252.
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Virginia that the Eleventh Amendment "does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State.
The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases: and in these a
State may still be sued. '4 73 Marshall unequivocally restated his understanding of state sovereign liability as against foreign states in his opinion
for the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.4 7 4 The Court there held that
an Indian tribe could not bring a suit against Georgia without its consent
precisely because it was not a foreign state: "May the plaintiff sue in [this
Court]? Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in the sense in which that
term is used in the constitution?" 4 75 Marshall thus presumed that a for473. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
474. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
475. Id. at 16. The Court subsequently clarified that States are also entitled to
sovereign immunity in suits by Indian tribes qua tribes; States are immune independent of
the argument rejected in Cherokee Nation that tribes are not foreign states. See Blatchford
v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991). However, the United States may sue as
trustee of a tribe, see United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926), and the tribe
can subsequently intervene, see Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 271 n.4 (2001). A
tribe may also intervene in an original action between States in which the United States has
already intervened on its behalf. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983). See
generally Catherine T. Struve, Raising Arizona: Reflections on Sovereignty and the Nature
of the Plaintiff in Federal Suits Against States, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 105 (2000).
Although the issue of state sovereign immunity in suits by tribal sovereigns is beyond
the scope of this Article dealing with foreign sovereigns, it is obviously analytically relevant.
My view is that the States' ratification consent to suits in the Supreme Court was confined
to other States and foreign states. (The holding in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621,
646 (1892) would add the United States, notwithstanding a colorable argument that the
holding was inconsistent with the Framers' intent. See supra text accompanying notes
103-109.) There is no indication from the historical evidence that the Framers thought
troubles between States and Indian tribes were of sufficient concern and sensitivity to vest
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. There was a regrettable but familiar hypocrisy in this:
The Framers sought to offer the Court as a quasi-international tribunal in the eyes of more
powerful European states but did not think to do so for the Indian tribes, where the
balance of power was more favorable to the United States.
Even if the argument for ratification consent for Indian tribes is unavailing, should
tribal sovereign status enhance Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Indian Commerce Clause ("To regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes,"
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)? Professor Henry Monaghan thinks it should and accordingly
criticizes the Court's implicit holding to the contrary in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 72-73 (1996) (deciding without considering the relevance of tribal sovereign status).
See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102,
116-17 (1996). It is a typically ingenious move, but I am not so sure that it is right. Unlike
the theory of congressional abrogation as applied to the enforcement of the post-Civil War
amendments for the benefit of U.S. persons that the Court has recognized, see Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976), there is no post-Eleventh Amendment constitutional
amendment enhancing congressional power to abrogate state immunity vis-A-vis Indian
tribes. Accordingly, any federal legislative power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
must have existed in 1788, at the time of the ratification of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Such a theory of abrogation would "seem[ ] to contradict the significance, if not the letter,
of the holding in Cherokee Nation" in 1831, see Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh
Amendment, supra note 25, at 1089 n.282, which of course was not decided in the context
of a congressional statute purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Moreover,
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eign state could sue a State, but held that the Cherokee nation was not a
foreign state.
Justice Thompson, speaking for himself and Justice Story, wholeheartedly agreed: "That a state of this union may be sued by a foreign
state, when a proper case exists and is presented, is too plainly and expressly declared in the constitution to admit of doubt ....,,476 He dissented on the belief that the tribe was indeed a foreign state. 4 7 7 In 1831,
when Cherokee Nation was decided, the Court had not yet held that a State
could be sued without its consent by another State or by the United
States. It is therefore particularly telling that Chief Justice Marshall presumed that one clear case where state sovereign immunity did not apply
was in the case where a foreign state sued a State in federal court.
478
The next case in which the issue was raised was Florida v. Georgia.
The holding of the Court affirmed the right of the United States to intervene in a boundary dispute between Florida and Georgia involving territory acquired by the United States from Spain. Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, joined by Justice John McLean, dissented on the ground that,
although Georgia had "consented" to suit by Florida as part of the original constitutional plan, it did not "thereby consent[ ] to the introduction
into the controversy of any party whose rights were so involved in the
controversy that the court is bound, upon principles of natural justice, to
have that party before the court, in order to make a decree." 4 79 The
third party in this case was, of course, the United States. Justice Curtis
agreed that the Constitution, under his theory of ratification consent, allowed suits against States by foreign states, even absent specific consent to
the suit.4 8 0 "The State of Georgia has consented to be sued by one or
more States, or by foreign states, and by no other person or body politic."'48 ' The Court had expressed no view on this specific matter, alwhatever might be said for greater congressional power to abrogate under pre-Eleventh
Amendment constitutional provisions like the Interstate Commerce Clause on Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer's theory of a fundamental rebalancing of federal and state power to regulate the
rights of U.S. persons in the wake of the Civil War, see id. at 1087 n.276, Bitzer's theory does
not seem big enough to support a similar rebalancing of federal legislative power for States
with respect to their relations with Indian tribes.
476. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 52 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
477. See id.

478. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854).
479. Id. at 507 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 507, 510.
481. Id. at 507. Justice John Campbell, in a separate solo dissent, disagreed with
Justice Curtis on the point. See id. at 520-21 (Campbell,J., dissenting). Justice Campbell

was the only member of the Court to have expressed a contrary opinion on the question
prior to the 1934 decision in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. But he did not disagree as
a textual matter and relied, rather, on original intent. In short, Justice Campbell rejected
Justice Curtis's ratification theory of consent. Instead, he consciously advocated the
contemporaneous international law position that, absent specific consent to suit, a
sovereign state could not be sued in a tribunal by another sovereign state. In a preview of
the principal argument in Monaco, he reasoned, "It is clear the constitution did not
abrogate any law of nations, and the only question is whether the States consented to suits
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though its holding was clearly consistent with Justice Curtis's view, and,
indeed, more restrictive of state sovereign immunity in its implication
that the State might be sued without specific consent by the United
States.
Nearly sixty years after Cherokee Nation, and only two years after the
Supreme Court extended state sovereign immunity to suits by citizens of
the State in Hans v. Louisiana,48 2 it reaffirmed, in United States v. Texas,
Marshall's reading of the Eleventh Amendment as recognizing the constitutional power of the federal court to hear suits by foreign states against
nonconsenting States. 483 The specific issue was the right of the United
States to sue the State of Texas over contested territory. But in answering
the question in the affirmative, the Court relied on the presumptive suability of American States by foreign states under the Constitution as main
ballast, just as Marshall had done in Cohens and Cherokee Nation. Justice
Harlan wrote for the Court:
We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while
extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between two or more States of the Union, and between a State
of the Union and foreign States, intended to exempt a State alto484
gether from suit by the General Government.
Apart from its recognition of the obvious plain meaning of the constitutional text, United States v. Texas is additionally important to our subject because, in deciding that the Constitution authorized suits by the
United States against the States absent consent, the Court articulated rationales broad enough to encompass suits by foreign states. First, Justice
Harlan reasoned that this judicial power made sense from a functional
perspective given the overarching constitutional aim of protecting the
Union. 48 5 To understand how easily this rationale might be applied to
the external threat to the Union posed by foreign state-versus-State treaty
disputes during the founding period of American weakness, consider the
following excerpt, which repeats and continues the above-quoted passage, and to which I have suggested a substitution for italicized portions
in brackets:
We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while
extending the judicial power of the United States to controverwithout any reciprocal right, or whether the existence of such a power in foreign states
could possibly assist any objects of the confederacy." Id. at 520.
In support of his position, Justice Campbell quoted the same remark by James
Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention that the Monaco Court would highlight eighty
years later. Id. at 520-21 ("I do not conceive ... that any controversy can ever be decided
in these courts, between an American and foreign state, without the consent of parties. If
they consent, provision is here made. . . . This is consonant with the law of nations."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
482. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
483. 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892).
484. Id. (emphasis added).
485. Id. at 641-42.
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sies between two or more States of the Union, and between a
State of the Union and foreign States, intended to exempt a
State altogether from suit by the General Government. They
could not have overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial solution, might arise between the United States
[foreign states] and some of the States, and that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal
was not entrusted the power to determine them according to
the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal could a
trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than to
that which the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice and insure domestic tranquility, have constituted with authority to speak for all the people and all the States, upon questions before it to which the judi4 6
cial power of the nation extends?
Second, the Court noted,
The question as to the suability of one government by another
government rests upon wholly different grounds. Texas is not
called to the bar of this court at the suit of an individual, but at
the suit of the government established for the common and
equal benefit of the
people of all the States [the entire people of
4 7
a sovereign state].
These rationales underscore a functional affinity between a suit against a
nonconsenting State in which the United States is plaintiff and one in
which a foreign state is plaintiff.
In California v. Southern Pacific Co., Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Brewer, once again acknowledged the constitutional authorization of suit
by foreign states against rionconsenting States. 488 In dissenting from the
Court's holding invalidating original jurisdiction in a suit by California
because private and municipal parties had interests on California's side,
Justice Harlan pointed out that
under the interpretation of the Constitution adopted in this
case, ourjurisdiction cannot be invoked in any mode for its final
settlement if it appears in evidence that some individual or corporation is interested in that settlement. Still more, although
this court is given original jurisdiction of a case between one of
the States of the Union and a foreign State, it will not exercise it
even in such a case if individual parties are interested in the
48 9
controversy.
Justice Harlan did not invoke his prior statement in United States v.
Texas to support this point, which the Court did in Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
quoting the entire passage from Texas excerpted above in rejecting a narrow interpretation of its original jurisdiction in a suit over ownership to
486. Id. at 644-45.
487. Id. at 646.

488. 157 U.S. 229, 269-70 (1895).
489. Id. This passage also implicates the doctrine of espousal, which I discussed supra
Part III.C.
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Indian lands. 490 Minnesota had argued that original jurisdiction under
the State-as-Party Subclause existed only when "the opposite party is another State of the Union or a foreign State," 49 1 but not the United States.
Minnesota v. Hitchcock was followed in the span of five years by deci49 3
49 2
sions in South Dakota v. North Carolina and Virginia v. West Virginia,
which quoted ChiefJustice Marshall's conclusion in Cohens verbatim, that
the Eleventh Amendment "does not comprehend controversies between
two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases; and in these a State may still
49 4
be sued.
A unanimous Supreme Court similarly read the Eleventh Amendment to have no effect on the constitutional authorization of suits by foreign states against States as late as 1926. The Court in United States v.
Minnesota matter-of-factly declared: "Of course the immunity of the State
is subject to the constitutional qualification that she may be sued in this
Court by the United States, a sister State, or a foreign State." 495 It is thus
particularly surprising that the Court in Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi
came to the polar opposite conclusion with nary a mention of United
States v. Minnesota, decided a mere eight years earlier. 49 6 In so doing, the
Monaco Court limited Cherokee Nation to its facts (i.e., the Eleventh
Amendment applies to Indian tribes) and did not mention Chief Justice
Marshall's statement in Cohens, or the Court's pronouncements in United
States v. Texas and United States v. Minnesota.
To sum up, between the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in
1798 and the decision in Monaco, nine of the ten Justices who expressed a
position in a published judicial opinion asserted the constitutionality of
suits in the Court by foreign states against States. The pronouncements
may be dicta, but their number and consistency cast serious doubt on the
holding in Monaco and strongly support the thesis of this Article. The
nine included some of the most legally distinguished justices of the nineteenth century: Marshall, Thompson, Curtis, Harlan, Brewer, and Fuller.
It would also be fair to count Justice Story, who joined Justice Thompson's two-man dissent in Cherokee Nation. Although they disagreed with
Chief Justice Marshall's disposition of that case for the Court, they emphatically agreed with him on one point: "That a state of this Union may
be sued by a foreign state, when a proper case exists and is presented, is
490. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 385 (1902) (Brewer, J.).
491. Id.

492. 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (Brewer, J.).
493. 206 U.S. 290, 318 (1907) (Fuller, C.J.).
494. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
495. 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926).
496. Charles Evans Hughes had replaced William Howard Taft as Chief Justice in
1930, but six members of the Monaco Court were on the bench in 1926, including Justice
Willis Van Devanter, author of the unanimous decision in United States v. Minnesota. That
Monaco was a unanimous decision in light of this continuity on the Court is hard to
explain.
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too plainly and expressly declared in the constitution to admit of doubt
"497

C. Reclaiming the Court's Lost OriginalJurisdiction
Long dormant, the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction of
treaty-based suits by foreign states against States has become an issue in
the past decade. States' habit of ignoring rights to consular access by
criminal defendants who were foreign citizens sparked lawsuits by the defendants and the foreign states affected. 4 98 In the lead case, Angel
497. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 52 (1831) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
498. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998) (per curiam order denying
certiorari); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514-17 (June 27) (finding that,
by not informing German nationals of their right to consular access and refusing to
reconsider their convictions, the United States breached its obligation to Germany under
article 36 of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 257-58 (Apr. 9)
(ordering United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure" that Breard, a
Paraguayan national who was sentenced to death in Virginia without having been informed
of his right to consular access, was not executed pending final decision in the
proceedings). In the most recent important iteration of the controversy, Oklahoma state
courts stayed the execution of a Mexican national, and the state governor commuted his
sentence to life imprisonment, in response to a judgment from the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). See Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary
Hearing, Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals (May 13, 2004) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Final Judgment of ICJ in Mexico v. United States (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also William J. Aceves,
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 923,
924-28 (2003) (detailing circumstances of the ICJ case and likely consequences); Sarah M.
Ray, Comment, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1729, 1758-66 (2003)
(discussing Avena and counseling adherence by the Court and other United States entities
to ICJ resolution).
The suits have been the subject of great interest among international lawyers and law
professors, and so this Article will not belabor discussion. For a sampling of scholarship,
see generally William J. Aceves, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 210
(2002) (providing synopsis of LaGrand decision); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 529 (1999) (claiming
that the internationalist approach espoused by critics of Breard is inconsistent with the
United States's long-standing dualist approach, in which domestic and international law
are distinct); Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism
to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 675 (1998) (arguing that, in its criticism of
Breard, the international law community failed to consider federalism concerns); Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Interpreting U.S. Treaties in Light of Human Rights Values, 46 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 43, 51-58 (2002-2003) (discussing the trend of interpreting the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations in light of human rights values); Damrosch, supra note
27 (disagreeing with the United States government's position that Paraguay's claim in
Breard was nonjusticiable); Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations,
and the States, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 679 (1998) (asserting that the International Court of
Justice's Order to the United States that it take all measures to ensure Breard is not
executed was legally binding); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty
Power, 70 Colo. L. Rev. 1317 (1999) (exploring whether the treaty provision in question in
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Breard, a Paraguayan national on death row for murder, brought suit
against Virginia under article 36 of the Vienna Convention on49 Consular
9
Relations and a U.S.-Paraguay treaty of amity and commerce.
Many of these lawsuits were dismissed on grounds not relevant to our
problem, such as procedural bars applicable to state and federal postconviction proceedings and the lack of a private cause of action or ajudicially enforceable remedy (e.g., suppression of evidence) in the terms of
the underlying treaties. 50 0 But the federal district and circuit courts in
Breard cited the state sovereign immunity holding in Principalityof Monaco
v. Mississippi as an alternative ground for dismissing Paraguay's suit
against Virginia. 50 1 Moreover, the courts that have extended Monaco's
0 2
holding to this treaty context have indicated that an Ex parte Youn
exception to the Eleventh Amendment was inappropriate in the circumstances because there was no continuing violation in each individual case
50 3
that might be enjoined.
In a refrain reminiscent of the antebellum Southern Port Quarantine controversies, the national government professed attempts at lobbying the offending States informally but effected no change in policy. In
the Breard case, for example, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked
the Governor of Virginia to delay the execution of Breard, a Paraguayan
national, upon the issuance of a provisional order by the International
Court ofJustice, where Paraguay had brought a separate suit in the matter. 50 4 In an echo of the national reciprocity interest implicated by the
Chinese mob violence controversies, the State Department pled concern
about possible repercussions for American citizens abroad. The plea fell
on deaf ears: Virginia executed Breard after the Supreme Court denied
review in the concurrent domestic case on the ground that Breard's federal habeas petition was procedurally barred for failure to exhaust state
Breard violates the anticommandeering principle); Note, Too Sovereign, supra note 25
(exploring different legal options for enforcing consular treaty obligations on the States).
499. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292-94 (providing
that consular offices should have access to nationals of the sending state, specifically that
they have the right to visit and correspond with nationals who are in prison, custody, or
detention); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., 12
Stat. 1091.
500. See, e.g., United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. LomberaCamorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st
Cir. 2000); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998).
501. See Allen, 134 F.3d at 627-28; Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269,
1273 (E.D. Va. 1996); see also United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222-24
(9th Cir. 1997) (upholding Arizona's sovereign immunity in suit by Mexico for treaty
violation).
502. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
503. See, e.g., Allen, 134 F.3d at 627-28; Woods, 126 F.3d at 1223.
504. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 46, Republic of Paraguay v.
Gilmore and Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214).
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court remedies. 50 5 In dictum, the Supreme Court reasoned that even absent the procedural bar, Paraguay's case was barred on state sovereign
immunity grounds, citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi for the "fundamental principle" that "the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them... by a foreign State." 50 6 Because
Breard involved treaty claims, it seemed unlikely that the Court would be
inclined to hold that a foreign state could bring a treaty-based suit against
a State in the Court or any federal court without consent if the issue
presented itself in a subsequent vehicle.
But, surprisingly, in a 1999 per curiam order denying the Federal
Republic of Germany leave to file an original action in the Court against
the United States and Arizona in another death row consular notification
case, 50 7 the Court intimated that the issue was not foreclosed. The motion for leave to file was denied, but apparently as a matter of discretion:
"Given the tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction." 50 8 On the specific matter of its original jurisdiction as to Arizona, 51 9 the Court said,
[I] t is doubtful that Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, provides an anchor for an
action to prevent execution of a German citizen who is not an
ambassador or consul. With respect to the action against the
State of Arizona, as in Breard[,] . . . a foreign government's ability here to assert a claim against a State is without evident support in the Vienna Convention and5 in
probable contravention
10
of Eleventh Amendment principles.
Justice Souter, in a short concurring statement joined by Justice
Ginsburg, added that he did "not rest [his] decision to deny leave to file
the bill of complaint on any Eleventh Amendment principle. '5 11 Justice
Breyer, in a dissenting statementjoined by Justice Stevens, asserted,
[T]he jurisdictional matters are arguable. Indeed, the Court
says that it is merely "doubtful that Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, provides an
anchor" for the suit and that a foreign government's ability to
assert a claim against a State is "... in probable contravention of
Eleventh Amendment principles." The words "doubtful"5 12and
"probable," in my view, suggest a need for fuller briefing.
5 13
This Article has taken up Justice Breyer's invitation.
505. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 378-79 (per curiam order denying certiorari).
506. Id. at 377 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30
(1934)); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67-68 (1996) (citing Monaco for
the same proposition).
507. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111 (1999).
508. Id. at 112.
509. As to the United States, the Court said "it appears that the United States has not
waived its sovereign immunity." Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
512. Id. at 114 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
513. Although it takes four Justices to grant certiorari on a petition for review, "a
majority seems to be needed to grant a motion for leave to file .... During the period
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CONCLUSION

The highest foreign policy priority for the Framers of the Constitution was to keep the 1783 Treaty of Peace and avoid renewed war with
Great Britain. The greatest danger to honoring the peace treaty was
breach by a State. At the apex of an ingenious, complex scheme of judicial and political solutions the Framers designed to deal with the problem
was an original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of suits
by foreign states against States. The only obstacle that stands in the way
of reclaiming this jurisdiction is Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi, a 1934
decision, which, although mistaken in its reading of constitutional text
and history, may be distinguished on its facts.
The Rehnquist Court has consistently claimed that the basis of its
state sovereign immunity doctrine is a respect for the dignity of the States
faithful to the original constitutional plan. The Court has applied this
guiding principle to uphold the States' claims to immunity, notwithstanding the protests of constitutionalists who discount dignity's importance
and interpret the historical evidence differently. But as this Article has
sought to demonstrate, original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court of suits brought by foreign states charging state treaty violations is
consistent with the dignity principle, and, additionally, compelled by the
text and supported by the overwhelming weight of historical evidence.
There can be no serious question that a suit by a foreign state works no
offense on a State's dignity, and that the Framers drafted into the Constitution a role for the Supreme Court in resolving foreign state-versus-State
514
treaty disputes.
1961-93, 50 of the 102 motions for leave to file were denied, generally without opinion."
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 273 (internal citations omitted).
514. Ratification consent dispenses of the need to find workarounds to state sovereign
immunity, but it is worth pointing out, to support the argument for ratification consent,
that at least two of the most important workarounds appear unavailable or inappropriate
with respect to foreign states alleging violations of international law vis-a-vis States and state
officials. First, as six members of the Court indicated in Breard, a foreign state is most likely
not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) and, hence, could not avail itself of
that statute to vindicate a claim of treaty violation against a state official. See 523 U.S. at
378 (per curiam, for five members of the Court) ("Paraguay is not a 'person' as that word is
used in § 1983."); id. at 379 (statement of Souter, J.) ("I have substantial doubts that either
Paraguay or any official acting for it is a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."). While there would appear to be no similar threshold obstacle to a foreign state
filing for prospective injunctive relief against a state official for an ongoing violation of
federal treaty law under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), (putting aside for
the moment concerns about implying the Ex parte Young cause of action from a treaty given
the unavailability of § 1983 and a constitutional provision to ground it), this option raises
the reverse dignity problem. That is to say, why should a sovereign state sue an official
person under a legal fiction to protect the official's sovereign? To force the foreign
sovereign to do so must surely work an affront to its sovereign dignity, much in the way
members of Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks refrained from declaring
war on Osama bin Laden because it was considered "beneath our dignity" to declare war
on an individual person. See Alison Mitchell & Philip Shenon, After the Attacks:
Congress; Agreement on $40 [B]illion for Aid and a Response, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2001,
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Nor does it sabotage the conduct of the Republic's foreign relations
to allow foreign states access to federal court to press claims of treaty
violations by individual States. The original reason to permit such suitsfear of war and retaliation by more powerful European states absent the
opportunity for a judicial remedy-may have faded with the days of
American weakness, but in its stead, the complexity of transnational interactions in the modern world has increased both the level of direct interaction between foreign and American states and the potential that state
interests may differ from those of the nation at large. The result is that
the States continue to violate treaties, and such violations continue to be
at odds with the national interest. At the same time, the nature of our
federalism continues to make it difficult for the political branches to do
anything about it. In the words of the Solicitor General in Breard, when a
State defects from a U.S. treaty, the Executive's means to deal with the
problem "under our Constitution may in some cases include only
5 15
persuasion."
It makes sense under these circumstances to stick to the constitutional solution the Framers devised for this very problem. As they well
understood, it is wrong and shortsighted to think the States have no direct influence on the Republic's foreign relations and the federal courts,
and specifically the Supreme Court, have no role in them. Their ingenious solution to this counterproductive byproduct of federalism was to
address the deleterious effects of the former with the institutional expertise of the latter. In so doing, they created what may fairly be called the
first modern permanent international court-one that was formally "national." All that is required for the Court to remain true to its own federalism principles is to give present effect to the Framers' constitutional
ingenuity.
at A19 ("SenatorJohn W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, who was working closely on the
language of an authorization of force, said he would also argue strongly against a
declaration of war, saying 'it is beneath our dignity' to declare war against Mr. bin
Laden.").
515. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Republic of Paraguay v.
Gilmore and Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214).

